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“Be not the slave of your own past. Plunge into the sublime seas, dive deep
and swim far, so you shall come back with self-respect, with new power, with an
advanced experience that shall explain and overlook the old.”
Ralph Waldo Emerson
Abstract
My PhD thesis consists of three chapters in Empirical Industrial Organization. The first
two chapters focus on the relationship between firm performance and specific public policies.
In particular, we analyze the cases of cooperative research and development (R&D) in the
European Union and the regulation of public transports in France. The third chapter focuses
on copyright protection in the digital era and analyzes the relationship between legal and
illegal consumption of digital music.
The first chapter, entitled European Cooperative R&D and Firm Performance, focuses on the
impact of participation in research joint ventures as part of the European Union Framework
Programmes on firms’ economic performance. These programmes are the main financial
tools used by the European Union to support cooperative R&D activities in the EU. Unlike
previous empirical studies, this chapter suggests that their impact on firms’ competitiveness
is significant. We analyze industry-oriented research joint ventures supported by the Fifth
European Framework Programme between 1998 and 2002. A key feature of this Programme
is that funding is available to the firms based on social and economic concerns instead of pure
performance criteria, which guarantees that financial support is not granted conditional on
technological opportunities. This allows us to identify the causal effect of the programme on
firms’ performance using the funding available to the firms in their respective industries as
a source of exogenous variation in the decision to participate in the programme. Our results
suggest that participation in large research projects raises labor productivity by at least 35
percent and profit margin by up to 8 percentage points.
The objective of the second chapter, entitled Knowledge Spillovers in Cost-Reduction Incen-
tives, is to identify and measure the relevance of knowledge spillovers in the French urban
transportation industry, where most regulated transportation networks are operated by firms
that belong to the same company. We build and estimate a structural cost regulation model
under incomplete information where the service is regulated by an authority and is provided
by a single operator that may be owned by a larger company. We identify the knowledge
spillovers which arise for some operators being linked to a same group, and see how they
influence the firms’ decisions of exerting effort in order to reduce their operating costs. Our
model provides us with estimates of the operators’ inefficiencies, the effort of the managers
and the knowledge spillovers. Our results show that knowledge spillovers are indeed relevant
for the existing industrial groups present in the French urban transport industry. Simula-
tion exercises provide evidence of significant reductions in total operating cost following the
enlargement of industrial groups and mergers between existing groups.
In the third chapter, entitled Digital Music Consumption on the Internet: Evidence from
Clickstream Data, we analyze the behavior of digital music consumers on the Internet. Using
clickstream data on a panel of more than 16,000 European consumers, we estimate the effects
of illegal downloading and legal streaming on the legal purchases of digital music. Our results
suggest that Internet users do not view illegal downloading as a substitute to legal digital
music. Although positive and significant, our estimated elasticities are essentially zero: a 10%
increase in clicks on illegal downloading websites leads to a 0.2% increase in clicks on legal
purchases websites. Online music streaming services are found to have a somewhat larger (but
still small) effect on the purchases of digital sound recordings, suggesting complementarities
between these two modes of music consumption. According to our results, a 10% increase
in clicks on legal streaming websites lead to up to a 0.7% increase in clicks on legal digital
purchases websites. We also find important cross country difference in these effects.
Resumen
Mi tesis doctoral consta de tres cap´ıtulos en Organizacio´n Industrial Emp´ırica. Los dos
primeros cap´ıtulos se centran en la relacio´n entre el rendimiento de la empresa y determinadas
pol´ıticas pubicas. En particular, se analizan los casos de cooperacio´n en Investigacio´n y
Desarrollo (I+D) en la Unio´n Europea y la regulacio´n de transporte pu´blico en Francia. El
tercer cap´ıtulo se centra en el derecho de autor (copyright) en la era digital y analiza la
relacio´n entre consumo legal e ilegal de mu´sica digital.
El primer cap´ıtulo, titulado European Cooperative R&D and Firm Performance, se centra
en el impacto de los Programas Marco de la Unio´n Europea (European Union Framework
Programmes) sobre los resultados econo´micos de las empresas participantes. Estos Progra-
mas tienen como objetivo fomentar la cooperacio´n en I+D, subvencionando a empresas para
que participen en proyectos de cooperacio´n en I+D (Research Joint Ventures). A diferencia
de estudios emp´ıricos previos, este cap´ıtulo sugiere que su impacto sobre la competitividad
de las empresas participantes es significante. Se analizan proyectos de cooperacio´n en I+D
orientados hacia la industria y financiados por el Quinto Progrma Marco de la Unio´n Eu-
ropea entre 1998 y 2002. Una caracter´ıstica clave de este programa es que los fondos de
financiacio´n disponibles para las empresas se basan en criterios sociales y econo´micos en lu-
gar de criterios de rendimiento puro, lo que garantiza que la ayuda financiera no se otorga en
funcio´n de oportunidades tecnolo´gicas. Esto nos permite identificar el efecto causal del pro-
grama sobre los resultados de las empresas usando los fondos disponibles para las empresas
en sus respectivas industrias como fuente de variacio´n exo´gena en la decisio´n de participar
en el programa. Nuestros resultados sugieren que la participacio´n en grandes proyectos de
investigacio´n aumenta la productividad del trabajo en al menos un 35 por ciento y el margen
de beneficio en hasta 8 puntos porcentuales.
El objetivo del segundo cap´ıtulo, titulado Knowledge Spillovers in Cost-Reduction Incentives,
es identificar y medir la relevancia de externalidades de conocimiento (knowledge spillovers)
en la industria de transporte urbano france´s, donde la mayor´ıa de las redes de transporte
reguladas son operadas por empresas que pertenecen a un mismo grupo empresarial. Se
construye y se estima un modelo estructural de regulacio´n bajo informacio´n incompleta,
donde el servicio es regulado por una autoridad y es proporcionado por un u´nico operador
que puede pertenecer a una empresa mayor. Se identifican las externalidades de conocimiento
que surgen del hecho que algunos operadores esta´n vinculados a un mismo grupo empresarial,
y se analiza co´mo influyen al esfuerzo de las empresas para reducir sus costes operativo. El
modelo nos proporciona estimaciones de las ineficiencias de los operadores, del esfuerzo de
los directivos y de las externalidades de conocimiento. Los resultados muestran que las
externalidades de conocimiento son relevantes para los grupos industriales presentes en el
sector del transporte urbano france´s. Ejercicios de simulacio´n proporcionan evidencia de una
reduccio´n significativa en el coste operativo total tras ampliar los grupos industriales y tras
fusiones entre los grupos existentes.
En el tercer cap´ıtulo, titulado Digital Music Consumption on the Internet: Evidence from
Clickstream Data, se analiza el comportamiento de los consumidores de mu´sica digital en
Internet. Se hace uso de datos de visitas (clickstream) que permite seguir el comportamiento
de ma´s de 16.000 consumidores europeos en Internet y se estiman los efectos de las descargas
ilegales y del streaming legal sobre las compras legales de mu´sica digital. Nuestros resul-
tados sugieren que los usuarios de Internet no ven las descargas ilegales como un sustituto
a la mu´sica digital legal. Aunque positivas y significativas, las elasticidades estimadas son
esencialmente cero: un aumento del 10 % de los clics en los sitios web de descargas ilegales
lleva a un incremento del 0,2% de los clics en sitios web de compra legal. Servicios de stream-
ing de mu´sica en l´ınea tienen un efecto algo mayor en las compras de mu´sica digital, lo que
sugiere una complementariedad entre estos dos modos de consumo de mu´sica . De acuerdo
con nuestros resultados, un aumento del 10 % de los clics en los sitios web de streaming
legales conduce a un aumento de hasta el 0,7 % de los clics en sitios web de compra legal.
Tambie´n encontramos importantes diferencias entre pa´ıses en estos efectos.
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Chapter 1
European Cooperative R&D and
Firm Performance:
Evidence Based on Funding
Differences in Key Actions
1.1 Introduction
Research and development (R&D) investments are flawed by two important characteristics
that make their equilibrium levels less than socially desirable in a freely competitive market.
First, the knowledge generated by a firm’s R&D effort is non-rival: To the extend that this
knowledge cannot be kept secret, its use by a firm does not preclude its use by another.
Second, R&D is characterized by spillovers: A firm investing in R&D usually imposes a
positive externality on the other firms which can appropriate the results of this investment.1
This will lead firms to under invest and therefore to an under-provision of R&D investment
in the economy.
Along with the establishment of an intellectual property system, two types of public policies
are generally used to reduce this market failure. First, direct subsidies can be offered to
firms. By modifying the marginal return of R&D investments, they encourage firms to invest
more than they would in a free market equilibrium.2 A second policy consists in encouraging
firms to collaborate in R&D activities in order to partially internalize the externality they
impose on other firms. In this paper we focus on this last type of policy. More specifically, we
focus on the core instrument used by the European Union to support European cooperative
1See De Bondt (1997) for a review.
2The government can also intervene and encourage R&D investments through tax incentives.
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R&D activities, the European Union Framework Programmes (EU-FPs in the remainder of
the paper).
The main objective of European policies toward research joint ventures in the beginning
of the 1980’s was to fight the relative decline in the international competitiveness of high
technology sectors.3 Started in 1984, the first Framework Programme came in response to a
situation where individual R&D activities were uncoordinated and required a large number
of Council decisions (Georghiou, 2001).4 The EU-FPs are the main financial tools used by
the EU Commission to support cooperative R&D activities, and the EU participation in
the coordination and financing of RJVs has been increasing until today.5 Due to the large
amount of public funds raised by the different EU-FPs, it is crucial to have a clearer idea
about their effect and the outcomes they generate. To help in accomplishing this task, the
present paper analyzes the effect of participation in the Fifth Framework Programme (EU-
FP5 in the remainder of the paper), which was allocated a total budget of 14.96 billion
euros over the 1998-2002 period; this amounts to almost 2% of the total intramural R&D
expenditures generated by the EU 27 countries over the same period (Source: Eurostat).
More specifically, we focus on its effects on two firm level performance measures, labor
productivity and profitability.
The predecessors of the EU-FP5 mostly aimed at stimulating the transnational collabora-
tion in research, particularly between industry and universities (European Commission, 2000,
2001). The important role of these types of partners in shaping projects’ objectives indi-
cates that these were primarily oriented towards explorative research rather than market
exploitation of research results.6 In other words, most of the research carried before the
EU-FP5 did not intend to develop specific products and processes on its own, which makes it
“pre-competitive”. Pre-competitive research concerns R&D for which commercial possibili-
ties remain five to ten years in the future (Luukkonen, 1998). This characteristic has largely
explained the poor direct effects on the economic results of participants found in previous
studies (Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2002; Barajas et al., 2011).
3Other factors specific to the European Community (EC) also influenced the need for these policies.
For instance, there were large differences between the many country members in terms of industrial and
technological capabilities. Some members also had an already well established policy infrastructure for Science
and Technology while others totally lacked such infrastructures. Finally, there was no appropriate legal
framework and institutions at the EC level for supporting a consistent technology policy. In 1981, these
considerations led the European Commission to establish the pilot ESPRIT program with the endorsement
of the twelve largest European producers of electronics (Hagedoorn et al., 2000).
4Also at that time arose the formal expression of the policy rationale for the Community action in the field
of research and technological cooperation. This is embedded in the principle of subsidiarity, which states that
support should come where the scale or cost of cooperation was beyond that affordable by a single country,
where complementarity in national work could achieve results for the whole Community, and where research
contributes to development of the common market, laws and standards, or to the unification of European
science and technology (Georghiou, 2001).
5The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th EU-FPs were allocated 3.75, 5.4, 6.6, 13.2, and 14.96 billion euros,
respectively (Artis and Nixson, 2001).
6Exploration is understood as “the pursuit of knowledge, of things that might come to be known,” and
exploitation as “the use and development of things already known” (Levinthal and March, 1993).
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Instead, the EU-FP5 includes an important thematic programme, namely the User-friendly
Information Society (IST in the remainder of the paper) programme, which includes projects
that remain mainly industry-driven (Fisher et al., 2009). As opposed to participants coming
from research and academic communities, industry partners are more likely in this case to be
driven by motives to commercially exploit rather than explore a given technology. Projects
involving mainly industry partners, even if not targeted to the development of a particular
marketable product or service, are consequently associated with objectives that are closer to
the market. The mechanism through which performance could be enhanced by participating
in the programme is not explicitly modeled here, but we have in mind that cooperative R&D
agreements are part of an innovation activity that provides access to external know-how and
hence leads to gains in performance. This know-how is expected to have a more direct impact
on performance when collaboration is more market-oriented.7 We argue that focusing more
specifically on the IST programme allows us to identify a significant effect of participation
in the EU-FP5 on firms’ performance.
The main econometric challenge of our study arises from the fact that participation in the
EU-FP5 is not random. Participation is the result of a selection process involving decisions
from both participants and the European Commission. Participants must first decide to
joint an RJV and elaborate a proposal. The Commission then decides whether to fund
(part of) the project. Hence, showing that participating firms perform better than non-
participating ones is not sufficient to prove a positive impact of programme participation.
This self-selection problem is crucial and recurrent when estimating the impact of government
sponsored R&D. Not taking it into account would severely bias the results (Klette et al.,
2000). To get rid of this self-selection effect, we use a two step estimation method where we
first estimate a selection equation. For this purpose we need at least one exogenous variable
that provides randomness in the participation decision but that is otherwise unrelated to
firms’ performance.
We use the funding available to the firms in their respective industries as a source of exogenous
variation in the decision to participate in the programme. We expect this variable to be an
important determinant of the participation status of each firm, since the higher the funding
available the higher the willingness to participate and/or the higher the likelihood that the
project is accepted and funded. A relevant concern is that the European Commission might
allocate its support partly in line with technological opportunities, which could in turn differ
across industries and affect firms’ performance. We take advantage of a key feature of the
EU-FP5 which is that funding is available to the firms through key actions based on social
and economic concerns instead of pure performance criteria. According to the European
Commission, “the idea of the key actions is precisely to bring together the contributions of
7In general, the empirical literature corroborates that a more market-oriented collaboration is more likely
to bring along positive economic effects (Belderbos et al., 2004; Cincera et al., 2003).
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specialists from very differing scientific fields, together with industrial researchers, users, and
political and economic decision-makers.”8 This would lead to the development of projects
that allow, for instance, people to choose, order, and pay electronically in complete safety,
or to design a system “to provide users with a full range of transport-related information
such as parking availability, traffic jams, recommended routes, public transport, and so on.”9
Since funding is not motivated by performance, it can be used as a tool to solve the selection
issue. This specific variable has to our knowledge never been used in the analysis of these
programmes nor in the context of RJV studies. It has however been used to identify the
effects of specific contracts on firms’ R&D investments (Lichtenberg, 1988) and in the context
of R&D subsidies (Wallsten, 2000; Gelabert et al., 2009). In a recent paper, Einio¨ (2012)
follows a similar approach and uses geographic differences in R&D support allocation as
an instrumental variable to assess the effects of government R&D subsidies on company
performance.
We evaluate the effect of participation in the programme on performance across two impor-
tant dimensions. First, R&D collaboration remains an activity with long-term objectives,
and this is a crucial feature that needs to be taken into account. In our analysis, we make
sure to identify the long-term effect of participation in the programme on the economic per-
formance of firms. In particular, our database allows us to consider lags of up to 4 years
after the start of each project. Second, we account for the heterogeneity in the projects’
size to better understand how participation may affect firms’ performance. If RJV size and
diversity increase knowledge complementarity and therefore spillover effects among partici-
pants, it would also lead to a larger increase in R&D efforts (Sakakibara, 2001). Moreover,
if higher R&D expenditures increase a firm’s absorptive capacity and learning capability,
participation in an RJV should as well increase a firm’s R&D effort (Cohen and Levinthal,
1989). Thus, participation in large RJVs will lead to larger impacts in terms of productivity
and profit gains since they induce participants to put more effort in them.
Our results suggest that the long-term effect of participation is an increase in labor produc-
tivity by, at least, 35 percent. We also find a positive long-term effect of participation on
the profit margin, with increases of up to 8 percentage points. The large magnitude of our
estimates will be put into perspective. In particular, our results will be interpreted as the
average impact of the programme for those firms induced to participate as a result of the
change in the funding available to them (the “marginal” participants).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 summarizes the relevant
literature on the subject. It presents the results of the main empirical studies on the effects
of participation in the EU-FPs and relates them to the programmes’ characteristics. Section
8See http://ec.europa.eu/research/rtdinf21/en/key/why.html.
9See http://ec.europa.eu/research/rtdinf21/en/key/07.html.
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1.3 presents the EU-FP5 in more detail as well as the IST programme. The empirical
strategy for identifying the causal effect of participation in the IST programme on economic
performance is presented in section 1.5, while section 1.4 presents the data and the different
variables used in the estimation. Section 1.6 is devoted to the presentation and discussion of
our results. Finally, section 1.7 draws some policy implications and concludes.
1.2 Related literature
Our paper shares features with two important categories of empirical studies on R&D col-
laboration. It is first related to the empirical analysis of the determinants of RJV formation
and participation. As an important part of this rather thin literature, Herna´n et al. (2003)
analyze the determinants of participation in European RJVs and find that sectorial R&D
intensity, industry concentration, firm size, technological spillovers, and past RJV participa-
tion positively influence the probability of forming RJVs. Mar´ın and Siotis (2008) extend this
analysis by exploiting the differences in institutional design of two European collaboration
programmes (EUREKA and the EU-FPs) and find that past experience in the EU-FPs is an
important factor explaining participation. For the case of US RJVs, Ro¨ller et al. (2007) take
asymmetries in firms’ size into account and show that these are important determinants of
participation. They find that larger firms are less willing to share their economic knowledge
with smaller rivals.
Second, our work relates to empirical studies analyzing the effect of cooperation on firm’s
economic performance, such as productivity or profits.10 Even though this literature has
resulted in quite mixed results, it has supported the existence of a positive relationship
between close-to-the-market R&D cooperation and economic performance.
An early work analyzing the effect of RJV participation on firm economic performance is the
one by Siebert (1996). Analyzing 314 US joint ventures, he shows that cooperation has no
direct impact on profit margin, but he finds that the effect of R&D intensity on the profit
margin is larger for cooperating than for non-cooperating firms. In a very influential paper
analyzing the effects of collaboration in Europe, Belderbos et al. (2004) study the impact
of cooperation on Dutch firms’ productivity. They differentiate between the type of R&D
partner (competitors, suppliers, customers, and universities and research institutes) and
find that supplier and competitor cooperation has a significant impact on labor productivity
growth. They do not, however, find any significant impact of cooperation with universities or
research institutes on labor productivity, highlighting the importance of market orientation
10Another part of the literature has analyzed the effects of R&D cooperation on innovative performance,
like sales of innovative products or patenting activity (Branstetter and Sakakibara, 1998, 2002; Dekker and
Kleinknecht, 2008; Czarnitzki et al., 2007).
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for the effects of collaboration on economic performance. Cincera et al. (2003) take the view
that cooperation in R&D gives access to external know-how and use it to explain performance
at the firm level. Using data on R&D and productivity for Belgian firms, they find that
on top of own R&D expenditures, international R&D cooperation significantly increases a
firm’s productivity growth. Just as in Belderbos et al. (2004), they put forward the fact
that firms may benefit differently from different types of cooperation and find that the main
benefits come from international cooperation with customers, suppliers or other companies,
which reflects more applied international cooperative activities. Their results therefore give
further evidence on the positive relationship between the degree of market orientation of the
cooperation and its impact on economic performance.
The empirical literature concerning the effects of collaboration taking place in the EU-FPs
has shown rather disappointing results, mainly explained by the pre-competitiveness nature
of the projects. Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002) carry an analysis to evaluate the impact
of European collaboration programs on participating firms’ productivity. They study the
impact of two different programs, EUREKA and the (3rd and 4th) EU-FPs in the 1992-
1996 period. They find that firms participating in EUREKA have experienced a significant
improvement in their performance measures, while firms participating in RJVs under the EU-
FP scheme do not show any significant change in performance. They attribute this result
to the fundamental differences between the two programmes. The EUREKA programme
has a decentralized funding source where research projects are proposed and defined by the
participants themselves. It therefore shows a bottom-up structure which has much more
market-oriented projects, as opposed to the top-down structure of the EU-FPs and their
pre-competitive projects. In a recent study, Barajas et al. (2011) analyze the impact of
participation in the EU-FP on the productivity of Spanish manufacturing firms between
1995 and 2005.11 They show that participation has a positive impact on firms’ technological
capabilities, which in turn have an effect on firms’ labor productivity. In other words, they
do not find a direct effect of participation on economic performance, but they find an indirect
effect through the generation of new knowledge.
The characteristics of the EU-FPs (pre-competitiveness, participation of universities and re-
search institutes) have lead their impact to be mainly set on firms’ technological development
and capacity. Luukkonen (1998) shows that their main impact has indeed been intangible
effects, such as learning new skills or creating new network relations.12 Other studies have
also found these impacts to differ with firms’ characteristics, and in particular with respect
to size. Fisher et al. (2009) analyze the relationship between participation in the EU-FP5
and EU-FP6 and the innovative activity of firms using data from the Community Innova-
tion Survey and a large database composed from other sources. They find that, as opposed
11Their analysis therefore covers parts of EU-FP4, all of EU-FP5 and part of EU-FP6.
12Skills refer to the technical and scientific skills rather than to the social skills needed in collaboration.
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to large companies, small and medium enterprises demonstrate more economically-driven
objectives (innovation, commercialization and market-related) and generally join a project
looking for complementary resources to achieve a specific objective that will typically be a
new or improved product/service or process. This translates into more positive results in
terms of innovation. They also notice that, due to their limited size and resource level, SMEs
will engage in a small number of cooperative agreements each of which will be important for
their immediate survival and growth. For these type of firms, the funding provided by the
commission is therefore crucial. Finally, a relevant finding of their study is the positive effect
on both product and process innovation for first-time participants in the EU-FPs.
The next section is now devoted to a more detailed presentation of the EU-FP5 on which we
will concentrate our empirical analysis.
1.3 The EU-FP5, the IST Programme, and Key Actions
Since 1984, research and innovation activities from the EU are bundled into the EU-FPs.
These have been the main financial tools with which the EU supports R&D activities covering
almost all scientific disciplines. Six EU-FPs have already been completed and the seventh has
started in 2007.13 The aim of these EU-FPs is to support and encourage European research,
but the detailed objectives of each programme vary from one funding period to another. All
of the RJVs that are formed under this programme are eligible for an EU subsidy, which
varies according to the nature of the project.
The EU-FP5 comprises several thematic programmes, which are themselves decomposed into
a total of 23 Key Actions. The thematic programmes are “Quality of Life and Management of
Living Resources”, “User-friendly Information Society (IST)”, “Competitive and Sustainable
Growth”, “Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development”, and “Nuclear Energy”. In
this paper we focus on the IST programme. Two main reasons motivated our choice. First,
with a budget of 3.6 billion euros, the IST programme represents the lion’s share of the
EU-FP5 in terms of budget allocation. The second reason is tightly linked to the objectives
set by the commission in the design of the EU-FPs’ projects. The pre-competitiveness of a
project, as argued above, is recurrently mentioned in the empirical literature as being the
reason for the poor economic effects observed on the firms participating in the EU-FPs. Our
view is that the cooperation taking place in the projects of the IST programme have an
impact on economic performance through the sharing of knowledge and the learning of new
skills. Given their more industry-oriented nature, these projects are more likely to be driven
by motives to commercially exploit rather than explore a given technology. We therefore
13The seven EU-FPs cover the periods 1984-1987, 1987-1991, 1990-1994, 1994-1998, 1998-2002, 2002-2006,
and 2007-2013.
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believe the relationship between access to knowledge and firm performance to be of a more
direct nature in the IST programme.
The IST programme contains four Key Actions: Key Action 1 is called Systems and services
for the citizen; it aims at improving information and communications technologies in a wide
variety of domains such as health, education, culture, social services, the needs of elderly
and handicapped people, the environment, transportation and leisure. An example is the
project directed by Nokia which leads to the development of a portable terminal combining
mobile telephony and PDA (Personal Digital Assistant) technology. According to the Euro-
pean Commission’s webpage, “The system is designed to provide users with a full range of
transport-related information such as parking availability, traffic jams, recommended routes,
public transport, and so on. Six towns in Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Nether-
lands, France and Germany have hosted tests for this innovation, in conjunction with several
major European telecommunications firms, car manufacturers and GIS (geographical infor-
mation system) providers.”14 Key Action 2 is denoted New methods of work and electronic
commerce; its objective is to develop telework and electronic commerce and investigate an
in-depth reorganisation of social relations and labour legislation, both for business and for in-
dividuals. An example is the SEMPER Project (Secure Electronic Marketplace for Europe).
As described on the European Commission’s webpage, it “has developed one of the first
operational architectures tailored for commerce on the Internet. Using the web, consumers
can access a database of catalogues of goods and services, and fill in order forms on their
computer screens. Payment is by credit card, using the SET protocol (Secure Electronic
Transaction), or by an e-cash smart card.”15 Key Action 3 is related to Multimedia content
and tools. The European Commission highlights the importance of multimedia technologies
as they are “opening new ways of mastering information, acquiring knowledge, and trans-
ferring know-how available to a broad public.” As an example, their website presents the
project “SAVIE (Support Action for Videoconferences In Education) which has produced
several training modules which have permitted teachers to prepare and produce lessons that
are adapted to the new teaching tools.”16 Finally, Key Action 4 is called Essential tech-
nologies and infrastructures; it focuses on essential components involving micro-electronics
and software engineering, which deal with processing, storing and transmitting information
in many types of products and services. A project example, also taken from the European
Comission’s webpage, is the one of “ASML, which has become a lead player in the domain
of photolithography - a strategic technology for printing the integrated circuits found in
micro-processors. ASML is developing a technology of scan photolithography, which is rev-
olutionising productivity and the cost of printing integrated circuits one tenth of a micron
14See http://ec.europa.eu/research/rtdinf21/en/key/07.html.
15See http://ec.europa.eu/research/rtdinf21/en/key/08.html.
16See http://ec.europa.eu/research/rtdinf21/en/key/09.html.
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insize.”17
The design of Key Actions is an important novelty of the EU-FP5 in the history of the EU-
FPs. They aim at identifying socio-economic stakes and concentrating research funds in order
to develop research activities that are organized around key issues. Thus, promoting research
focused on performance for its own sake is not relevant here. This is a very important property
since it suggests that the funds invested in the EU-FP5 by the European Commission are
not targeting specific industries based on their performance. At the time of identifying the
causal effect of participation in the IST programme on firms’ performance, the funds made
available by the programme in each industry is an excellent source of exogenous variation.
Note, however, that we still expect participation in the IST programme to help firms to
potentially improve their performance as we picture cooperative R&D agreements as part of
an innovation activity that provides access to external know-how and hence leads to gains
in performance. This know-how is expected to have a more direct impact on performance
when collaboration is more market-oriented.
The European Commission does not itself undertake or participate in the EU-FP projects. Its
role is to offer financial or other support to private and public research bodies, and companies
and institutions wishing to embark on a research project. Each year throughout the period of
the EU-FP5, the commission publishes so-called workprogrammes that contain different calls
for proposals that describe the objectives planned (Zobel, 1999). The proposal of a project
must then be submitted in response to these specific calls. This means that unsolicited project
proposals are not allowed and the project’s content must correspond to the objectives set
out by the commission. Also, several eligibility criteria must be satisfied by the different
partners involved in the project. One of them is that the project must involve at least two
legal entities (e.g. individuals, industrial and commercial firms including SMEs, universities,
research bodies, technology dissemination bodies) independent of each other and established
in two different Member States or in a Member State and an associated country.18 The
financial contribution from the Commission consists in the reimbursement of a set percentage
of the participants’ eligible expenses, although sometimes flat-rate contributions are made.
In order to be reimbursed by the Commission, participants must identify and report their
eligible expenses by submitting interim and final statements. In particular, the expenses must
be necessary for the action in question, provided for in the contract, actually incurred and
recorded in the accounts. Finally, it is important to note that participants cannot establish
intellectual property rights over their discoveries: all research must be shared among partners.
17See http://ec.europa.eu/research/rtdinf21/en/key/10.html.
18This means that entities established outside the EU and international organizations can also participate.
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1.4 Data
Conducting a study on the impact of participation in the IST programme requires a database
that contains both information on the different projects included in the programme and
on the economic performance of firms for a period long enough to capture the long term
effects of collaboration. The empirical analysis will therefore be carried out using a database
constructed from two different sources. The data from the IST projects is taken from the
Community Research and Development Information Service (CORDIS) web page, where a
total number of 2522 projects is available.19 The second source of information is the one
about the participating firms. Once the information about each project is recovered, we can
look at each participating firm individually in order to obtain firm-level data. This latter
task will be done using Amadeus (Analyse MAjor Databases from EUropean Sources),
a database produced by BUREAU Van DIJK, a specialist provider of firm-level data. Firms
participating in the projects recovered from the CORDIS web page are therefore linked to the
Amadeus database in order to retrieve their relevant information. The Amadeus database
contains balance sheet information on the top 250,000 firms in Europe, while the CORDIS
database provides information on each project, i.e. its description, its reference, the starting
and ending dates of the project, its status and its acronym, the contract type offered to
the participants, the cost of the project as well as the funding provided by the European
Commission. The name of the coordinator of the project and of the participating firms are
given as well.
We were able to retrieve 961 firms that participated in at least one FP5 RJV from Amadeus.
Table 1.1 gives the different number of RJVs the firms participate in and shows how some
firms were often involved in more than one project. In our analysis, we decided to focus
on the firms that participate in one project only. This corresponds to a total of 620 firms
participating in 466 projects. After cleaning the dataset, we end up with a total of 379
participants that correspond to 315 projects.20
Table 1.2 presents some average values for the projects included in the database. The column
All Projects represents all the projects we could recover from the CORDIS webpage for the
EU-FP5 (2359 projects)21, while the column Single Part contains the projects in which
only single participants (in our data set, that is) are involved (466 projects). The last
column Sample contains information on the projects that correspond to the participating
firms present in our final sample (315 projects). The projects that we are able to analyze
19All the projects’ fact sheets are available at http://cordis.europa.eu/ist/projects/projects.htm.
20We realize that the final number of participating firms in our sample is rather low. To correct for the fact
that Amadeus contains larger and potentially more productive firms, we construct different control groups
to deal with this potential bias. They are presented in greater detail below.
21Due to some technical restrictions related to our data collection procedure, we were not able to recover
the information on all of the 2522 projects available on the CORDIS webpage.
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seem to be larger in terms of number of participants and cost. Unless otherwise stated, the
next tables will present statistics of the projects included in our final sample.
Table 1.3 reports the characteristics of the projects in our database according to their starting
dates. The vast majority of the projects were initiated between 2000 and 2002, and only
a few in 2003. Table 1.4 provides summary statistics on the number of participants by
project, showing that projects are more or less evenly distributed, with a higher proportion
incorporating 6 to 10 participants. The duration is on average lower when projects have few
participants (0 to 3) and the cost of each RJV is increasing with the number of participating
firms. Regarding the projects’ costs, table 1.5 reveals that the majority of RJVs have costs
between 0 and 6 millions euros, with a peak for the ones with costs between 1 and 3 millions.
We can also observe that both the number of participants and their diversity in terms of
industry increase with the cost of the project. When carrying our analysis on the effects of
participation taking project’s size into account, we will define a large RJV as being one with
a total budget of more than 2.8 million euros, which is the median value of the distribution of
the projects’ cost in our sample. Table 1.6 presents projects’ characteristics when classified
according to our definition of size. Again, note that large projects not only involve more
participants, but that they involve more participants coming from different industries (defined
at the 4-digit level). Large projects are therefore more diverse than small ones in terms of
participants’ industry of origin.
An important problem one has to deal with when evaluating the impact of government-
sponsored R&D is the one of selection bias since it is hard to think of RJV participation
as being randomly assigned or decided. This inevitably creates a potentially important bias
in the estimated impact parameters. Table 1.7 provides us with a glimpse of this potential
problem by reporting summary statistics on some variables for both the participants and
non-participating firms in Amadeus for 1999. Participants have significantly larger figures
for most of the variables considered, confirming the fact that the programme selects larger
firms for participation. Further evidence of this fact is given in the left panel of figure 1.1,
which shows the distributions of the log transformation of sales for both participants and
firms contained in Amadeus. The participants’ distribution is similar to the one of the
outsiders, only shifted to the right.
To perform our empirical test, we use three different samples. The first one is composed of
the participating firms and of non-participating firms randomly picked from Amadeus. After
cleaning the data, we are left with 2134 observations for participants and 6638 for the selected
non-participants over the years 1997 to 2006. This sample is referred to as the Random
sample throughout the text. An alternative control group is constructed by selecting non-
participating firms from Amadeus so as to replicate the cross-tabulation of participants
by country and industry. After cleaning the data, we are left with 2134 observations for
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participants and 3531 for the selected non-participants over the years 1997 to 2006. In our
estimations, we call this sample IC-Rep (for Industry Country Replication). Last, we use a
third control group constructed so as to replicate the distribution of the sales variables of the
participants for 1999 (i.e. before the start of any project). The final kernel density estimates
of the control group for 1999 are presented in figure 1.1. After cleaning the data, we are left
with 2134 observations for participants and 3726 for the selected non-participants over the
years 1997 to 2006. We call this sample Sales-Rep in our estimations.
A potential concern is that firms belonging to our control group may be involved in other
RJVs. Another important programme under which pan-European RJVs have been formed in
the last two decades is the EUREKA programme, another initiative aimed at enhancing cross-
border technological cooperation. In order to further support the validity of our samples, we
would therefore like to verify that the non-participating firms present in our control groups
are not participating in other R&D collaboration programmes such as EUREKA. We were
able to do so for some of the firms in our database, as we were given access to information
on the French firms that participated in the EUREKA programme during the years 1998
to 2005. We were therefore able to check whether French non-participants from our control
groups had participated in the EUREKA programme during this same period.22 Although
our control groups are not only composed of French firms, the latter still represent a non-
negligible share of the non-participants with 16.4 percent, 19.3 percent and 23.6 percent in
our three different samples. The results showed that only 5 firms did participate in EUREKA
during he same period for one of the samples, while for the other two control groups, only 1
and 4 firms participated. This means that more than 95 percent of the French firms in our
samples have not participated in the EUREKA programme.
Finally, the repetitive nature of the Framework Programmes rises a concern as well. Indeed,
if firms currently participating in the EU-FP5 have been involved in previous Framework
Programmes, identifying the sole effects of a participation in the EU-FP5 on firms’ perfor-
mance becomes tricky. This concern is specially relevant since the previous literature has
found that many participants tend to repeat their participation in consecutive editions of
the programme (Herna´n et al., 2003; Barajas et al., 2011). We do not have any information
on the EU-FP4; however, we have data on the EU-FP6 which allows us to check whether
participants in the IST programme of the EU-FP5 are also involved in the IST programme
of the EU-FP6. The result of this exercise revealed that out of the 379 participants present
in our final sample, less than 14 percent (51 firms) took part in the IST programme of the
EU-FP6. It suggests that our sample includes a small share of firms that are prone to repeat
the experience. As for the non-participating firms, only a very small fraction (less than 0.01
percent for each of the three different samples) turned out to be participating in the EU-FP6,
giving further support to the validity of our control groups.
22We are grateful to Aminata Sissoko for allowing us to do so.
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1.5 Empirical strategy
We provide an empirical test of the effect of participation in the IST programme on the firms’
economic performance. Let Pit = 1 be the event of firm i participating in a project at time
t and let yit be the measure of firm i’s performance. Denote by y
0
it and y
1
it the performance
of firm i at time t when it does not and when it does participate in EU-FP5 respectively.
Hence we write
yit =
{
y1it if Pit = 1
y0it if Pit = 0.
Equivalently, yit can be expressed as
yit = y
0
it + (y
1
it − y0it)Pit. (1.1)
We want to identify the effect of participation at time t on the firm’s performance yit.
This effect can be expressed as ∆it ≡ y1it − y0it. It measures the difference between the
observed performance of participant i and the performance it would have reached had it
not participated in the project. Since the counterfactual outcome y0it can never be observed
for a participating firm, ∆it cannot be computed directly and needs to be estimated. If we
consider a constant treatment effect, i.e. ∆it = y
1
it − y0it = δ, we can rewrite (1.1) as
yit = α+ δ · Pit + εit, (1.2)
where α is a constant and εit is an error term. A direct approach to circumvent the miss-
ing counterfactual problem is to replace the missing counterfactual outcome by the mean
performance of the non-participating firms. This would be a simple treatment-control com-
parison (TCC) estimator as it mimics the analysis in an experimental setting. The estimator
of δ, δ̂TCC , would then be the mean difference in performance between participants and
non-participants.
A simple treatment-control comparison in the form of equation (1.2) is most likely to yield
inconsistent estimates. As mentioned above, δ̂TCC will suffer from a selection bias since it is
hard to think of participation in the programme as being random. Selection bias comes from
the existence of firms’ characteristics (be they observable or not) that are correlated with
participation in the programme. To the extend that the programme attracts bigger and more
productive firms, we have to deal with a positive selection bias. We therefore also control
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for observable characteristics x that affect both the decision to participate (treatment) and
the productivity of the firm (outcome). Doing so leads to the following specification:
yit = x
′
itβ + δ · PARTit + εit. (1.3)
Estimation of δ from equation (1.3) allows to control at least for selection on observable
characteristics (all included in the vector x) such as firm size, capital intensity, absorptive
capacity, industry concentration as well as country, industry and time fixed effects.
To the extend that firms self-select in the programme based on some observable characteris-
tics, the above estimation strategy allows us to solve for the selection problem. It is, however,
most likely that firms decide on participation based on unobservable characteristics included
in εit as well, in which case the endogeneity problem will remain and estimators will still be
inconsistent. We can, for example, think of firms as having heterogeneous “managerial” or
“innovative” ability that may influence their decision to participate in an RJV. Participation
decisions (from the firms or from the programmes’ organization) may also be based on past
outcomes of yit. Klette et al. (2000) give an example from the study of Klette and Moen
(1999) in which the Norwegian government was supporting large firms facing severe problems
when the IT industry was restructured towards the end of the 1980’s. In this case, we would
have that COV(εis,PARTit) 6= 0 for s < t, leading to inconsistent estimation results of the
impact of participation.
When identification is jeopardized because the participation (or treatment) variable is en-
dogenous, a standard solution is to look for a variable that generates some exogenous varia-
tion in the participation decision of firms, which would allow to mimic a randomly assigned
treatment. Finding such a variable is not easy, as it amounts to finding a variable that
simultaneously determines the participation decision of the firms and does not appear as a
determinant of the outcome variable yit.
Two-steps estimation
The empirical strategy then consists in two steps. In the first one, we specify an equation
explaining the participation decision. In particular, we assume that the probability that firm
i will engage in an RJV of the IST programme is given by
Pr(PARTit = 1 | z) = F(z′itγ). (1.4)
The variables in the vector x in (1.3) are a subset of the variables in z. That is, at least one
element of z (call it z1) is unique and is a non-trivial determinant of PARTit. Hence z1 is
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a variable correlated with the endogenous dummy variable PARTit but that has no direct
effect on the outcome yit (it only has an effect through PARTit). We will specify F (·) to be
the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution.
The methodology consists in estimating (1.4) using pre-determined observations to explain
programme participation. Notice that this amounts to using pre-programme firm character-
istics as instruments for the endogenous variable PARTit. Given that the IST programme
starts in the year 2000, we want to prevent firms’ characteristics from being affected by the
programme. In essence, the first step of our estimation strategy therefore tries to define the
profile of a typical participating firm right before the start of the IST programme. For this
purpose, we use observations for years 1997 to 1999 to estimate equation (1.4) and obtain
an estimate of γˆ. Notice that in order to do so we use as a dependent variable a dummy
indicating whether the firm will be a participant in the programme. We then construct the
predicted probabilities of participation using the subsequent years of data and our estimate
γˆ to obtain ̂PARTit = F (Zitγ̂). Notice that although we use past firms’ characteristics as
instruments, the current firms’ characteristics variables are used to construct the predicted
probabilities of participation. The second step of our strategy consists in using these pre-
dicted values to identify the impact of participation estimating equation (1.3) using years
2000 to 2006.
The variables
Our econometric specification requires the construction of a set of variables that measure or
proxy the determinants of participation in the IST programme as well as the determinants
of our outcome variables (labor productivity and profit margin). The performance measures
that will be considered are labor productivity, measured as added value per employee, and
profit margin, measured as the profit (before taxation) over the operating revenue.
The most important explanatory variable is the one that we use as a source of exogenous
variation to explain participation. Our approach is based on the idea that differences in
available funding across industries induce variation in the likelihood of participating in the
programme. Indeed, the participation in a project is the result of two decisions. The initial
decision comes from the firms, which must choose whether to apply or not for funding. Con-
ditional on the result of this first decision, the European Commission then decides whether to
fund the project or not.23 The budget dedicated to the funding of RJVs is therefore likely to
be correlated with the participation decision of firms for at least two (non-exclusive) reasons.
First, firms will be more willing to participate if they know that more funds are available.
Second, a project is more likely to be accepted if the commission has more funding to offer.
23Unfortunately, we only observe the accepted projects in our dataset. The firms that applied for funding
but were denied can therefore not be distinguished from those that did not apply.
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An important concern is that the Commission might allocate its support partly in line with
technological opportunities, i.e., the projects that are selected are those which involve in-
dustries that perform badly. As explained in detail above, the exogeneity of our available
funding variable relies on the creation of the key actions in the EU-FP5. Indeed, Edith Cres-
son, the then European Commissioner in charge of research and innovation stated that “We
are moving from research based on performance for its own sake to research which focuses on
the social and economic problems which face society today”.24 Thus, the objective underlying
the Fifth Framework Programme differs radically from that of its predecessors.
Since any industry could potentially be represented in any of the Key Actions, the latter
provide exogenous variation in the availability of funding in each industry. Optimally, we
would like to observe the part of the budget of each KA that goes to each industry so as
to build a measure of available budget at the industry level. Since we do not observe these
shares, we need to build our available funding variable based on the awarded funds in each
industry:
AvailableFundingj =
∑
k∈KAs
∑
RJV kr
dkjr · Fundingkr
where dkjr is a dummy equal to 1 if a firm from industry j participates in RJV r in key action
k, and Fundingkr is the funding received by RJV r in key action k from the EU-FP5.
To compute our two steps estimation procedure, we use additional explanatory variables.
First, we introduce a measure of firms’ size to take into account the existent asymmetries
across firms. As noted by Ro¨ller et al. (2007), differences in firms’ sizes reflect differences in
efficiency. This variable may also have an important effect on participation in case specific
fixed costs for the creation of an RJV exist. For example, large firms would be able to spread
these costs more easily across a larger volume of sales and would therefore be more willing to
participate in the programme. Another measure of size that must be taken into account is
the relative size of a firm within its industry. As noted by Herna´n et al. (2003), relative size
may matter if RJVs are used as a vehicle for pursuing “technology watch”, i.e. to monitor
innovative activity in their segment. As they point out, the largest firms (which are also the
technology leaders), have most to lose from the emergence of new, technologically advanced
rivals (see also Laredo (1998)). This measure is proxied by the introduction of a variable
measuring market share, calculated as firm size over industry size, both measured by the
amount of sales.25
24See “A turning point for community research”, RTD Info 21, p.3 at
http://ec.europa.eu/research/rtdinf21/en/edito.html.
25This index is constructed over the entire Amadeus database at the four-digit industry level.
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R&D expenses are an important determinant of firm’s participation in the programme as
they are a good measure of a firm’s “absorptive capacity”. This idea was first introduced
by Cohen and Levinthal (1989), who argue that external knowledge is more effective for the
innovation process when the firm engages in own R&D. Performing R&D would therefore
increase a firm’s value of cooperation and increase its willingness to participate in such
agreements.26 One main shortcoming of our dataset, however, is the unavailability of R&D
expenses at the firm or even at the industry level. Although R&D expenses are not explicitly
reported in Amadeus, they are, in most countries, booked under intangible assets. In order
to partially overcome this availability problem, we use the ratio of intangible fixed assets
over employees (in logarithm) as a proxy for the intensity of the firm’s innovative activity.
We realize that this variable also contains information on patents, copyrights, trademarks
and other similar items and may therefore not give a perfect measure of R&D intensity. This
variable is however likely to be highly correlated with a firm’s absorptive capacity, increasing
the likelihood of participation in an RJV.
Industry concentration has an ambiguous effect on the incentives to participate in R&D col-
laboration. On the one hand, a highly concentrated industry can facilitate the identification
of suitable partners and spillovers to non-participants are limited because of their reduced
number. Also, an RJV may well be created in order to weaken competition or increase the
market power of its participants. In all of these cases, more concentration would increase
the incentives for firms to participate in RJVs. On the other hand, one could also expect a
negative impact of concentration on the likelihood of RJV formation since strict limits are
imposed by competition policy on collaborative projects in concentrated industries.27 To
construct a measure of industry concentration, we include the Herfinda¨hl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) for each four-digit sector present in our sample.28 The HHI is defined as:
HHIj =
n∑
i=1
(MarketSharei,j)
2.
Further control variables include a set of 2-digit industry dummies as well as country dummies
and the ratio of tangible fixed assets over employees (in logs) as a proxy of physical capital
intensity.
With these covariates properly defined, we can now respectively rewrite equations (1.4) and
(1.3) as
26See Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) for a discussion on the effects of absorptive capacity on the probability
of cooperating in R&D.
27An example is the EU’s block exemption which automatically allows ventures between firms that collec-
tively represent less than 25 percent of the relevant anti-trust market but requires authorization for values
above that threshold.
28Similarly to our market share measure, this index is constructed over the entire Amadeus database.
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Pr(PARTit = 1 | z) =F(z′itγ)
=F
(
γ0 + γ1 log(Employees)it + γ2 log
(FixedAssets
Employees
)
it
+γ3 log
(IntangibleAssets
Employees
)
it
+ γ4HHIjt + γ5MktShareit
+γ6 log(AvailableFunding)j
+
P∑
p=1
γ7pCountryip +
J∑
g=1
γ8gIndustryig +
99∑
s=98
γ9sdst
)
(1.5)
and
yit = x
′
itβ + δ · PARTit + εit, (1.6)
where x′it contains all the variables of z
′
it excluding AvailableFunding. We estimate Equation
(1.5) with a logit procedure and obtain P̂ARTit ; in a second step, P̂ARTit is used as an
instrument in (6). In our regressions, we bootstrap the standard errors to account for the
fact P̂ARTit is an estimated variable. Since the residuals are also likely to be correlated within
industries, our calculation of standard errors controls for this correlation by clustering at the
four-digit industry level.
1.6 Results
We now present the results of our estimations. We first discuss the results concerning the
determinants of participation in the programme and then turn to the effects of the programme
on economic performance.
Determinants of participation in the IST programme
Table 1.8 presents the results of the logit estimation (1.5) of the determinants of participation
in the IST programme, controlling for residual correlation among observations from the
same industry. For each of our different samples (Random, IC-Rep and Sales-Rep), we
present two alternative specifications in order to assess whether the results are sensitive to
the inclusion of the intangible assets intensity as a proxy for R&D intensity in determining
participation. The results appear to be robust to the inclusion of this variable as the other
coefficients are not significantly affected.
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Our main attention is set on the parameter associated to the variable AvailableFunding.
The coefficient turns out to be positive and strongly significant in both specifications for
our three different samples, corroborating the fact that the available funding is indeed an
important predictor of participation in the programme.29 As explained above, two possible
non-exclusive explanations can explain this result. One is the fact that firms are more willing
to participate (i.e. to apply for a subsidy) when the available funding is larger. Another
possibility is that, all else equal, firms that are willing to participate (i.e. that already
applied for participation) are more likely to be accepted for a subsidy if the funding is larger.
Although we are not able to identify which is the true mechanism driving this correlation
with the data at hand, either one of them serves our purpose by confirming the relevance of
our exogenous variable.
The coefficient associated with firm size is positive and highly significant in the IC-Rep
and Random samples.30 As already noted by Herna´n et al. (2003), several non-exclusive
explanations can explain this finding. First, controlling for industry concentration, large
firms may have a preference to collaborate with other large firms in order to maximize the
internalization of spillovers (see Ro¨ller et al. (2007) for a theoretical model). Second, it
may reflect the existence of large fixed costs associated with RJV formation (for example
large administrative and negotiation efforts necessary to reach agreements with partners,
the establishment of specific facilities). Third, for projects involving partners from different
and complementary industries, a preference to cooperate with a larger partner may simply
reflect a preference to cooperate with a more efficient partner. Finally, the positive coefficient
associated with firm size may also be the result of a certain exogenous preference for large
firms on the part of the EU-FP5 organization.
The coefficient associated with firm market share, a measure of the firm’s relative size, is
positive and significant in both specifications for our three samples. This results corroborates
the “technology watch” explanation presented above, according to which relatively large firms
in an industry (i.e. leaders) have an incentive to participate in the programme to monitor
the innovative activity in their segment. Indeed, technological leaders have a lot to lose from
the emergence of technologically advanced rivals.
29Table 1.8 presents the χ2 statistics for the coefficient on the AvailableFunding variable in each sample
and specification. The values of the test are all above 50 and strongly reject the null of the available funding
not affecting participation in the programme. Since we are explaining future participation in the programme
with data from 1997 to 1999, it could nevertheless be that the available funding does not predict participation
that well in the years following 2000. To check for that possibility we used the data from 2000 to 2006 to run
regressions of our participation variable on the predicted values ̂PARTit and all the variables included in the
vector x in (1.3). The results present positive and highly significant coefficients on our predicted participation
variable.
30This coefficient is not significant in the case of the Sales-Rep sample given that we constructed the latter
replicating the participants’ sales, a variable highly correlated with firms’ number of employees.
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Although significant in only two of the samples, the HHI variable shows a positive impact
on the probability of participation31, indicating that firms coming from more concentrated
(or less fragmented) industries are more likely to participate. As argued above, this result is
consistent with the fact that firms find it easier to identify suitable partners in such industries.
Also, the latter provides greater scope for the internalization of spillovers.
The fixed assets intensity, a measure of capital intensity, is a positive predictor of participa-
tion, but turns out to be significant in the Random sample, and only when the intangible
fixed assets intensity is not included as a regressor, see specification (1). When the latter
is included, its corresponding coefficient is positive and significant, showing the important
correlation between the fixed assets and intangible fixed assets variables.
Finally, the coefficient on the intangible assets intensity variable shows up to be positive in
our three samples, but only marginally significant for the Random sample. Although the
sign is the one expected, we can therefore not affirm that R&D activities proxied by the
intangible fixed assets are a significant determinant of programme participation.
Impact of the IST programme on economic performance
In the second step of our procedure, we replace the participation dummy by the predicted
value P̂ARTit obtained from the participation equation. The impact of participation on the
firms’ performance is then estimated using observations from years 2000 to 2006.
Before turning to the discussion of the results, it is important to recall the interpretation that
must be given to our estimates. To the extent that the treatment effects are heterogeneous
among different firms, our strategy allows us to estimate the average treatment effect for
the firms whose treatment status (participant or not) is affected by changes in the variable
AvailableFunding. In this case we are therefore not able to identify the average treatment
effect on all the treated, but only for the marginal participants. For this effect to be identified,
an additional monotonicity assumption still needs to be met, which says that while the
exogenous variable might have no effect on some firms, all of those who are affected in their
participation decision must be affected in the same way, see Imbens and Angrist (1994). Our
results should therefore be interpreted as the average impact of the programme for those
firms induced to participate as a result of the change in the funding available to them.
Tables 1.9 and 1.10 present the estimation results for Equation (6). In each of the tables
and for the three different samples used, the columns (OLS) report the OLS estimates, while
columns (TS1) and (TS2) show the results of our two-stage procedure. The OLS estimates
31Just as in the case of firm size for the Sales-Rep sample (see footnote 30), the non-significance of the
concentration index for the IC-Rep sample is most probably due to the way we constructed the latter (i.e.
replicating the cross tabulation of participants by country and industry).
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suggest a positive effect of participation on the labor productivity, whereas the effect on
profit margin is mainly non significant. Since OLS ignores the endogeneity of participation
in the programme, these estimates are likely to be biased if selection into the programme
is based on unobservable characteristics. Columns (TS1) and (TS2) present the results of
estimating Equation (6) correcting for the endogeneity of participation. We find that the
average effect of participation on labor productivity is positive and significant in our three
samples. Firms engaging in an RJV enjoy an average increase in labor productivity of about
25 to 34 percent. At the same time, Table 1.10 suggests that the effect of participation on
profit margin is nil.
As R&D collaboration is an activity with long term objectives, we also attempt to identify
lagged effects of participation on firms’ performance over time.32 As the mean duration of a
project in the sample is 27 months, we may expect the effects of a project to appear at least
2 years after its start. Hence, we re-estimate Equation (6) as follows:
yit+τ = x
′
itβ + δτ · PARTit + εit+τ ,
where the dependent variable yit+τ refers to the (t+ τ)th period after the starting year of
the observed project. The coefficient δτ must then be interpreted as the average impact
of programme participation on economic performance, starting τ years after entering the
project. Comparing the coefficients δτ for different values of τ will therefore help to see the
evolution and distribution of the impact of participation over time. Tables 1.11 and 1.12
report the δτ coefficients (for τ = 0, . . . , 4) for each of our estimations. Each line therefore
shows a point estimate resulting from a different regression estimation.33
We first discuss the results in table 1.11, which refer to labor productivity as a measure
of economic performance. Except for the Random sample which presents slight drops in
the point estimates, we observe an increase in the magnitude of the δτ coefficients when
τ increases. This suggests that, overall, the effects of participation in the programme on
labor productivity are significant and should be measured from a long-term perspective.
On average, participation leads to a significant increase in labor productivity of about 30
percent to 38 percent three to four years after starting the project. Turning to the effects on
the profit margin (table 1.12), our results only show significant impacts in the Sales-Rep
sample. In particular, the point estimates indicate that participation leads to an increase
of 4 to 5 percentage points in the profit margin. As in the case of labor productivity, the
32The need to measure the long term impact of participation in EU-FP has already been noted by most
empirical analysis (Dekker and Kleinknecht, 2008; Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2002; Barajas et al., 2011).
33The first line of each table therefore reports the coefficients on the participation dummies from tables 1.9
and 1.10 respectively (i.e. when τ = 0).
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evolution of the coefficients shows that the effect of participation becomes significant several
years after the start of a project.
Analysis by RJV size
The size of the project may influence the magnitude of the impact of firms’ participation in
the EU-FP5 on their performance; indeed, the size of a project is related to the RJV diversity,
which in turn affects the R&D effort of participants and increases knowledge sharing among
partners.
Sakakibara (2001) highlights three possible channels through which the diversity of an RJV
could positively affect the R&D effort of participants: The first channel relates to the spillover
effect of a firm’s own R&D on others’ R&D productivity. Assuming that RJV size and diver-
sity increase knowledge complementarity among participants, a higher degree of knowledge
complementarity implies a larger spillover effect, and would also lead to a larger increase in
R&D efforts. Second, RJVs provide firms with new learning opportunities. If higher R&D
expenditures increase a firm’s learning capability, and assuming that better learning oppor-
tunities arise when the size and the diversity of the RJV increases, participation in a large
RJV will lead to larger R&D efforts by each RJV participant. Finally, when cooperative
R&D reduces firms’ marginal costs of production, the resulting increase in competition (and
decrease in profits) will lead to a lower level of R&D effort. Large RJV are more likely
to involve participants coming from different industries, reducing the risk of an increase in
competition which, in turn, decreases the likelihood of a reduction in the R&D effort.
We therefore test whether heterogeneity in projects’ size translates into heterogeneous effects
in terms of economic performance. To do so, we separate large projects from small projects
in the following specification:
yit = x
′
itβ + δ
L · PARTLit + δS · PARTSit + εit, (1.7)
where PARTSLit = 1 if firm i participates in a large (L) project and PARTSSit = 1 if firm i
participates in a small (S ) project. The vector x includes the same covariates as in equation
(6). Since participation in a project of a given size is again endogenous, we use our two-step
approach to estimate the effect of participation in the two different kinds of RJVs. Our
strategy is similar to the one we followed in section 1.5 with the difference that we explain
now participation in the two types of projects (large versus small): Each firm i can therefore
choose among three alternatives, participate in an large project, participate in a small project
or participate in neither of them (i.e. stay out of the programme). We define the dependent
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variable PARTic to take value 1 if project c is ever chosen, where c ∈ {Large,Small,Out}.
We therefore assume that the probability that firm i chooses project c is given by
Pr(PARTict = 1 | z) = F(z′itγc), (1.8)
where F(·) is now the multinomial logistic cumulative distribution function. The estimation
strategy is identical to the one we pursue in section 1.5. In order to mitigate endogeneity
issues, we use pre-programme observations (t = 1997, 1998, 1999) to explain the participation
choices in the several categories specified above. We then use observations for years 2000 to
2006 to predict participation decisions using the results from the first step and subsequently
use the predicted values to identify the impact of participation in the two types of RJVs
by estimating equation (1.7) with the 2000-2006 period. Again, we control for residual
correlation among observations from the same industry and bootstrap the standard errors in
our regressions.
Table 1.13 reports the results of the multilogit estimation (1.8). Regardless of the sample
used and the methodology (including or not the intangible assets intensity), the coefficient
on the AvailableFunding variable is positive and strongly significant for both types of RJVs
(although larger for big projects). The available funding is therefore a relevant determinant
of participation in the programme, irrespectively of the size of the project considered. Almost
all of the remaining explanatory variables have the same sign as in our simple logit model.
The coefficient on firm size is quite similar for large and small projects, and is always posi-
tively related to participation.34 The coefficient on the HHI variable again shows a positive
relationship between industry concentration and participation in the two different types of
projects. The results for the Random sample are, however, not significant anymore for either
type of RJV.35
Capital intensity is a positive predictor of participation, and always a more important one
for larger projects. Although not significant, it even shows to be negative for small projects
in two of our samples. On the contrary, the intangible assets intensity is a stronger positive
predictor for participation in smaller project, although only significantly so in the Random
sample. Finally, an interesting result appears for the variable referring to firms’ relative size.
As in the simple logit case, it is again positively related to participation, but is now significant
only for larger RJVs. This again corroborates our “technology watch” interpretation and
further suggests that for a leading firm, monitoring the innovative activity in its sector is
more relevant when the projects are of an important size. These kinds of projects are indeed
the ones where competing firms could gain the most and possibly take the technological lead.
34Again, the coefficients appear non significant for the Sales-Rep sample, see footnote 30.
35For the same reason presented in footnote 31, they are neither significant for the IC-Rep sample.
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In the second step of our procedure, we replace the participation dummies (one for each type
of project) by the predicted values obtained with the information from the first step. Tables
1.14 and 1.15 present the estimation results for equation (1.7) when residual correlation
among observations from the same industry is accounted for. The OLS estimates suggest a
positive effect of participation on the labor productivity, for both small and large projects.
This effect is however greater for large projects. No significant effect is obtained if profit
margin is the explained variable. The IV estimation results suggest that the average effect
on productivity over the years following the start of the projects is positive and significant
in our three samples. The average gains in labor productivity come mainly from the larger
projects and range from 35 percent to close to 50 percent. The results regarding the profit
margin show no significant impact of participation in either type of project.
Instead of an average effect, we may as well evaluate how the impact of participation is
distributed across years after the start of the project. Table 1.16 focuses on labor productivity
and suggests that, in the Random sample, the effect of participation in small projects is
insignificant from 3 years after the start of the project, while it is larger and significant for
the large projects. The same pattern is observed for the remaining two samples, although
the impact for the small projects is never significant. According to these estimates, the
long-term effect of participation in a large project from the IST programme is an increase in
labor productivity in about 37 percent to up to 60 percent.
Table 1.17 presents the results when performance is measured by the profit margin. The
results reveal a positive and significant impact from participating in large RJVs, while par-
ticipation in small projects leads to negative and significant effects on the profit margin.
Participation in large projects leads to increases in as much as 8 percentage points, while
participation in small projects leads to decreases to up to 6 percentage points in one of our
samples.
The results obtained when taking the size of the projects into account give support to the
underlining mechanism that we expect to be at work: Cooperative R&D agreements are
part of an innovation activity that provides access to external know-how which leads to
gains in performance. In this respect, large projects provide many advantages that may lead
to increases in participants’ R&D efforts compared to small projects. In particular, their
more diverse composition in terms of industry origin offers RJV participants better learning
opportunities and increases spillover productivity.
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1.7 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we analyze the effects of R&D collaboration within the EU-FP5 on firms’
economic performance. Previous literature has shown that participation in RJVs supported
by the EU-FPs has had little direct relevant impact on firms’ economic outcomes, a fact
mainly explained by the pre-competitiveness of the programme. By concentrating on the
IST programme, we focus our analysis on the projects that involve more market-oriented
collaboration, and which are therefore more likely to result in direct positive economic effects.
We also account for the fact that R&D collaboration remains an activity with long-term
objectives and therefore identify the long-term effect of participation in the programme.
As a mean to address the self-selection effect of participation, we follow a two-step method
and use the funding available to the firms as an exogenous variable to provide randomness in
the firms’ participation status. Our results show that the long-term effects of participation
is an increase in labor productivity by, on average, almost 40 percent. Taking projects’ size
into account, this increase appears to be mainly driven by gains in the large projects, as we
find that entering a large RJV raises labor productivity by up to 60 percent. We also find
a positive effect of participation on the profit margin, with increases of 4 to 5 percentage
points. These positive effects are again the result of the important impact of participation
in the larger projects, which leads to gains of up to 8 percentage points.
The large magnitude of our estimates has to be put into perspective. Indeed, our results
should be interpreted as the average impact of the programme for those firms induced to
participate as a result of the change in the funding available to them. Our results should
therefore not necessarily be taken as evidence of the aggregate effectiveness of the EU-FP5,
but as the average effect on the “marginal” participants. Though we are not able to identify
these particular firms, our results on the determinants of participation may give us a hint
about their characteristics. We found absolute firm size to be an important determinant of
participation, pointing to the fact that RJVs involve large fixed costs. The “marginal” par-
ticipants, whose participation in the programme is more dependent on the funding available
and received, are most likely to be smaller, first-time participants. This is in line with the re-
sults of Fisher et al. (2009) which found first-time participants and medium-sized companies
to benefit the most from participation in the EU-FP5 and EU-FP6 in terms of innovation.
We see participation in the IST programme as a way of obtaining access to new knowledge
and resources which in turn positively affect economic performance.
It is also important to note that participation in the IST programme actually involves two
simultaneous actions, namely cooperation with other firms or institutions (i.e. the formation
of an RJV) and the granting of a subsidy to help financing the project pursued by the RJV.
We are unfortunately not able to disentangle these two effects separately, and can a priori
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only identify a joint effect of both cooperation and subsidy granting. Our results on the
impact of participation by project size indicate that cooperation within an RJV and the
sharing of know-how is a crucial factor to explain the gains in performance from the IST
programme. This, however, is not informative on the direct effect of the funds received
by the RJV. One may argue that our results would be consistent with a scenario in which
RJV are beneficial (the mere fact of cooperating with other firms) but the subsidy itself is
not, meaning that the gains from cooperation would have been obtained regardless of the
granting of the subsidy. We stress, however, that some firms (in particular small or financially
constrained firms) would not be able to participate in an RJV if there was no subsidy, and
that our results show that the benefits of participation can be very substantive for these
specific firms.
Raising the available funding for the small first-time participants would encourage them to
participate in projects that would benefit them greatly. This could be accomplished, for
instance, by covering a substantial part of their fixed costs, such as the administrative costs
for the project’s proposal or for the research project itself. In any case, and as suggested
by Barajas et al. (2011), policy makers should take these costs into account and distinguish
between firms with previous experience in cooperative projects and other firms. In particular,
participation in large projects would lead to important gains in competitiveness.
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Table 1.1: Number of RJVs per firm
Number of RJVs Number of firms Per cent Cumul.
1 620 64.52 64.52
2 140 14.57 79.08
3 64 6.66 85.74
4 34 3.54 89.28
5 21 2.19 91.47
6 14 1.46 92.92
7 8 0.83 93.76
8 7 0.73 94.48
9 7 0.73 95.21
10 or more 46 4.79 100.00
Table 1.2: Mean statistics by project
Variable All Projects Single Part Sample
Nb of Participants 7.00 8.58 8.77
Duration (in months) 27.04 27.93 27.40
Cost (thousand e) 2376.54 2999.21 3002.23
Funding (thousand e) 1380.21 1663.37 1638.60
Nb of Projects 2359 466 315
Table 1.3: Projects’ characteristics by starting year
Starting Number of Number of Duration Cost in Funding in
Year RJVs participants in months thousand e thousand e
2000 96 (30.5 %) 8.23 27.55 3096.99 1683.81
2001 108 (34.3 %) 8.69 27.62 2761.45 1502.80
2002 104 (33.0 %) 9.33 26.68 3240.63 1786.52
2003 7 (2.22 %) 9.29 32.57 1875.71 916.29
All 315 8.77 27.40 3002.23 1638.60
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Table 1.4: Projects’ characteristics by number of participants
Number of Number of Duration Cost in Funding in
participants RJVs in months thousand e thousand e
3 or less 14 (4.4 %) 17.21 631.56 444.35
4 to 5 36 (11.4 %) 28.19 2429.06 1345.53
6 to 7 89 (28.2 %) 27.94 2657.61 1476.00
8 to 10 105 (33.3 %) 27.12 2874.11 1581.15
11 to 15 48 (15.2 %) 29.25 4163.96 2167.86
16 or more 23 (7.3 %) 27.65 4836.39 2611.22
All 315 27.40 3002.23 1638.60
Table 1.5: Projects’ characteristics by cost
Cost in Number of Duration Number of Nb of different Funding in
millions RJVs in months participants industries thousand e
0 to 1 53 (16.8%) 18.49 6.68 1.55 430.35
1 to 3 122 (38.7%) 28.35 8.13 1.81 1191.41
3 to 6 111 (35.2%) 29.91 9.33 2.59 2145.41
6 to 8 21 (6.7%) 30.48 13.00 3.43 3394.76
more than 8 8 (2.5%) 29.00 13.63 4.38 4821.25
All 315 27.40 8.77 2.21 1638.60
Table 1.6: Projects’ characteristics by size†
Size Number of Number of Duration Cost in Funding in Nb of different
of RJV RJVs participants in months thousand e thousand e industries
Small 162 (51.4%) 7.73 24.83 1523.66 909.75 1.73
Large 153 (48.6%) 9.88 30.12 4567.78 2410.33 2.72
All 315 8.77 27.40 3002.23 1638.60 2.21
† An RJV of small size is defined as one with a total cost of less than 2.8 million e.
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Table 1.7: Comparison of participants and Amadeus for 1999
Participants Amadeus
Mean Median N Mean Median N
Sales 1,617,717.1 61,192.0 560 76,461.5 12,648.0 91475
Employees 7,833.5 441.0 522 482.4 87.0 102273
Fixed Assets 1,295,842.3 15,400.5 598 60,009.1 2,112.0 146753
Intangible Fixed Assets 147,837.6 381.5 582 5,413.6 2.0 140781
Labor Productivity 317.9 63.2 380 141.7∗∗ 49.0 71872
Costs of Employees 366,136.9 20,507.0 508 14,431.1 1,882.0 106638
Mean Wage 49.6 42.5 448 57.5∗∗∗ 31.1 91759
Profit Margin 5.8 4.9 560 5.0∗∗∗ 3.0 124496
Gross Profit Margin 40.1 35.9 140 69.0∗∗∗ 18.3 42718
∗∗ Cannot reject the null hypothesis (equality of the means) in a two-tailed t-test at the 5% level
between the participants and the corresponding control group in each column.
∗∗∗ Cannot reject the null hypothesis (equality of the means) in a two-tailed t-test at the 10% level
between the participants and the corresponding control group in each column.
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Table 1.8: First stage estimation results (logit)†
Sample Random IC-Rep Sales-Rep
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant -6.795∗∗∗-6.153∗∗∗-8.635∗∗∗-8.357∗∗∗-6.917∗∗∗-9.288∗∗∗
(1.49) (1.51) (2.10) (2.16) (1.64) (2.05)
log(Employees) 0.427∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 0.012 0.013
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
log(Fixed Assets Intensity) 0.201∗∗∗ 0.134∗ 0.104 0.085 0.055 0.037
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
log(Intang Assets Intensity) 0.120∗∗ 0.039 0.033
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
log(Available Funding) 0.507∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Market Share 6.229∗∗∗ 6.044∗∗∗ 6.621∗∗∗ 6.452∗∗∗ 3.123∗∗ 3.047∗∗
(2.18) (2.32) (2.35) (2.38) (1.61) (1.60)
HHI 2.271∗∗ 2.303∗∗ 1.216 1.181 4.238∗∗∗ 4.237∗∗∗
(1.12) (1.11) (0.82) (0.82) (1.20) (1.19)
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
χ2 test on
log(Available Funding) 60.34 60.96 52.27 51.91 74.67 74.41
Pseudo-R2 0.436 0.443 0.291 0.292 0.370 0.370
Number of obs. 1667 1667 1545 1545 1362 1362
† The dependent variable is equal to 1 for participants and 0 for non-participants. Standard
errors in parenthesis and clustered at the four-digit industry level.
∗ Significant at the 10% level.
∗∗ Significant at the 5% level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 1.13: Analysis by RJV Size: First stage estimation results (Multinomial logit)†
Sample Random IC-Rep Sales-Rep
(1) Large Small Large Small Large Small
Constant -8.889∗∗∗-4.166∗∗ -9.593∗∗∗-4.989∗∗∗-7.020∗∗∗-3.768∗∗∗
(2.09) (1.70) (1.39) (1.46) (1.45) (1.36)
log(Employees) 0.365∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.017 -0.040
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09)
log(Fixed Assets Intensity) 0.257∗∗∗ 0.110 0.160∗∗ 0.030 0.123 -0.071
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
log(Available Funding) 0.799∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04) (0.10) (0.05)
Market Share 10.670∗∗∗ 3.775∗ 8.405∗∗∗ 2.947∗ 6.075∗∗∗ 1.861
(2.49) (2.14) (1.86) (1.59) (2.03) (2.20)
HHI 1.840 1.879∗ 0.751 0.917 4.072∗∗∗ 4.378∗∗∗
(1.38) (1.11) (0.99) (1.08) (1.36) (1.17)
χ2 test on
log(Available Funding) 76.08 42.32 51.15 38.24 66.44 51.46
Pseudo-R2 0.381 0.261 0.326
Number of Obs. 1667 1550 1362
(2) Large Small Large Small Large Small
Constant -9.393∗∗∗-5.528∗∗∗-9.380∗∗∗-5.639∗∗∗-7.496∗∗∗-3.148
(1.70) (1.94) (1.67) (1.87) (1.58) (1.92)
log(Employees) 0.386∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.017 -0.036
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08)
log(Fixed Assets Intensity) 0.204∗∗ 0.030 0.143∗ -0.001 0.124 -0.114
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
log(Intang Assets Intensity) 0.093 0.140∗∗ 0.037 0.060 0.003 0.072
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
log(Available Funding) 0.789∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04) (0.10) (0.05)
Market Share 10.571∗∗∗ 3.586 8.239∗∗∗ 2.737∗ 6.140∗∗∗ 1.606
(2.58) (2.28) (1.90) (1.62) (2.04) (2.31)
HHI 1.792 1.887∗ 0.725 0.847 4.016∗∗∗ 4.380∗∗∗
(1.38) (1.13) (0.98) (1.08) (1.36) (1.19)
χ2 test on
log(Available Funding) 74.39 41.46 51.13 36.07 65.35 50.53
Pseudo-R2 0.387 0.262 0.327
Number of Obs. 1667 1550 1362
† Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the four-digit industry level. All specifications
include time, industry and country dummies. The reference outcome is not participating in
the EU-FP5 IST programme.
∗ Significant at the 10% level.
∗∗ Significant at the 5% level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1% level.
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Figure 1.1: Sales distributions for participants, Amadeus and Control Groups in 1999.
Chapter 2
Knowledge Spillovers in
Cost-Reduction Incentives
2.1 Introduction
This goal of this paper is to identify and measure the relevance of knowledge spillovers
in the French urban transport industry. In each French city of significant size, the local
authority regulates and monitors the activity of a single operator that provides the transport
services on the urban network within a regulatory framework. The latter takes the form
of a written contract that defines the payment and cost-reimbursement rules between the
parties. Two types of regulatory contracts are observed in practice, namely fixed-price and
cost-plus schemes. Under fixed-price contracts, the operator receives subsidies to cover ex-
ante (expected) operating deficits, while under cost-plus regulation, subsidies are provided
by the local authorities to finance ex-post (realized) deficits. As it is well known, each type of
regulatory rule has an impact on operating costs since it entails different levels of incentives
in terms of effort in cost reduction activities. In particular, fixed-price contracts provide
powerful incentives to reduce operating costs.
The regulator does not observe the technological efficiency or the cost reduction activity of
the operator. In France, local authorities have been historically blamed for their laxness in
assessing operating costs, mainly because of their lack of knowledge and experience of trans-
portation economics and technologies, and/or because of their limited capacity of monitoring
and auditing complex operating activities. These considerations prevent them to adequately
assess the effort of operators in providing appropriate and competent solutions to cost and
network inefficiencies.
41
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A distinguishing feature of the French urban transport industry is that about eighty percent
of the operators are owned by three large companies. The transport services provided in
different networks by operators belonging to the same industrial group are therefore, in
essence, provided by the same firm. This peculiarity suggests that these companies may
benefit from spillovers by operating several networks in different localities. In other words,
the economic activity involved in one specific network may affect the economic activity
in other networks operated by the same company. In the specific context of the urban
transport industry, we expect these spillovers or externalities to take place when a cost-
reducing activity developed by one of the operators reaches other parts of the group. As
a consequence of this positive externality, all networks operated by the firms belonging to
the group benefit from the cost-reducing efforts provided by any of the operators. In the
French urban transportation industry, operators have engineer teams in each network that
are responsible for the improvement of the operator’s productivity. When operators belong
to the same group, the new methods and procedures that they develop can potentially be
used by the entire company, therefore improving productivity and/or reducing operating
costs. To reflect the fact that these spillovers could be related to a large array of know-how
generated by the firm, ranging from technological to organizational, we will refer to them as
knowledge spillovers throughout the text.
This paper is aimed at identifying and measuring the importance of these knowledge spillovers
in the French urban transport industry and their impact on the efficiency of operators.
Our work shares features with different strands of the empirical literature on both regulation
and firm performance. First, our paper belongs to the recent empirical literature on incentive
regulatory policies. Considering contract in the transportation industry, Gagnepain and
Ivaldi (2002) focus on the incentives effects of cost-plus and fixed-price contracts on the cost-
reducing activities of operators and compare the welfare level of observed regulatory practices
with the one that would have been obtained using first-best and second-best regulatory
policies. Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2010) build on a similar model and incorporate political
aspects of regulation to analyze the determinants of contract choices. Gagnepain et al. (2013)
analyze the dynamics aspects of regulation by assessing the cost of renegotiation in the French
transportation industry. Our models builds on this previous literature by focusing on the
incentives of cost-plus and fixed-price contracts and extends it by modeling the knowledge
spillovers that result from these incentives when transport operators are linked to each other.
From that perspective, our paper is one of the first to take into account knowledge spillovers
in a regulation context.
Dealing with technology and knowledge externalities, our paper also relates to the empirical
literature on R&D knowledge spillovers. However, most of the latter deals with knowledge
spillovers across firms rather than within firms (Bernstein and Nadiri, 1989; Griliches, 1992;
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Bloom et al., 2013). Most related to our paper is the work of Klette (1996). Using data
on Norwegian manufacturing firms, he analyzes the relationship between firm performance
and R&D. In addition to being able to identify R&D at the line-of-business level within each
firm, he can identify firms that belong to the same “interlocking group of firms”.1 His results
show significant spillover effects across different lines of business (e.g. chemicals or metal
products) within a firm but also reveal significant spillovers for activities within a line of
business that are carried out by different firms within the same group.
Our work also relates to part of the literature on knowledge transfer within the firm. In a
seminal paper, Szulanski (1996) analyzes firms’ ability to transfer best practices internally.
Using survey data on best practice transfers in eight different companies, he shows the major
barriers to internal knowledge transfer to be knowledge-related factors such as the recipient
lack of absorptive capacity. Although we are not able to explicitly measure the knowledge
transfers within groups in our analysis, we can still account for some form of network-
specific absorptive capacity in our analysis and find evidence of positive knowledge spillovers
across networks linked to the same group.2 Another related paper is Darr et al. (1995),
which analyze knowledge transfer acquired through learning-by-doing in service organization.
Focusing on 36 pizza stores owned by 10 different franchisees, they find evidence of knowledge
transfer across stores owned by the same franchisee but not across stores owned by different
franchisees. Related to this, some papers have also highlighted the importance of free-riding
among the different franchisees of a given chain (Brickley, 1999; Lafontaine and Slade, 1997,
2007). Indeed, a franchisee has incentives to free-ride on the tradename of the franchisor
given that her effort is private while the benefits will accrue to all the members of the chain.
This closely relates to our case where each local network privately pays the cost of its effort
which will benefit (at least partially) all members of the group.
We build and estimate a structural cost regulation model with asymmetric information that
includes knowledge spillovers (i.e. externalities) of operating different networks. Our goal is
to identify the latter, and see how they influence firms’ decisions of exerting effort to reduce
their operating costs. Our model provides us with estimates of the firms’ inefficiencies, the
effort of the managers and the technology.
In each given city, there’s a single network operator in charge of providing the transportation
service. This operator can be part of one of the largest industrial groups or it can be
independent. In either case, each operator has a local manager who takes care of running
the network and decides on the effort to be exerted to reduce the operating costs of the
local transportation activity. In our model, each operator in each given city faces different
1According to the author, an interlocking group of firm is characterized by a parent company and all
subsidiaries in which the parent company owns a majority share of equity.
2In particular, we are able to construct indices that relate to the structural differences between a given
network and the remaining networks from the same group. They are presented in greater detail below.
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incentives to reduce these costs. First, the type of regulatory contract (fixed-price vs cost-
plus) is a crucial determinant of cost reducing activities. The second class of incentive is the
one driven by the knowledge spillovers that follow from operators being part of a same group,
if any. The econometric task consists then in recovering the parameters of a static model
of cost regulation under incomplete information, and testing for the relevance of knowledge
spillovers.
Our results show that knowledge spillovers are indeed relevant in the French urban transport
industry. Note that we do not model the regulation decision by the authority, i.e. we take the
regulatory mechanisms as exogenously given to estimate the model’s parameters.3 Likewise,
we leave dynamic considerations out of our framework. In particular, we do not address the
ability of the regulator to commit not to use the information on the operator’s cost from one
regulatory period to another.4 Here, our aim is to focus on the knowledge spillovers that
arise from the operators’ group structure within a static framework.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the regulation of urban trans-
portation in France in more detail. Section 3 presents the contracts that are implemented
during our period of observation and describes the structure of the different existing indus-
trial groups in the French urban transport industry. Section 4 discusses the assumptions
that are maintained throughout the paper. Section 5 presents our model of cost regulation
which encompasses the main features of urban transportation and the environment in which
network operators make their decisions. Section 6 then develops a formal specification of the
cost function to be estimated. Section 7 is devoted to the construction of the variables and
the presentation of our results. Section 8 evaluates the cost gains of adding operators to a
group and further simulates the cost gains following a merger between two groups. Section
9 provides a summary and some concluding remarks.
2.2 The French Urban Transportation Industry
As in most countries around the world, urban transportation in France is a regulated activity.
Local transportation networks cover each urban area of significant size, and for each network,
a local authority (a municipality, a group of municipalities or a district) is in charge to reg-
ulate an operator which has been selected to provide the transportation service. Regulatory
rules prevent the presence of several suppliers of transportation services on the same urban
network, and each network is therefore operated by a single operator.
3See Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2010) for a political model of regulation that incorporates the determinants of
contract choices.
4These issues are addressed in Gagnepain et al. (2013).
Chapter 2. Knowledge Spillovers in Cost-Reduction Incentives 45
The 1982 Transportation Law was enacted to facilitate decentralized decision-making on ur-
ban transportation and to provide guidelines for regulation. As a result, each local authority
now organizes its own transportation system by setting route and fare structures, capacity,
quality of service, conditions for subsidizing the service, levels of investment and ownership
nature. The local authority may decide to operate the network directly or to require the
services of a transport service provider. In the latter case, a formal contract defines the regu-
latory rules that the operator must follow as well as the payment and/or cost-reimbursement
scheme between the authority (the principal) and the operator (the agent).
In most urban areas, operating costs are on average twice as high as commercial revenues.
Budgets are therefore rarely balanced without subsidies. One reason is that operators face
universal service obligations and must operate in low demand areas. Low prices are main-
tained to ensure affordable access to all consumers of public transportation. Moreover, special
fares are given to targeted groups like seniors and students. Subsidies come from the State’s
budget, the local authority’s budget, and a special tax paid by local firms (employing more
than nine full-time workers). They are not necessarily paid directly to the operator. In
addition to the price distortions causing deficits, informational asymmetries that affect the
cost side and lead to inefficiencies make it more difficult to resume these deficits. We return
on these points more in detail below.
A distinguishing feature of France compared to most other OECD countries is that about
eighty percent of local operators are private and are owned by three large companies, two
of them being private while the third one is semi-public.5 In 2002, these companies, with
their respective ownership structures and market shares (in terms of number of networks
operated) were Keolis (private, 30%), Transdev (semi-public, 19%), Connex (private, 25%).
In addition there are a small private group, Agir, and a few public firms controlled by local
governments. The next section is dedicated to a more detailed presentation of the structure
of these groups.
Our objective is to take these features of the urban transport industry into account and to
perform an analysis of the observed regulatory schemes within a principal-agent setting. This
requires a database that provides information on both the performance and the organization
of the French urban transport industry. Such a database was created in the early 1980s from
an annual survey conducted by the Centre d’Etude et de Recherche du Transport Urbain
(CERTU, Lyon) with the support of the Groupement des Autorite´s Responsables du Transport
(GART, Paris), a nationwide trade organization that gathers most of the local authorities
in charge of a urban transport network. In France, this rich source is a unique tool for
comparing observed regulatory schemes both across year and over time. In our econometric
5For an overview of the regulation of urban transportation systems in the different countries of the European
Union, the United States and Japan, see IDEI (1999).
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analysis, we consider the regulatory scheme adopted in each urban area during a year as a
realization of the same regulatory contract. The sample does not include the largest networks
of France, i.e., Paris, Lyon and Marseille, as they are not covered by the survey. Overall, the
panel data set covers 87 different urban transport networks over the period 1987-2001.
We now turn to a more detailed description of the contractual relationships and of the urban
transport group structures.
2.3 Regulatory Contracts and Transport Groups
Two types of regulatory contracts are implemented in the French urban transport industry,
namely fixed-price and cost-plus schemes. Over the period of observation, fixed-price con-
tracts are employed in 61% of the cases, as shown in table 2.1. Under fixed-price contracts,
operators receive subsidies to finance the expected operating deficits, while under cost-plus
schemes, subsidies are paid to the local authorities to finance ex-post deficits. Hence fixed-
price regimes are very high-powered incentive schemes, while cost-plus regimes do not provide
any incentives for cost reduction. For the same network, the regulatory scheme may switch
from cost-plus to fixed-price or from fixed-price to cost-plus between two contract periods.
We indeed count twenty-three changes of regulatory regimes, eighteen of them being switches
from cost-plus to fixed-price regimes. These changes may occur either during the term of a
local authority which decides for a shift in the regulatory framework, or after the election of
a new local government.
As already mentioned, and as shown in table 2.1, about eighty percent of local transport
service operators are owned by three larger industrial groups; Keolis, Connex and Trans-
dev. Industrial groups of urban transport have a long history of mergers in France. Keolis
was born out of the merger of several companies created in the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury. The Socie´te´ des transports automobiles, created in 1908, its subsidiary (the Socie´te´
ge´ne´rale des transports de´partementeaux ) and the company Lesexel, founded in 1911 to help
on the development of tramways, merged to form the VIA-GTI company, mainly focused
on urban transport. In the meantime, another company, Cariane, was specialized in the
French interurban transport. Ultimately, VIA-GTI and Cariane merged in 2001 to give
birth to Keolis.6 The industrial group Connex was born out of the merger of the Compagnie
Ge´ne´rale Franc¸aise des Transports et Entreprises (CGFTE) and the Compagnie Ge´ne´rale
d’Entreprises Automobiles (CGEA) in the late 1980’s.7 The company was ultimately re-
named Veolia Transport in 2005. Finally, the Transdev group was created in 1955. On
March 3rd 2011, it merged with Veolia Transport to give birth to Veolia Transdev.
6http://www.keolis.com/en/about-us/key-facts/history.html
7The company actually decided to take on the name Connex in 2000. For more details, see
http://www.connex.info/tmpl/ExtensionPage 2778.aspx?epslanguage=ML.
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Table 2.1 presents figures on the distribution of the operators in our sample according to
their affiliation to one of the three groups and to the type of contract they face. While
61% of all the networks are under a FP regime, this figure amounts to 64.5% when focusing
on the operators belonging to a group and to 48% for independent networks. Although it
seems that belonging to a group is an important determinant of being regulated under a
FP contract, a closer look at the frequency of FP contracts within groups indicates that
this figure comes mainly from the Transdev group, where more than 90% of the networks
it operates are under a FP scheme. The overall proportion of networks operated by firms
belonging to one of the three major groups is of 78.6%. For networks regulated under a FP
regime, 83.1% are operated by firms belonging to a group. For networks under CP contracts,
this figure amounts to 71.6%.
For each urban transport network, the automatic renewal of the contract between the local
authority and the operator in place was effectively ended, by law, in 1993. Since then, local
authorities are required to use beauty contests to allocate the construction and management
of infrastructures of urban transportation. In practice, however, very few networks have
experienced changes of operators from one regulatory period to another. Over the period
covered by our analysis, only 5 networks have decided to get rid of their operators to select
another company. Out of these, two changed from being operated by a firm belonging to
a group to a being operated by an independent firm, while only one network changed from
being operated by an independent firm to being operated by a firm belonging to a group.
Finally, only 2 networks saw their operator change from a firm belonging to a given group
to a firm belonging to another group.
As a matter of fact, the different operators mostly avoided head to head competition and
generally put tenders for markets in distinct urban areas. By committing to distinct geo-
graphical areas, the three main groups succeeded in reducing the degree of competition in
the awarding of transport operations in urban areas where the regulatory contract comes to
an end. Competitive tendering is therefore not a relevant issue in this sector, and ex-ante
competition is not so fierce. Finally, these groups also operate other municipal services such
as water distribution or garbage collection, which makes it even harder for public authorities
to credibly punish operators following bad performances in the provision of transport ser-
vices. It follows that group structures are rather stable both across networks and over time
in our sample.
These urban transport industry features constitute the core of our analysis on the knowledge
spillovers among operators belonging to the same group and inspire the construction of the
structural model of regulation that we present below. Before going to the construction of
our economic model, we introduce some assumptions that we now present in detail.
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2.4 Delineating the Scope of the Study
The organization and structure of the urban transportation industry in France as described
above motivates the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 : The network operator has private information about its technology, and the
authority does not observe its effort to improve productivity or to reduce costs.
We assume that the network operator has private information about its innate technology
(adverse selection) and that its cost-reducing effort is non-observable (moral hazard). Be-
cause French local authorities exercise their new powers on transportation policy since the
enactment of the 1982 Law only, and since they usually face serious financial difficulties, their
limited auditing capacities is recognized among practitioners. A powerful and well-performed
audit system needs effort, time and money. French experts on urban transportation blame
local authorities for being too lax in assessing operating costs, mainly because of a lack of
knowledge of the technology.8 The number of buses required for a specific network, the costs
incurred on each route, the fuel consumption of buses (which is highly dependent on drivers’
skills), the drivers’ behavior toward customers, the effect of traffic congestion on costs, are
all aspects for which operators have much more data and a better understanding than public
authorities. This suggests the presence of adverse selection on innate technology in the first
place. Given the technical complexity of these issues, it should be even harder for the local
authority to assess whether and to what extent operators undertake efforts to provide appro-
priate and efficient management. Moral hazard arises quite naturally on top of the adverse
selection problem. When compounded, those informational asymmetries play a crucial role
in the design of contractual arrangements and financial objectives.9
Assumption 2: Regulatory schemes and operators’ efficiency levels are exogenous
According to the new theory of regulation, when contractual relationships are characterized
by informational asymmetries, a welfare-maximizing regulator applies the revelation principle
to provide the operator with incentives to reveal its true efficiency level. This mechanism
8The French urban transport expert O. Domenach has argued that “the regulator is not able of determining
the number of buses which is necessary to run the network. The same comment can be made regarding the fuel
consumption of each bus. The regulators are generally general practitioners instead of transport professionals.
Hence, the (re)negotiation of contracts between regulators and operators is not fair. See Domenach (1987).
A more recent report on the weak capabilities of expertise of the local governments and the lack of ex ante
competition in the industry is proposed by the French court of auditors de Comptes (2005); for more details
see http://www.ccomptes.fr/content/download/2454/24573/version/2/file/RapportTransports.pdf.
9Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) confirmed through a test that adverse selection and moral hazard are two
important features of the industry. They showed that a regulatory framework which encompasses these two
ingredients performs well to explain the data.
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can be decentralized through a menu of linear contracts and avoids leaving excessive rents.
Each operator facing such a menu chooses the contract that corresponds to his own efficiency
level. In this context, the most efficient firm chooses the highest-powered incentive scheme,
i.e. a fixed-price contract, while the most inefficient firm chooses the lowest-powered incentive
scheme, i.e. a cost-plus contract. Between these two extremes are incentive schemes chosen
by firms with intermediate efficiency levels (Laffont and Tirole, 1993).
Does this framework apply to the French urban transport industry? If it did, fixed-price
and cost-plus contracts would be extreme cases of a menu and would be chosen by the
most efficient and the most inefficient firms, respectively. Since current rules apply to any
companies (even the ones with intermediate efficiency levels) and since the real world cannot
be confined to fully efficient or inefficient firms, one must conclude a priori that observed
contracts do not include any revelation principle, and cost-plus and fixed-price schemes
are equally proposed to operators without paying any attention to their efficiency level.
It is therefore realistic to assume that regulatory schemes are not driven by the intrinsic
characteristics and efficiency levels of large service companies and of network operators.
Assumption 3: An operators belonging to an industrial group benefits from the cost reducing
activities of the remaining operators of the group.
In each network, the existence of inefficiencies may lead to higher operating costs than the
levels defined by the cost frontier. Firms can, however, undertake cost-reducing activities to
overcome these inefficiencies. They can, for instance, engage in process research and devel-
opment, or managers can spend time and effort in improving the location of inputs within
the network. They can as well attempt to find cheaper suppliers, bargain better procurement
contracts, subcontract non-essential activities, monitor employees, or solve potential labor
conflicts.
We assume that operators belonging to one of the groups presented above (i.e. Keolis,
Transdev or Connex) will be affected by actions taken in other networks operated by another
member of the same group. In each network, the group has a local manager (or team of
managers) who takes care of running the network and has decision rights on the effort to
be exerted in order to decrease operating costs. Given this decision-making configuration,
we expect actions related to cost-reducing activities taken in a specific network to generate
a positive externality on the operating costs of the remaining operators of the group. The
main idea is that knowledge generated in a given location can be processed by the group’s
headquarters and later be transmitted and used in another network operated by the group.
For instance, the results of process R&D obtained in one location can spill-over to another
operator through the group’s headquarters. This operator would therefore benefit from (part
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of) this R&D without investing as much effort as it would have to if it were independent.
Similarly, the effort incurred to find a cheaper supplier in one network may reduce the need
to look for a cheaper supplier in another city. The bargaining of procurement contracts may
also be easier if the operator belongs to a group with relevant experience in other networks.
Likewise, methods to efficiently monitor employees could also be learned in a given place
and transmitted to another. In that sense, a network belonging to a group will benefit from
positive externalities coming from the effort exerted in all the remaining networks of the
group. To reflect the fact that these spillovers could be related to a large array of know-how
generated by the firm, ranging from technological to organizational, we refer to them as
knowledge spillovers.
We propose to estimate a structural cost function that accounts for the regulatory scheme
faced by the operator as well as for the structure of the group it belongs to, if any. This
allows us to test for the relevance of knowledge spillovers among operators in the French
urban transport industry.10
We now turn to the construction of our structural model of regulation.
2.5 The Economic Model
We now present our model of regulation of the urban transport industry. Starting from the
technology associated with the transportation activity, we first define the primal operating
cost function, which is conditional on the cost-reducing activity of the operator. We describe
how the contract types and the structure of the transport groups affect the operators’ choice
of cost-reducing effort. Once the optimal level of effort is determined, we plug it back into
the conditional cost function to obtain the final cost function that captures all the relevant
incentives affecting the activity of the firm.
Technology and primal cost function
To provide the required level of services Q, the transit firm (the operator) needs to combine
variable and fixed inputs. Let w = (wL, wM ) be the price of variable inputs, namely labor (L)
10Three additional remarks should be made. First, private information on demand is not a relevant issue in
our industry. Local governments are well informed about the transportation needs of citizens. The number of
trips performed over a certain period is easily observed, and the regulator has a very precise idea of how the
socio-demographic characteristics of a urban area fluctuate over time. Given the level of demand, the regulator
sets the service capacity provided by the operator. Second, we do not address the issue of determining what
should be the optimal rate-of-return on capital. The rolling stock is owned by the local government for a
vast majority of networks. In this case, the regulator is responsible for renewing the vehicles, as well as
guaranteeing a certain level of capital quality. Finally, we rule out the possibility of risk sharing in the
contractual relationships between the operators and the regulators since the provision of transport services
does not entail unpredictable cost fluctuations for the operators.
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and materials (M). Let K and I be, respectively, the stock of capital and the infrastructure
used by the operator, which are both fixed in the short run. The production process is
then represented with the production function Q = f(K, I, L,M |λ), where λ is a vector of
parameters characterizing the technology in the production process. Note that both L and
M are the efficient levels of inputs, which are only observable to the operator. We denote
by C the observed operating cost of each firm. As the stock of capital K and the size of the
infrastructure I are determined by the regulator, our cost function is determined in the short
run, and is conditional on the stock of capital and on the size of the infrastructure.11 Each
operator chooses the cost-minimizing input allocation subject to technological constraints,
which leads to a cost function of the following form:
C0i = C
0
i (wi, Qi, Ii,Ki|β), (2.1)
where β is a vector of parameters characterizing the cost function. In reality, the actual
operating cost may differ from the minimum operating cost defined by (2.1). Inefficiencies
may prevent operators from reaching the required level of service Q at the minimum cost,
which will result in upward distorted costs. To counterbalance these inefficiencies however,
firms can undertake cost-reducing activities. They can engage in process research and devel-
opment, or managers can spend time and effort in improving the location of inputs within
the network. They can as well attempt to find cheaper suppliers, bargain better procurement
contracts, subcontract non-essential activities, monitor employees, or solve potential labor
conflicts. Whatever these cost-reducing activities may be, we will refer to them as effort.
A distinguishing feature of the French urban transport system is that about 80% of local op-
erators are private and are owned by three large industrial groups. In 2002, these companies,
with their respective market shares (in terms of number of networks operated) were Keolis
(30%), Transdev (19%) and Connex (25%). Hence a given firm i operating a specific network
can be either independent or belong to one of these larger companies. Each of these industrial
groups g = {Keolis, T ransdev, Connex} operates a set of urban networks Ng = {1, . . . , ng}.
While production inputs are exclusively network specific, we assume the inefficiencies to af-
fect all the ng networks of a given group g. Likewise, we expect the cost-reducing efforts
exerted in a given network to affect the operating cost of other firms belonging to the same
industrial group. These knowledge spillovers are, however, not present for an independent
network. We return to these points more in detail below.
Denote by θg the intrinsic inefficiency level of each of the ng networks of group g, and let θ
be the intrinsic inefficiency level of an independent network. We denote the effort level of
11In practice, the operator plays a role in the choice of investment, which, potentially, introduces another
dimension that can be affected by information asymmetries. Our understanding of the industry is that this
question is of second-order since, for instance, the production of new buses, which could have a drastic impact
on the efficiency of the transport network, takes time and refers to periods longer than regulatory periods.
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firm i belonging to group g by eig, and let e−ig denote the effort of the remaining networks
belonging to the same group. Let ei be the effort level of an independent network i. Note
that both the inefficiency and the effort levels are unobservable to the regulator and to the
econometrician. Each operator therefore faces a cost function which provides the frontier
of minimum operating costs conditional on the levels of capital, infrastructure, inefficiency,
effort and group structure. Specifically, operator i faces a cost function of the form:
Ci(C
0
i , θ, e|β) =

C0i × φ (θ, ei) if i is independent
C0i × φ (θg, eig, κige−ig) if i ∈ Ng,
(2.2)
where φ (θ, e) is a continuous function that is increasing in θ and decreasing in e. κig is a
parameter measuring the knowledge spillovers obtained by operator i for being linked to the
remaining operators belonging to group g. Notice how we define the κig parameter to depend
both on network and group characteristics, as we expect networks within a same group to
benefit asymmetrically from knowledge spillovers. Note that while the inefficiency parameter
θ is exogenous, the cost reducing effort is a choice variable which will depend on both the
contract that the firm faces and on the structure of the group it belongs to, if any. We next
turn to the operator’s effort decision and to the construction of the structural cost function.
Incentives, knowledge spillovers and the optimal level of effort
Two main aspects dictate the incentives that each operator faces to reduce costs through
the conditional cost function (2.2). The first environment’s characteristic that affects the
operator’s incentives to reduce its costs comes from the regulatory pressure, defined by the
type of contract that the operator faces. Two regulatory contracts are observed in practice,
namely fixed-price (FP) and cost-plus (CP). Under a fixed-price contract, the operator is
residual claimant for effort. It obtains an ex-ante subsidy tFP equal to the expected balanced
budget, which is the difference between expected costs and expected revenues. This contract
is a very high-powered incentive scheme as the operator is now responsible for insufficient
revenues and cost overruns. With the cost-plus contract, the public authority receives the
commercial revenue R(q), and receives an ex-post subsidy tCP that reimburses the firm’s
total ex-post operational cost C. The firm is therefore not residual claimant for effort and
this contract is a very low powered incentive scheme. Under this regime, firms have no
incentives to produce efficiently. The operator can, under both types of contracts, exert
effort e to reduce its operating cost C. The cost reduction activity induces an internal cost
ψ(e).
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The second aspect of the economic environment that affects the incentives to reduce costs
is whether the operator belongs to an industrial group or whether it is independent. Each
network that belongs to a group has a local manager (or team of managers) who takes
care of running the network and has decision rights on the effort to be exerted in order to
decrease operating costs. Each manager is self-interested in the sense that their objective is to
maximize local profits, but their cost-reducing efforts can reach other networks from the group
through the group’s headquarters and therefore result beneficial to them. In other words,
while a group is in effect operating several networks simultaneously, we assume that decisions
on cost-reducing activities are made locally and independently. There are several reasons to
justify this assumption. First, network operators are not able to unilaterally decide on the
type of regulatory contract they will face as this is the result of a negotiation process between
the operator and the local authority. A given group could therefore never choose which type
of contract to face in a given network, much less in all the different network it operates.
Second, this negotiation process is always carried out locally and at different points in time,
implying that contracts do not end at the same time in different networks. In other words,
even if it wanted to, a group would not be able to coordinate the negotiation of contracts in
the different networks it operates given this timing difference. Moreover, local authorities also
change over time, meaning that the type of contract resulting from the negotiation process
in a given period would not necessarily translate into the same outcome in the regulatory
period.12 These considerations imply that contract types will change across the networks of
a given group at different points in time. This sequential decision configuration therefore
renders a centralized planning of effort impossible and implies a local choice of effort at the
network level. Finally, note also that decisions on cost-reduction activities cannot solely
be based on group-level knowledge of the transportation activity, but must also depend on
specific knowledge of the local network where the service is provided. For example, the
number of buses required for a specific network or the drivers’ skills and behavior towards
customers in a specific location are all aspects for which local managers have much more
information and knowledge than the group’s headquarters. As such, it seems natural to
assume that cost-reduction activities are first independently carried out at the local level.
The results from these activities are then naturally transmitted to the group’s headquarters.
Given this decision-making configuration, we expect actions related to cost-reducing activities
taken in a specific network to generate a positive spillover on the operating costs of the
remaining operators of the group. These spillovers are a central point in our model. We
have in mind new methods, procedures or general knowledge that are generated in one
network and can be transmitted to another via the group’s structure. For instance, the
results of process R&D obtained in one location can spill-over to another operator through
12See Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2010) for an analysis of how the political color of the local authority affects
the negotiation of regulatory contracts in the French transportation industry.
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the group’s headquarters. This operator would therefore benefit from (part of) this R&D
without investing as much effort as it would have to if it were independent. Similarly,
the effort incurred to find a cheaper supplier in one network may reduce the need to look
for a cheaper supplier in another city. The bargaining of procurement contracts may also
be easier if the operator belongs to a group with relevant experience in other networks.
Likewise, methods to efficiently monitor employees could also be learned in a given place and
transmitted to another. Note, however, that the knowledge generated in a given location
may not necessarily be perfectly transferable or applicable to another network of the group.
In particular, its application and use in other locations will depend on specific network
characteristics and capabilities (such as input and/or network structure).
While the necessary amount of effort to reduce inefficiencies is affected by the group structure
a firm belongs to, we assume that it is still expensive to exert a given amount of effort. In
other words, we assume that the marginal cost of effort is not affected by the group structure.
For a given firm that belongs to group, this means that while the efforts exerted in the
remaining networks will affect its operational costs, the function ψ(e) will only depend on its
own effort. These network effects are not present for an independent network and its effort
level will therefore only depend on the type of contract it faces.
We now explicitly take into account these incentives through the cost function (2.1) that is
conditional on inefficiency θ and the effort level e. We first derive the optimal level of effort
for each operator and check how this effort depends on the incentives mentioned above.
Second, we plug back this equilibrium level of effort into the conditional cost function. This
will lead us to an unconditional structural cost function that can be estimated. Accounting
for these changes in incentives through the cost structure enables us to reduce the source of
misspecification and avoid biases in the estimation of the technological parameters.
Each industrial group g operates a set of urban networks Ng in quantity card (Ng) = ng.
Let Nfpg denote the set of networks that the group g operates under a FP contract, which
entails card
(
Nfpg
)
= nfpg networks. Similarly, let N
cp
g denote the set of networks that the
group g operates under a CP contract, which entails card (N cpg ) = n
cp
g networks. Hence, for
each group g we have that ng = n
fp
g + n
cp
g .
Under a fixed-price contract, each operator i determines the optimal effort level that maxi-
mizes the objective function
pii =

tfpi +R (qi)− Ci(C0i , θ, ei|β)− ψ (ei, α) if i is independent
tfpi +R (qi)− Ci(C0i , θg, eig, κige−ig|β)− ψ (eig, α) if i ∈ Ng,
(2.3)
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where R(q) = p(q)q denotes revenue and q measures transport demand.13 If the network is
independent, the optimal effort level efpi that maximizes its profit in (2.3)
is determined by the following first order condition:
− ∂Ci(C
0
i , θ, ei|β)
∂ei
=
∂ψi(ei, α)
∂ei
, (2.4)
which implies that the optimal level of effort efpi is chosen to equalize marginal cost savings
with the marginal disutility of effort.
For a firm belonging to a group, the optimal effort level will depend on the effort exerted by
the remaining members of the group. Each of the networks belonging to group g that are
under a FP contract satisfy the following first order conditions:
− ∂Ci(C
0
i , θg, eig, e−ig|β)
∂eig
=
∂ψi(eig, α)
∂eig
, ∀i ∈ Nfpg , (2.5)
which constitutes a system of nfpg equations. For a firm belonging to a group and under a
FP contract, the optimal effort level efpig is therefore conditional on the effort e−ig exerted
by the other members of the group:14
efpig = eig
(
C0i , θg, κige−ig | β, α
)
, ∀i ∈ Nfpg . (2.6)
Solving for the nfpg equations, we obtain the unconditional effort level:
efpig = eig
(
C0i , C
0
−i, θg, κig, n
fp
g |β, α
)
, ∀i ∈ Nfpg . (2.7)
Under a cost-plus contract, each operator i determines the optimal effort level that maximizes
the objective function
pii =

tcpi − ψ (ei, α) if i is independent
tcpi − ψ (eig, α) if i ∈ Ng.
(2.8)
13Note that transportation networks are industries where capacity (or supply) Q is adjusted to demand
levels q. As demand fluctuates during the day, the regulator determines the minimum capacity level that covers
all quantities of service demanded at any moment of the day. As capacity cannot adjust instantaneously to
demand levels, the minimum capacity level is always higher than demand. Hence commercial revenues are
determined by q, while costs are determined by Q.
14Note that for each network i, the effort efpig is decreasing in the effort of the remaining networks of the
group, e−ig. This free-riding problem naturally arises because the cost of effort is only paid by the local
network operator but benefits (at least partially) all members of the group.
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In this case, since positive effort is never rewarded under a CP regime, firm i will never
provide any effort, irrespective of whether it belongs to a larger industrial group. Hence we
have that the optimal effort level under a cost-plus contract is given by ecpig = e
cp
i = 0. Note
that setting the optimal effort under a CP contract to zero is a simple normalization that
we adopt for ease of exposition and tractability. We could as well assume that the operators
provide the minimum effort level that guarantees to some extent the renewal of the transport
concession from one period to another. There is no loss of generality because what matters
in our analysis is the difference efp − ecp.
Plugging these effort levels into the conditional cost function (2.2) yields the unconditional
cost function, namely,
Cρi (C
0
i , θ, e
ρ|β) =

C0i × φ (θ, eρi ) if i is independent
C0i × φ
(
θg, e
ρ
ig, κige
ρ
−ig
)
if i ∈ Ng,
(2.9)
where ρ = {fp, cp} refers to the type of contract. For a given firm i, equation (2.9) therefore
entails two different cost structures depending on the observed regulatory regime.
2.6 Econometric specification
We now turn to the econometric specification of our cost regulation framework. In order to
derive the structural cost function to be estimated, we need to assume a specific functional
form for the cost function in (2.9) and the disutility of effort ψi(e).
We assume a Cobb-Douglas specification for the cost function presented in (2.1). This spec-
ification retains the main properties desirable for a cost function while remaining tractable.
Alternative more flexible specifications such as the translog function lead to cumbersome
computations of the first order conditions when effort is unobservable. The primal cost
function is therefore specified as:
C0i = C
0
i (wi, Qi, Ii,Ki|β) = β0wβLLi w
βM
Mi
Q
βQ
i I
βI
i K
βK
i . (2.10)
We impose homogeneity of degree one in input prices, i.e. βL+βM = 1. In order to allow the
observed cost C to deviate from the cost frontier defined by (2.10), we specify the function
φ(·) to be the exponential function, so that (2.2) is now specified as
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Ci(C
0
i , θ, e|β) =

C0i × exp{θ − ei} if i is independent
C0i × exp{θg − eig − κig
∑
j 6=i
ejg} if i, j ∈ Ng.
(2.11)
We assume the internal cost of effort to be provided by the following convex function:
ψ (e) = exp {αe} − 1, α > 0, (2.12)
with ψ(0) = 0, ψ′(e) > 0, and ψ′′(e) > 0 and where α is a parameter to be estimated.
Using the specifications for the operating costs (2.11) and the cost of effort (2.12), we can
solve the first order conditions defined in the previous section to express the optimal effort
level for a network under a FP contract. We next determine the effort levels and the resulting
unconditional cost functions for the different operators according to their group status and
regulatory regimes.
Independent Networks
For an independent network i, the optimal effort level under a FP contract is given by the
solution to (2.4) and is expressed as:
efpi =
1
1 + α
(
ln(C0i )− ln(α) + θ
)
(2.13)
Recalling that ecpi = 0 and substituting back e
cp
i and e
fp
i into (2.11) allows us to obtain the
final forms for the cost functions Ccpi (·) and Cfpi (·) to be estimated for independent networks
as:
ln(Cfpi ) =
α
1 + α
[
ln(C0i ) + θ
]
+
1
1 + α
ln(α) (2.14)
and
ln(Ccpi ) = ln(C
0
i ) + θ. (2.15)
Note that equation (2.14) corresponds to the expression of the Cobb-Douglas cost function
which is usually estimated, i.e. when moral hazard in the form of presence of an effort
activity is not taken into account. Note also that lim
α→+∞
ln(Cfpi ) = ln(C
cp
i ), since the effort
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level under a FP contract converges to 0 when the cost-reducing technology parameter α
becomes infinitely large. This also translates into a lower effect of the inefficiency θ on the
final costs of operator i when the cost of exerting effort is lower.
Operators Belonging to Industrial Groups
If a network i belongs to a group and is under a FP contract, it will benefit from its own
cost reducing activity and from the efforts of the nfpg − 1 remaining operators that belong to
the same group and that are regulated under a fixed-price regimes as well.15 Thus, for any
industrial group g where nfpg ≥ 2 and for any i, j ∈ Nfpg :
efpig =
1(
1 + α+
(
nfpg − 1
)
κig
) ×

(
1 + α+
(
nfpg − 2
)
κig
)
(1 + α− κig) ln(C
0
i )
− κig
(1 + α− κig)
∑
j 6=i
ln(C0j ) + (θg − ln(α))
 . (2.16)
Notice how, for firm i, efpig now depends on the components defining the cost frontiers of the
remaining networks of the group,
∑
j 6=i
lnC0j . Plugging the optimal efforts and (2.16) back into
the cost function (2.11) allows us to obtain the final form for the cost functions Cfpig (·) to
be estimated.16 Hence if operator i is under a FP contract and belongs to a group g where
nfpg ≥ 2, then, ∀ j ∈ Nfpg , the final form for the cost function is given by:
ln(Cfpig ) =
α(
1 + α+
(
nfpg − 1
)
κig
)

(
1 + α+
(
nfpg − 2
)
κig
)
(1 + α− κig) ln(C
0
i )
− κig
(1 + α− κig)
∑
j 6=i
ln(C0j ) + θg
+ 1 + (nfpg − 1)κig
1 + α+
(
nfpg − 1
)
κig
ln(α). (2.17)
Note how the group inefficiency θg is reduced by the knowledge spillovers parameter κig.
When the latter grows larger, the efforts provided in the remaining networks of the group
have a larger effect on the reduction of the inefficiencies.The coefficient on the θgparameter
15Recall from (2.8) that firms under a CP contract never exert any effort in equilibrium.
16Note that it could also be the case that firm i belongs to a group and is the only operator under a FP
contract. In this case the cost function to be estimated would result in (2.14) since no other firm in the group
would exert any effort. However, we do not observe such cases in our data.
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is decreasing in κig :
∂
∂κig
[
α
1+α+(nfpg −1)κig
]
< 0. Likewise, the negative effect of the ineffi-
ciency parameter is reduced when the number of FP networks within the group, nfpg , in-
creases, as operator i can benefit from the efforts of a larger number of operators. Note also
that lim
κig→0
ln(Cfpig ) = ln(C
fp
i ), as network i only benefits from its own efforts when knowledge
spillovers are absent.
Recall that a network regulated under a cost-plus regime will never provide any effort, irre-
spective of whether it belongs to a group or not. However, if firm i belongs to group g, it
will still benefit from the efforts efpig provided by the n
fp
g remaining operators which belong
to the same industrial group and are regulated under a fixed-price regime. Thus if operator
i is under a CP contract and belongs to a group g where nfpg ≥ 1, then the effort in the nfpg
remaining networks is as in (2.16) and, ∀ j ∈ Nfpg , the final form for the cost function is
given by :
ln(Ccpig ) = ln(C
0
i )+
1(
1 + α+
(
nfpg − 1
)
κig
)
−κig∑
j 6=i
ln(C0j ) + (1 + α− κig) θg + nfpg κig ln(α)
 .
(2.18)
Again, the effect of the group inefficiency parameter θg is decreasing in the knowledge
spillovers parameter κig and in the number of FP networks within the group, n
fp
g .
Knowledge Spillovers
We expect the different networks belonging to group g to benefit asymmetrically from the
knowledge spillovers captured in the κig, depending on several characteristics. Not every
operator within a group can equally benefit from the effort exerted by other operators of the
group. In particular, how much an operator will benefit from the effort of other operators will
depend on how “close” they are. On the one hand, we might expect that similar networks
are more likely to benefit from each other’s effort. On the other hand, an operator may
have more to learn and to gain from the efforts of the remaining networks in their group.
Recall that the only networks that will put effort to reduce their operating costs are the
networks regulated under a FP scheme. Hence, we consider that the extent to which a given
operator can benefit from knowledge spillovers will depend on its similarity to the average
operator under a FP contract within its group. To account for these considerations, we
proxy the parameter κig to be a function of several explanatory variables which account for
the characteristics of the operator, the characteristics of the network where the service is
provided and the characteristics of the group g it belongs to:
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κig = κ
(
γg, δi, DIF
x
i−g
)
, (2.19)
where γg is a group fixed effect and δi is a firm fixed effect. DIF
x
i−g is an index which
measures structural differences in the x characteristic between the observed firm i and the
average firm under a FP contract gfp in group g.
In our estimations, we focus on the sample containing FP networks only. That is, for a
network i in period t, we estimate the cost function:
ln(Cfpit ) = ξ
G
it ln(C
fp
igt) + ξ
I
it ln(C
fp
it ) + εit, (2.20)
where ξGit takes value 1 if operator i belongs to one of the three main industrial groups, and
0 otherwise, while ξIit takes value 1 if operator i is independent, and 0 otherwise. The error
term εit accounts for potential measurement errors and is distributed according to a normal
density function with mean 0 and variance σ2ε .
2.7 Data and Empirical Results
We present the estimation results of our model which are obtained by estimating the struc-
tural cost function (2.20) by maximum likelihood. We first comment the construction of the
variables that enter the model.
2.7.1 Data and Variables
Different types of variables are required in order to identify our model. The cost equation
calls for covariates that capture elements of the economic environment. Concerning the
knowledge spillovers, we need variables that capture both group-specific and network-specific
characteristics. Summary statistics are given in table 2.2, where we distinguish operators
according to their group affiliation.
Estimating the Cobb-Douglas cost function requires information on the level of operating
costs, the quantity of output, capital, and the input prices. Total costs C are defined as the
sum of labor and material costs. Output Q is measured by the number of seatkilometers,
i.e., the number of seats available in all components of rolling stock times the total number
of kilometers traveled on all routes. In other words, this measure accounts for the length of
the network, the frequency of the service and the size of the fleet. Note that this is also a
measure of the quality of service. Capital K, which plays the role of a fixed input in our
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short-run cost function, is measured by the size of the rolling stock, which is the total number
of seats available. Infrastructure I, which also plays the role of a fixed input, is measured by
the total length of the transport network in kilometers. Since the authority owns the capital,
the operators do not incur capital costs. The average wage rate wl is obtained by dividing
total labor costs by the annual number of employees. The price of materials wm has been
constructed as the average fuel price for France (published by OECD).
Estimating the knowledge spillovers requires observations on the characteristics of the op-
erators, as well as on the features of the networks in which they operate and of the group
they belong to, if any. We construct a dummy variable for each specific network and another
dummy for each one of the three industrial groups (Connex, Keolis and Transdev). In order
to take into account for the fact that different operators from the same group may benefit
asymmetrically from knowledge spillovers, we construct a measure of the structural differ-
ences between a given firm and the average firm in the group. In particular, we define the
index DIF xi−g to be a measure of the difference in the x characteristic between the observed
firm i and the average firm under a FP contract in group g, x¯fpg :
DIF xi−g =
|xig − x¯fpg |
xig
.
In our estimations we consider different variables in order to calculate this index. In par-
ticular, we will focus on structural differences in the share of drivers and in the length of
the network. The share of drivers is obtained by dividing the number of drivers in each
network by the total labor force, which entails the bus drivers as well as engineers who are
responsible for the improvement of the operator’s productivity. The size of the network is
measured as the total length of the transport network in kilometers. Note that this variable
is also a proxy for the size of the operator. The sample that we use in our estimation is
an unbalanced panel composed of 67 different networks regulated under FP contracts and
contains 714 observations over the period 1987-2001.
2.7.2 Results
We turn now to the empirical results of our estimations. Table 2.3 displays the estimates
of three alternative specifications. In each of them, we consider only networks regulated
under FP contracts and test different explanatory variables that are used as proxies for the
firm-specific knowledge spillovers within each of the industrial groups, κig. We specify the
function κ in (2.19) to have a quadratic form in all specifications. The function includes a full
set of firm-specific dummy variables to control for unobserved network-specific characteristics
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as well as group-specific dummy variables to control for unobserved group characteristics. In
other words, we specify the function in (2.19) to take the following form:
κig =
(
γg + δi + µDIF
x
i−g
)2
. (2.21)
For each network i belonging to group g, the dummy variable γg measures group g’s contribu-
tion to the network’s capacity to assimilate the knowledge spilled over by the other networks
from the group. The dummy variable δi measures the network’s specificities that will affect
its capacity to benefit from the knowledge spillovers. These are aimed at capturing unob-
served network characteristics that affect its ability to assimilate the spillovers coming from
the other networks of the group. As an example, consider the firms operating the transport
services in the French cities of Lille and Lyon, both belonging to the Keolis group. If the
mechanic team in Lille develops a new method for repairing its buses’ windshields, part of
this knowledge is reached by the mechanic team in Lyon through Keolis’ headquarters.17
While the overall efficiency of both networks is similar and determined by the Keolis group,
the mechanic team in Lyon may the have local characteristics which would affect its ability
to fully benefit from the effort exerted by Lille’s mechanic team.
Finally, we include the structural difference between a given firm and the average firm under
a FP contract in the group, DIF xi−g. In specification I, it is measured using the size of the
network (the total length in kilometers). We compute this index using the share of drivers
in specification II.
Consider first the estimates related to the output and input variables in table 2.3. All
parameter are significant at the 1% level and have the expected sign. Note that the parameter
are very stable across each specification. The disutility of effort parameter, α, is also positive
in both specifications, although only significant in specification II.
The effect of our similarity indexes on the knowledge spillovers parameter are positive and
significant in both specifications. This result means that networks that present larger differ-
ence relative to their group (measured either in terms of drivers or length of the network)
benefit to a larger extent from the efforts provided in the other networks from their group.
As already mentioned in section 5, we consider the network’s intrinsic inefficiency, captured
by the parameter θg in equation (2.17), to be group-specific. Indeed, each one of the oper-
ators belonging to group g possesses a team of engineers which is responsible for research
development, quality control, maintenance, and efficiency of the network. We consider that
their efficiency is determined at the group level rather than being independently determined.
17This example is taken from Barbosa (2009).
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The estimates of the group dummy variables θg appear positive and highly significant. Ir-
respective of the specification, Keolis appears to be the most efficient group, followed by
Connex and Transdev. Finally, it is interesting to note the differences in the coefficients
on the group dummy variables entering the knowledge spillovers parameter, γg. The latter
appear to be negative for each group, although it is much larger in absolute value for Connex
in both specifications.
Evaluating Knowledge Spillovers
Having these estimates in hands, we are able to derive the estimated κˆig for each network at
each period. In order to test the relevance of the knowledge spillovers in our regulation model,
we compute an average value of the knowledge spillovers parameter for each of the three
different groups. Table 2.4 presents the results derived from each of our specifications. The
estimates show statistically significant knowledge spillovers, confirming our hypothesis that
operators belonging to a same group benefit from the efforts exerted by all the networks of
the group. Our results also present differences across groups, with larger knowledge spillover
values for the Connex and Transdev groups. Note that these two groups are the ones with
the largest proportions of networks under a FP contract, highlighting the importance of this
component for the knowledge spillover effects to take place.
2.8 Simulations
The resulting estimates of our structural model of regulation allow us to produce a series of
counterfactual exercises. The effect of adding extra operators to a group on the final oper-
ating costs of the group members is of particular interest. Indeed, if we expect companies
to benefit from knowledge spillovers, operating extra networks should help in reducing the
costs of operators already in place. Another counterfactual of interest is to see what would
be the effect of a merger between two groups. While such an event will undoubtedly reduce
competition in the industry, it could nonetheless be beneficial if it leads to important cost
reductions due to knowledge spillovers. In what follows we propose to simulate such coun-
terfactuals in order to illustrate the potential impacts of knowledge spillovers in the French
transport industry. We start by analyzing the effects of adding new operators to the existing
groups.
Chapter 2. Knowledge Spillovers in Cost-Reduction Incentives 64
2.8.1 Group expansion
Our model predicts that a given network i belonging to a given group g will benefit from
the efforts exerted by the remaining firms in the group through the knowledge spillovers
parameter κig. We now focus our attention on the effect of increasing the number of operators
in a given group, while maintaining the knowledge spillovers parameter constant. To do this,
we consider a hypothetical scenario where a new operator is added to a given group and
compute the cost difference resulting from that change in the group structure. We perform
our simulation exercise as follows. We start by considering each operator to be the only
member of its group. That is, if for example operator A originally belongs to Keolis, we
consider that it is now part of a new group composed of only 1 network (namely, itself).
Under this hypothetical situation, we compute the total operating cost for each operator in
the sample. The next step consists in evaluating the cost change that each operator would
face if a new network were added to its respective group (which, so far, consisted in only
1 network). From our cost function in (2.17), we compute the total cost associated with
the operator belonging to a group composed of 2 networks. We assume the operator that
is added to the group to be the representative operator of the group to which the initial
network belongs. Following the example above, we would therefore add to the group of
operator A (initially composed of only 1 network) an operator that is representative of the
Keolis group (i.e. an operator characterized by the average values of the operators from
Keolis).18 Similarly, and using the same reasoning, we can compute the effect of adding a
larger number of networks into the group. Once the simulation exercise is completed, we can
easily compute the cost differential associated with the increase in group size from x to x+p
operators. That is, we can compute 4xpCfpig ≡
(
Cfpig | nfpg = x+ p
)
−
(
Cfpig | nfpg = x
)
for
x, p = {1, 2, 3, . . .}.
Tables 2.5 to 2.7 present the results of this simulation exercise using the estimates derived
from specification II. 19 Results show significant costs reductions from being linked to a larger
number of networks. In particular, the cost savings are increasing importantly with the
number of operators that are added to the group. Note also that the effect of an additional
network varies in function of the initial group size. Although to a small extent, the cost
reduction associated with an extra operator is decreasing in the size of the group. Finally,
note that the different groups benefit from the inclusion of additional operators to different
extents. In particular, and in accordance with the knowledge spillovers values presented in
table 2.4, Connex and Transdev benefit to a larger extent from the inclusion of extra networks
into their group.
18Note that for any operator i that belongs to group g, the variable DIF xi−g is unaffected by the addition
of an operator that is representative of the existing firms already in the group. It follows that the knowledge
spillovers parameter κig is unaffected by such a change.
19The simulations based on the estimates derived from specifications I show similar results.
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2.8.2 Merger
As already mentioned, industrial groups of urban transport have a long history of mergers
in France. The last merger that was witnessed in the French transport industry occurred on
March 3rd 2011 and involved Veolia Transport (the former Connex) and Transdev, which
gave birth to Veolia Transdev. Our model allows us to simulate such a merger and to evaluate
the potential gains in costs for the merging groups, namely Connex and Transdev.20 Several
assumption must be made on the post merger outcomes regarding our parameters. We first
assume that the inefficiency level of the group resulting from the merger (Veolia Transdev
in our example) will take the value of the most efficient merging group. In other words,
we assume that the less efficient group is absorbed by the most efficient one. In all of our
estimations above, the estimated parameters θˆg show that Connex is the most efficient group
of the two since θˆTransdev > θˆConnex . We therefore assume that θV eoliaTransdev = θConnex
in our simulations. Similarly, we assume that, after the merger, the group-specific capacity
to transmit knowledge will be the highest of the two merging groups. In all of our esti-
mations results, the estimated parameters γˆg show that Transdev has the highest capacity
to transmit knowledge among its operators since γˆTransdev >γˆConnex. We therefore assume
that γV eoliaTransdev =γTransdev in our simulations. Finally, note the difference between this
simulation exercise and the one we carried in the previous section. In the latter, we com-
puted the cost reduction associated with an increase in the group size while maintaining
the knowledge spillover parameter κ constant. Here, κ will also change as a result of the
merger since the operators entering the new group are not necessarily representative of the
ones already in place within the group.21 Table 2.8 presents the results of the merger sim-
ulation exercise using the estimates derived from each of our specifications. For each one
of the merging groups, each cell in the table presents the average percentage change in the
operators’ costs following the merger. The results are very similar across each specification
and show important gains in costs from the merger. In particular, cost reductions are very
important for operators initially belonging to Connex, sometimes twice as large as the cost
reductions for operators initially belonging to Transdev. This last fact is perhaps not sur-
prising for two reasons. First, according to our results in table 4, Connex is the group that
benefits the most, on average, from knowledge spillovers. Second, Transdev is the group
with the largest number of networks regulated under FP contracts (see table 2.1). It follows
that, after the merger, the operators initially belonging to Connex see their number of FP
networks increase much more relative to operators initially belonging to Transdev. For in-
stance, in our first year of data (1987), Connex was present in 5 different networks regulated
20Note, however, that our simulation does not correspond with the same years in which the actual merger
occurred. Since we simulate the merger with our entire sample that covers the period 1987-2001, it is as if
the merger had occurred in 1987.
21Recall that the simulation exercise in section 2.8.1 was realized by adding representative operators to a
group, maintaining constant the DIF xi−gvariable throughout the exercise (see footnote 18).
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under a FP contract while Transdev was present in 15 such networks. After a merger, the
operators initially belonging to Transdev would therefore see the number of FP networks in
their group increase by a third (from 15 to 20) while operators initially belonging to Connex
would see the number of such networks quadruple (from 5 to 20). It is however important to
highlight that our model does not capture the fact that not all of the 15 FP networks from
Transdev will equally contribute to Connex’s cost savings when the merger takes place (nor
will all of the 5 FP networks from Connex equally contribute to Transdev’s cost savings).
In particular, one might expect merging parties to show decreasing returns to the number of
merging networks with a given set of characteristics. To illustrate this point, consider table
2.9 which presents a measure of the congestion levels of the different FP networks involved
in our merger simulation.22 While Connex will benefit from the efforts of all 15 networks
from Transdev after the merger, our previous results have suggested that it will benefit from
them based on their characteristics rather than based on their number. For instance, table
2.9 indicates that Connex operates a single network with a congestion level of around 850
inhabitants per km of line. Transdev, on the other hand, is operating 5 different networks
with congestion levels within this range (between 600 and 950 inhabitants per km of line).
It therefore seems natural to think that the relevant knowledge that Connex would benefit
from would come for these 5 networks as a whole. Given that our model and simulation does
not explicitly take this consideration into account, the results from our simulations should
be taken as an upper bound on the potential gains that could follow from the merger and
should be interpreted with caution. In the same line, one must still take into account that
the main trade-off involved in a merger evaluation is between potential efficiency gains re-
sulting from consolidation versus the potential increases in price and potential deterioration
of the quality of the transportation service. It is therefore important to highlight that our
simulations only allow us to evaluate one part of this trade-off, namely the potential gains
in costs that would follow from the merger. From that perspective, our results confirm the
importance of considering the structure of the industrial transportation groups at the time
of evaluating mergers in the French transportation industry.
2.9 Conclusion
In this paper we identify and measure the relevance of knowledge spillovers in urban transport
regulation. We take advantage of a specific feature of the French urban transport industry,
namely that about eighty percent of the operators that provide the transport services in each
city are owned by three large industrial groups. The transport services provided in differ-
ent networks by operators belonging to the same industrial group are therefore essentially
22These are networks that were operated by either Connex or Transdev in 1987, the first year of our data,
and our congestion measure is computed as the ration of the population over the size of the network in
kilometers.
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provided by the same firm. On top of that, the activity of every network is regulated by a
local authority within a specific regulatory framework. The latter takes the form of a written
contract that can be, in practice, either cost-plus or fixed-price. While effort to compensate
technological inefficiencies is not rewarded under a cost-plus contract, fixed-price contracts
provides powerful incentives to reduce operating costs.
When operators belong to a same group, the new methods and procedures that they develop
can potentially be used by the entire company. We build and estimate a structural cost
regulation model with asymmetric information that includes knowledge spillovers resulting
from operating different networks. By focusing our analysis on operators regulated under
fixed-price contracts, we ask whether their linkage through a larger group helps them further
reduce their operating costs.
Our results show statistically significant knowledge spillovers, confirming the existence of rel-
evant knowledge spillovers in the French public urban transportation industry. Furthermore,
several simulation exercises derived from our estimates show that operators gain significantly
from being linked to a larger number of networks within a group. In particular, the cost re-
ductions following the addition of new operators into a group is increasing in the number
of networks added. Finally, the simulation of a merger between the Connex and Transdev
groups, as actually occurred on March 3rd 2011, show important costs reductions for the
operators involved, between 24% and 49%. Our results therefore provide evidence on the
importance of taking knowledge spillovers into account when evaluating the economic effects
of mergers.
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of regulatory contracts and group affiliation.
Variable Name Frequency Percent
Networks 87
Observations corresponding to FP contract 61.0
Belongs to a group if under FP contract 83.1
Changes in contract type 23
Changes from CP to FP 18
Changes of operator 5
Changes from group operator to indep. operator 2
Changes from indep. operator to group operator 1
changes from group operator to group operator 2
Operator belongs to a group 78.6
FP if operator belongs to a group 64.5
Operator is independent 21.4
FP if operator is independent 48.2
Operator belongs to Keolis 410
FP if operator belongs to Keolis 51.7
Operator belongs to Transdev 269
FP if operator belongs to Transdev 90.7
Operator belongs to Connex 241
FP if operator belongs to Connex 56.9
Note: CP refers to cost-plus contracts and FP refers to fixed price contracts
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics by type of operator
Type of operator
Belongs to group Independent
Name Variable Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev.
Cost (Euros) C 18157.23 26883.30 6473.55 5261.45
Revenue (Euros) R(q) 8400.05 13322.25 2765.65 2299.52
Production (Seat-kilometers) Q 579178.70 748774.50 240941.80 181420.00
Wage (Euros) wL 29.66 5.72 29.11 6.36
Price of materials (Index) wM 1.17 0.20 1.18 0.20
Size of the network (Kil.) length 256.05 223.84 153.51 87.49
% of drivers in the labor force Drive 0.72 0.08 0.74 0.07
Note: Group refer to operators belonging to either Keolis, Transdev or Connex.
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Table 2.3: Structural Estimation Results
Name Parameter I II
Constant −3.648∗∗∗ −3.684∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.109)
Connex θConnex 0.545
∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.052)
Keolis θKeolis 0.418
∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.046)
Transdev θTransdev 0.630
∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.053)
Wage βL 0.279
∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.034)
Production βQ 1.042
∗∗∗ 1.059∗∗∗
(0.199) (0.148)
Infrastructure βI 0.124
∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗
(0.023) (0.021)
Cost of effort ln(α) 1.719 1.624∗∗
(1.053) (0.708)
Connex γConnex −0.242∗∗ −0.225∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.070)
Keolis γKeolis −0.119∗ −0.068∗∗
(0.069) (0.031)
Trans γTrans −0.121 -0.076∗
(0.074) (0.039)
Dif Length DIFLeni−g 0.008
∗∗
(0.003)
Dif Drivers DIFDrii−g 0.072
∗∗∗
(0.024)
Stand. Dev. error σ 0.102
∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Firms fixed effects δi yes yes
Number of observations 714 714
Note: The sample contains networks regulated under a FP contract. Standard errors
in parenthesis. ***: Significant at 1%, **: Significant at 5%, *: Significant at 10%.
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Table 2.4: Average Knowledge Spillovers by Group
Specification
Group I II
Connex 0.017 0.015
(0.001) (0.001)
Keolis 0.007 0.005
(0.000) (0.000)
Transdev 0.014 0.012
(0.000) (0.000)
Note: Each cell represents the average knowledge
spillovers of the corresponding group, computed
as κ¯g =
1
n
fp
g
∑
i∈g
κˆig . Standard errors are in
parenthesis.
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Table 2.8: Percentage changes in total costs after merger
Specification
Group I II
Connex -49.28 -43.18
(4.632) (4.398)
Transdev -23.88 -24.02
(0.779) (0.763)
Note: Each cell gives the average percentage change in
the total costs of the operators of the corresponding
merging group. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Table 2.9: Congestion rate for the networks operated by Connex and Transdev in 1987
Group
Transdev Connex
Le Creusot 354.7
Thionville 393.0
Longwy 602.3
Valenciennes 668.7
Orleans 790.2
Montpellier 860.5
Bayonne 944.6
Toulouse 1068.5
Ajaccio 1212.5
Limoges 1340.6
Metz 1341.1
Agen 1465.0
Grenoble 1480.2
Macon 1904.4
Strasbourg 2136.4
Niort 847.2
Dunkerque 1336.3
Nice 1350.3
Cannes 1562.5
Aubagne 2116.1
Note: Each cell gives the network congestion rate as
the total number of inhabitants per km of line in 1987.
Chapter 3
Digital Music Consumption on the
Internet: Evidence from
Clickstream Data
3.1 Introduction
In the last decade, digitization has dramatically affected most of the media industries. Dig-
ital technologies have allowed to drastically reduce the costs of copying and disseminating
information. In the case of the music industry, these costs reductions have lead to major
gains for consumer who can now easily enjoy and benefit from a wider range of products at
a minimal cost. Music producers, on the other hand, have for many years feared the advent
of digitization, and in particular piracy, in which they saw a major threat to their revenues.
Understanding how technological change and digitization have affected the music industry
as a whole is important in order to assess its effects on welfare.
In order to promote innovation and maximize welfare, copyright protection trades off the costs
of limiting access to a creative work (e.g. a song) against the benefits of providing incentives
to create it (Landes and Posner, 1989). By effectively weakening copyright protection, music
piracy may wreak havoc with the objective of maximizing society’s welfare. Understanding
the effects of piracy is therefore of major importance from a public policy perspective. The
increase of illegal music consumption is worrisome because it could lead to a decrease in music
producers’ revenues and consequently to a reduction of the supply of innovative music. A
necessary condition for this claim to hold true, however, is that legal and illegal consumption
of music must be reasonably close substitutes. In this case, songs obtained via unauthorized
channels effectively depress sales since they would otherwise have been purchased. Illegal
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music consumption is therefore only a potential threat to artistic production inasmuch as it
displaces legal consumption.1
The impact of music piracy on legal sales of music has been studied extensively in the
empirical literature, focusing mainly on legal music sales in the form of physical CDs. Most
studies find that piracy harms revenues, with estimated sales displacement rate far below
one. That is, music consumers are found to substitute legal music consumption for illegal
music consumption, but much of what is consumed illegally would not have been purchased
if piracy was not available. There is a rather clear consensus on the negative effects of online
piracy on the off-line physical sales of recorded music. This naturally leads to a concern about
the potential negative effect that piracy could have on the flow of music to be delivered to
market.2
Since the launch of the iTunes music store in 2003, the availability to purchase legal digital
songs changed individuals’ music consumption alternatives. Instead of having to buy a whole
CD, the alternative to downloading any particular digital song illegally is now to purchase
it in MP3 format. As emphasized in Waldfogel (2010), the appearance of file-sharing and
downloading technology might have different effects on sales, depending on whether the legal
option is a 12-song CD or a` la carte songs. Consider an individual interested in a few songs
of a given artist. While she may not consider buying the entire album (which also contains
unknown songs) when offered the possibility to freely download these specific songs, she might
nevertheless be willing to pay for them individually. The effect of downloading on individual
songs and albums may therefore be different, and one can easily imagine a circumstance in
which file-sharing would hurt album sales more than it hurts song sales.
The empirical literature on music piracy has paid much less attention to the effect of illegal
music consumption on the legal sales of digital music. In this paper, we ask whether online
music consumers perceive illegal digital music as a close substitute to legal digital music
consumption. We therefore revisit the question of sales displacement in the digital era,
adding evidence to a fundamental debate in the economics of copyright. Second, we analyze
how online music streaming affects the purchases of digital music, a question that has received
very little attention in the empirical literature thus far. Finally, a key contribution to this
paper is the originality of its dataset, which helps us circumvent the inherent difficulties in
studying illegal behavior such as file-sharing. Our approach relies on a novel dataset that
enables us to follow a large sample of Internet users and their online behavior in five EU
1Note that this is only a necessary, but not sufficient condition. One must in particular take the effects of
digitization on the costs of production into account. These could indeed potentially benefit both producers
and consumers alike and offset the potentially negative effect of piracy (Waldfogel, 2012c). See Oberholzer-
Gee and Strumpf (2010) for an extended discussion on file-sharing, copyright protection and the incentives to
create, market and distribute new works.
2The empirical litterature has nevertheless failed to identified any negative effect of digitization on the
supply of music brought to market (Handke, 2012; Waldfogel, 2011, 2012a,b).
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countries during 2011. For each of the individuals in our sample, we observe both information
on demographic characteristics and on the webpages visited during the year. This allows us
to identify specific visits on websites related to music consumption, both legal and illegal.
Tracking individual online behavior also allows us to construct other variables reflective of
otherwise unobserved characteristics, such as taste for music. All of these features, combined
with the panel structure of our data, allows us to control for many forms of unobserved
heterogeneity that would otherwise jeopardize the identification of a causal effect of illegal
downloading (and legal online streaming) on the legal purchases of digital music.
Perhaps surprisingly, our results present no evidence of digital music sales displacement.
While we find important cross country differences in the effects of downloading on music
purchases, our findings suggest a rather small complementarity between these two music
consumption channels. It seems that the majority of the music that is consumed illegally by
the individuals in our sample would not have been purchased if illegal downloading websites
were not available to them. The complementarity effect of online streaming is found to be
somewhat larger, suggesting a stimulating effect of this activity on the sales of digital music.
Taken at face value, our findings indicate that digital music piracy does not displace legal
music purchases in digital format. This means that although there is trespassing of private
property rights (copyrights), there is unlikely to be much harm done on digital music revenues.
This result, however, must be interpreted in the context of a still evolving music industry.
It is in particular important to note that music consumption in physical format has until
recently accounted for the lion’s share of total music revenues.3 If piracy leads to substantial
sales displacement of music in physical format, then its effect on the overall music industry
revenues may well still be negative.
We cannot draw policy implications at the industry-wide level, as our analysis is only con-
fined to the digital segment of the music industry. Nonetheless, digital music revenues to
record companies are growing substantially. They increased more than 1000% during the
period 2004-2010, and grew 8% globally in 2011 to an estimated US$5.2 billion, reflecting
the importance of digitization in the music industry (IFPI, 2011, 2012).4 From that per-
spective, our findings suggest that digital music piracy should not be viewed as a growing
concern for copyright holders in the digital era. In addition, our results indicate that new
music consumption channels such as online streaming positively affect copyrights owners.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes the underlying
theory as well as the relevant literature on the subject. It presents the results of the main
3In the case of the UK, it is indeed only in the first quarter of 2012 that sales from digital sales surpassed
sales of traditional CDs and records for the first time, see http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2012/may/31/
digital-music-spending-bpi.
4This compares to growth of 5% in 2010 and represents the first time the year-on-year growth rate has
increased since IFPI started measuring digital revenues in 2004 (IFPI, 2012).
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empirical studies on the effects of piracy on record sales. Section 3.3 presents the data and
the different variables used in the estimation. Section 3.4 presents our empirical approach
and the results of our estimations. Finally, section 3.5 discusses the results and concludes.
3.2 Theory and Related Literature
Economic theory does not provide a clear prediction for how illegal downloading should affect
legal music consumption.5 The crucial point is to know whether illegal consumption (the
downloading of an album or a song) would have been converted into legal consumption (the
purchase of that same album or song) in the absence of illegal consumption channels. If
the albums consumed through illegal channels are valued above their price by the consumer,
then there is indeed sales displacement: the consumer would have bought the album had
she not downloaded it. If, however, the consumer’s valuation is below the album’s price,
then no sales displacement occurs: the consumer would not have bought the album had she
not downloaded it. Given the heterogeneity of consumers, the willingness to pay will be
above the market price for some and below the market price for others, leading to an average
displacement rate between zero and one. Considering this simple static configuration, it
follows that the availability of illegal music consumption channels unambiguously increases
welfare.6 All instances of sales displacement will simply convert some of the producers’
revenues into consumers surplus, while illegal consumption from low valuation individuals
(individuals with valuations lower than the price) will increase consumer surplus without
hurting revenues (Rob and Waldfogel, 2006; Waldfogel, 2010).
Illegal music consumption could also, in theory, stimulate legal music consumption. Since
music is an experience good, file sharing can allow consumers to sample specific songs or
albums which can inform them on what to buy. Similarly, the sampling of a specific song
may stimulate individual demand for other songs by the same artist (Shapiro and Varian,
1999; Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2006; Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010).
Given all these considerations, the question of whether consumers’ ability to illegally obtain
free recorded music displaces legal music consumption remains an empirical one. An impor-
tant and still growing amount of research has explored this question, using different data
sources and different approaches. The reasons for the inherent difficulty in measuring the
effect of illegal downloading on legal music sales are twofold. First, downloading is an illegal
behavior, which renders is measurement difficult. It is therefore not easy to obtain data on
unpaid consumption nor to link it to data on paid music consumption. Second, assuming
5We will use the terms downloading and file sharing interchangeably to refer to illegal music consumption
in the remainder of the text.
6Note that this leaves out the dynamic considerations of the issue.
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that such data is available, identifying the causal effect of downloading on legal purchases is
made difficult by the non-experimental nature of the data. The main challenge to overcome is
the existence of unobserved heterogeneity that renders the downloading variable potentially
endogenous.
Empirical researchers have pursued different types of strategies to come around these diffi-
culties. A first set of papers uses time series data at the geographic level in order to compare
the music sales levels in different location over time. The main idea is then to ask whether
places with higher levels of piracy (typically proxied by measures of Internet broadband pen-
etration) present lower levels of sales. Some studies following this approach include Hui and
Png (2003), Peitz and Waelbroeck (2004), Zentner (2009) and Liebowitz (2008), all of which
find some displacement of physical music purchases by illegal downloads.
A second category of papers uses product level data (i.e. record data) to see whether records
that are downloaded more are purchased more or less. Some researchers have used natural
experiments to identify the causal effect of piracy on sales. Danaher et al. (2012) use the
HADOPI graduated response law in France as an exogenous shock and compare iTunes music
sales in France to sales in a set of other European countries. They find that HADOPI caused
a 22.5% increase in song sales and a 25% in album sales relative to sales in the control group,
which is consistent with Internet piracy displacing legal iTunes sales.
Often lacking such natural experiments, others researchers have used an instrumental variable
approach to deal with the endogeneity of piracy. In a widely cited paper, Oberholzer-Gee
and Strumpf (2007) construct a weekly panel of album sales and illegal downloads. They use
the number of German secondary school students who are on holidays in specific weeks as
instruments for downloads and find that file sharing has an effect on sales that is statistically
indistinguishable from zero. Ina recent study, Hammond (2012) focuses on pre-release file
sharing, in which file sharers download sound recordings that are not yet publicly available.
Using instrumental variables to deal with the endogeneity of file sharing, he finds that the
causal effect of file sharing of an album on its sales is essentially zero.
The third approach used in the empirical literature is to use individual-level (survey) data,
asking whether consumers who engage in illegal music consumption engage in more or less
paid consumption.7 When using cross-sectional data, the presence of unobserved heterogene-
ity across individuals (in particular music taste) is an important obstacle to the identification
of the causal effect of downloading on legal purchases. Using a survey administered to U.S.
university students in 2003, Rob and Waldfogel (2006) rely on an instrumental variable ap-
proach with access to broadband as a source of exogenous variation in downloading. They
find that each album download reduces purchases by about .2 in their sample. Zentner
(2006) follows a similar approach using a cross-section of 15000 European individuals in
7See also Rob and Waldfogel (2007) and Bai and Waldfogel (2012) for the case of movie piracy.
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2001. Instrumenting for piracy using Internet connection speed as well as levels of Internet
sophistication, he finds that people who self-report downloading music are also less likely to
have recently purchased music.
As highlighted by Smith and Telang (2012), there are two main interpretation challenges that
arise when using a survey-based approach. First, the conclusions are, inevitably, tied to the
chosen sample. This is problematic if one believes that the sample is not representative of
the overall population of interest. Although a study based on a sample of university students
may still lead to insightful results, one cannot generalize them to a population other than the
one of college students. Second, surveys can be affected by inaccurate recall or obfuscation
from the respondents. In particular, individuals my voluntarily under- or over- represent
their actual purchase or illicit behavior.
Although some specific papers fail to find evidence of sales displacement, the emerging con-
sensus on the effect of piracy is that unpaid consumption depresses music sales. The dis-
placement effects found are, however, typically less than 1, indicating that much of what is
downloaded would not have been purchased in the absence of illegal consumption channels.
With the exception of Danaher et al. (2012), all of the above studies use data drawn from
times in which the standard legal option offered by the music industry was a physical CD.
Using two surveys of undergraduate college students, Waldfogel (2010) analyzes the effect
of piracy when legal digital options are available. He finds, however, that the rate of sales
displacement in both samples is similar to the one observed before legal digital options were
available. More specifically, each additional downloaded song is found to reduce paid con-
sumption by between a third and a sixth of a legally purchased song. A recent study shows
results that go in the opposite direction. Using survey data on a sample of 2000 French indi-
viduals, Bastard et al. (2012) find that while piracy has a negative effect on the probability to
purchase music in CD format, it has a positive effect on the probability of downloading music
legally. Hence legal music downloading and piracy are complements rather than substitutes
in their sample. Finally, DangNguyen et al. (2012) is, to our knowledge, the only empirical
study that analyzes the effect of streaming on music purchases. Based on survey data on
2000 French consumers, they find that consuming music as streams has no significant effect
on CDs purchases but is a complement to buying music online. Our findings are in line with
the results of this recent research.
The limited number of studies analyzing the effect of piracy on sales in times when con-
sumers are offered legal digital alternatives therefore offers rather mixed results. Given the
importance of copyright protection in the promotion of innovation and welfare, this scarce
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amount of evidence calls for further research on that crucial question.8
Several features of our data allow us to contribute to the existing literature presented above.
First, we have access to a sample of Internet users that is representative of the online popu-
lation in five different European countries in terms of gender and age. As opposed to studies
based on specific samples (e.g. college students), the results of our analysis therefore need
not be restricted to a particular part of the population. Second, contrary to studies based on
individual surveys, our data does not rely on subjective assessment from Internet users but
on actual consumption patterns. In particular, browsing activity of Internet users allow us
to construct many specific variables (such as proxies for interest in music) that will allow us
to control for otherwise unobserved individual characteristics. Finally, the panel dimension
of our data will allow us to further control for time invariant unobservables. We now turn to
a detail presentation of our data.
3.3 Data and Variables
3.3.1 The Data
The original data on which we rely comes from Nielsen NetView, which is Nielsen’s Internet
audience measurement service. It uses metered measurement of representative panels of
Internet users to track usage across websites and digital applications. The service also reports
demographic information on the Internet users. Nielsen initially aims at gathering a sample
that is representative of the overall Internet audience at home for people aged at least 2 years
old and with access to Internet in each country.
The Nielsen Clickstream Data provides a very rich set of information on both consumers’
demographic characteristics and online behavior. The sample that we have available contains
information on 5000 individuals for each of the five largest European economies: France, Ger-
many, Italy, Spain and the UK. First, we have access to information about the socioeconomic
characteristics of each user. In particular, we observe gender, age, education, occupation,
household income, household size, presence of children in the household and region of resi-
dence. Second, the original database contains all the clicks of each of the 25,000 Internet user
for the period going from January 1st, 2011 to December 31st, 2011. For each of these clicks,
we observe the URL of the webpage visited and the time at which it was visited, the dura-
tion of time that the webpage is viewed and a classification of the webpage according to its
content. There is a total of 15 different categories, which contain a total of 83 subcategories.
8Some empirical studies have looked at the effect of piracy on the legal consumption of other digital content.
See for example Danaher et al. (2010) for the case of television content and Danaher and Smith (2013) for
the case of movie digital sales.
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The main task that needed to be carried out was the identification and classification of
websites related to music consumption. By that we mean websites whose direct purpose is
the listening of music. These can take several forms, which constitute our different categories
of music consumption: music downloading, music streaming, music-video streaming, and
radio. The downloading and streaming categories can further be divided into legal and
illegal websites.9 We will restrict our analysis to the sample of individuals who consume
music through legal purchases, illegal downloading or legal streaming, meaning that we leave
out the individuals that never visited one of these specific music consumption websites during
2011. We consider individuals aged between 10 and 75. The focus of our study is to analyze
the relationship between several channels of digital music consumption, and in particular
on the causal effect of illegal downloading and legal streaming on legal purchases of digital
music. We therefore focus on individuals that are involved in either one of these three
activities. After dropping individuals with missing values, we are left with a total of 16,290
individuals.10
3.3.1.1 Websites
We identified a total of 2,759 music consumption related websites in our database, which
amounted to a total of 5,054,389 clicks during 2011. The classification of websites was done
by going on the mostly visited ones and checking their purpose and origin. We decided to
restrict our attention to the websites that had received more than 300 clicks during 2011,
leaving us with a total number of 779 websites to check manually.11 Since the distribution
of clicks is very concentrated on specific websites, our selection of websites covers 4,956,243
clicks, i.e. 98% of the total clicks.
It is important to note that we are only able to observe the number of clicks on a given
website and that we do not have a precise description of the individual behavior for each
click. Rather than measuring actual consumption or purchases, our data therefore gives a
measure of the propensity to consume music. We believe, however, that this is still a good
approximation to actual consumption. We see no specific reason for which an individual
would go on a music-consumption website with other purposes than to consume music. While
this is especially true for illegal downloading and legal streaming websites, the proportion of
clicks that lead to a purchase for visits on legal purchasing websites could be expected to be
9The observations on illegal music streaming websites are quite scarce in our data set.
10Missing values come mainly from the demographic variables, where some individuals failed to respond.
Note that our panel can be constructed at pretty much any time dimension. We have constructed one version
at the week level (52 observations per individual and one version at the month level (12 observations per
individual). As expected the weekly version contains many more 0 values than the monthly version.
11Notice that the total number of visits (clicks) accounts for the overall database. Less than 300 clicks
therefore means less than 1 visit a day among 25,000 individuals in 5 different countries, a rather small
number.
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lower due to simple browsing activity. Still, we believe that this (possibly) lower fraction of
purchasing-clicks does not reflect any particular individual characteristic. In particular, we
do not expect individuals to go window-shopping on legal purchasing websites in order to
illegally download after their visit. First, information on specific albums, songs or artists can
be found on other music-specific websites, so it is not clear why consumers should use legal
purchasing websites for such purposes. Second, we believe information on songs’ prices to
be almost perfectly known to consumers before they go on legal purchasing websites, ruling
out visits solely related to price information seeking. These features of our data suggest that
our variables of interest are measured with some errors. Our coefficient may therefore suffer
from attenuation bias, which would potentially bias them toward zero.
Our analysis is also affected by another related feature of the dataset. Many large retailers
such as Amazon sell, among many other things, music in digital format. Our inability to
observe precise consumer behavior within each website therefore prevents us from classifying
any visit on websites such as Amazon in a music consumption category. Note, however, that
this feature will only lower the number of clicks to music purchasing websites, potentially
driving our results in favor of a substitution effect. Last, visits on illegal peer-to-peer file
sharing websites do not allow us to differentiate between the file sharing of music files and
other types of files such as movies or books. We believe, however, that this variable is
still a very good proxy for the ability to obtain recorded music without paying. Note that
this feature is likely to overestimate the number of clicks that we identify as illegal music
downloading, potentially driving our results in favor of a substitution effect.
3.3.1.2 Variables
Our econometric specification requires the construction of a set of variables that measure or
proxy the determinants of legal digital music purchases. Aside from the type of individual
socioeconomic characteristics mentioned above, we need variables related to the individual’s
online activity. First, we expect some other forms of entertainment to be related to the
consumption of digital music. For each individual, we therefore consider the number of clicks
on websites related to the following activities: online shopping, books & magazines, events,
cinema and CDs purchase.12 Second, we can use information on the visits to specific types of
website as a proxy for individuals’ taste for music. Individuals with a strong interest in music
12Books & magazines websites are sites that contain information, products, and/or services specifically on
books and/or magazines. Events websites are sites that contain information and/or tickets sales specifically
on physical events. Cinema websites are sites that contain information, products, and/or services specifically
on movies, videos, and/or any other products and services associated with the movie industry. CDs purchase
websites are sites that allow the purchase of CDs and LPs. These are rather specific websites that sell either
collectibles or limited edition CDs. They are not websites from large retailers where one could find any type
of CD. The latter type of website is included in the online shopping category. As already mentioned, we are
unfortunately not able to identify the visits related to CDs from the ones related to other types of goods on
these websites.
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are indeed more likely to visit music-related websites such as radio and music-video websites.
We also consider websites that are related to music but not to direct music consumption.
These include websites related to music news, songs’ lyrics or musical instruments. We
finally also consider a variable that gives the total time spent online on all the websites of
our dataset.
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
The following subsection presents some characteristics of the individuals in our sample. We
then look at descriptive statistics on the online music consumption behavior for these indi-
viduals.
3.3.2.1 Music Users Characteristics
Table 3.1 presents some characteristics of the music users that constitute our final sample.
Individuals are, not surprisingly, quite evenly distributed among the 5 different countries
and in terms of gender. Almost half of the individuals in the sample have between 31 and
50 years of age, while more than 25% is less than 30 years old.13 More than 65% of the
individuals is employed, with close to 8.5% being self employed, 8.5% are students, and 17%
are out of the labor force.14 The unemployment rate in our sample is of 8.5%. Education
level is decomposed into three categories: Primary, secondary and tertiary. Close to 27%
of the sample has no more than a primary level of education, and more than a quarter has
a secondary level of education. The remaining 47% has a tertiary education level. Total
household income is divided into three categories.15 Twenty-two percent of the sample has
a low household income; 62.3% has a medium family income; and the remaining 15.3% has
a high household income. Half of the individuals in the sample form part of a less-then-two-
people household, while 41% belong to a household of 3 to 4 people. The remaining 8.5%
belongs to households of 5 or more individuals.
In terms of music consumption, almost 57% of the individuals have clicked at least once on a
legal downloading website. Similarly, 57% of the sample has clicked at least once on a legal
streaming website during 2011. Finally, close to 73% of the sample has clicked at least once
on an illegal music website during 2011. Note that these different types of music consumers
are not mutually exclusive. Figure 3.1 describes the distribution of music consumer types in
13The mean age in the sample is 39.7.
14These include children under 16, retired, homemakers, full-time carer (of someone in the household) or
individuals out of the labor force for other reasons.
15For France, Germany, Italy and Spain the income ranges are as follows. Low: Less than 18000 EUR a
year. Medium: Between 18000 and 54000 EUR a year. Large: More than 54000 EUR a year. For the UK,
the income ranges are as follows. Low: Less than 15000 GBP a year. Medium: Between 15000 and 50000
GBP a year. High: More than 50000 GBP a year.
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the sample and reveals that only 40% of the music consumers belong to a single category.
Twenty-six percent of the consumers actually belong to the 3 categories. More than half
(60%) belong to at least two categories, and 53% of the sample consumes both legal and
illegal digital music. Finally, note that 20% of the individuals in the sample have only
clicked on illegal downloading websites.
3.3.2.2 Clicks
We now take a closer look at the behavior of the different types of individuals in our data.
We can obtain a measure of music consumption intensity by looking at the number of times
a consumer clicks on a given website or on a category of specific websites. Table 3.2 presents
the mean number of monthly clicks on the different categories of websites (buying, streaming
and illegal) as well as the mean number of active months for the individuals in our final
sample.16
Several interesting patterns emerge when looking at individuals by country. In particular,
Spain shows a much larger number of clicks on illegal downloading websites than the other
remaining countries, and the second lowest number of monthly clicks on legal music websites.
Italy and the UK also show larger number of visits on illegal websites, but Italy presents the
lowest number of visits on legal webpages. Gender differences are also important in terms
of illegal clicks, but not so much for legal (purchase and streaming) websites. Males show a
much larger number of monthly clicks on illegal music websites. In terms of age, individuals
between 16 and 40 also have an above average number of monthly visits on illegal music
websites, with a rather low number of visits on legal pages. The same observation holds
for students (and to a lesser extent for unemployed) when compared to individuals with
other employment status. The mean number of clicks on illegal downloading websites is
substantially lower for higher income categories.
The figures show that legal consumers (individuals that never clicked on an illegal music
website during 2011) are, on average, active 2.5 months a year, while downloaders are active
almost 6 months a year. Most interestingly, downloaders are also more active than legals
both in terms of legal downloading (10% more clicks) and legal streaming (40% more clicks),
as shown by their mean values of clicks. A positive relationship between legal and illegal
consumption of digital music therefore emerges from this simple comparison of means. Com-
paring streamers and non-streamers (individuals that never clicked on a streaming music
website during 2011) leads to similar conclusions. The figures show that streamers click
more than twice as much on legal downloading websites, while their clicks on illegal down-
loading websites is 90% higher than for non-streamers. Again, this simple comparison of
16An active month is defined as a month in which the individual visited at least one of the three categories.
Note that this definition does not take into account the intensity of clicks within an active month.
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means shows a positive relationship between the different consumption channels and in par-
ticular between streaming and legal purchases. Table 3.3 presents cross correlations between
the different music consumption channels and gives further evidence on this point. All these
figures suggest, not surprisingly, that music taste is an important determinant of digital mu-
sic consumption, regardless of its origin. In other words, one should expect people who like
music to consume more of it, whether it is through legal downloading, illegal downloading,
or streaming.
3.4 Research Question and Empirical Approach
The impact of music piracy on legal sales of music has been studied extensively in the em-
pirical literature, focusing mainly on legal music sales in the form of physical CDs. While
most studies find that piracy harms revenues, the estimated sales displacement rate is far
below one. In other words, music consumers are found to substitute legal music consumption
for illegal music consumption, but much of what is consumed illegally would not have been
purchased if piracy was not available. Since the launch of the iTunes music store in 2003, the
availability to purchase legal digital songs changed individuals’ music consumption alterna-
tives. Instead of having to buy a whole CD, the alternative to downloading any particular
digital song illegally is now to purchase it in MP3 format. As emphasized in Waldfogel (2010),
the appearance of file-sharing and downloading technology might have different effects on
sales, depending on whether the legal option is a 12-song CD or a` la carte songs. Consider
an individual interested in a few songs of a given artist. While she may not consider buying
the entire album (which also contains unknown songs) when offered the possibility to freely
download these specific songs, she might nevertheless be willing to pay for them individually.
The effect of downloading on individual songs and albums may therefore be different, and
one can easily imagine a circumstance in which file-sharing would hurt album sales more
than it hurts song sales.
Our goal is to answer two broad questions. First, we are interested in looking at the deter-
minants of music consumption in the form of purchasing, downloading and streaming. The
motivation for this descriptive exercise is to understand better the demographic characteris-
tics that drive music consumption through the different channels available to consumers. Our
second objective is to see to what extent these different channels are related to each other.
We revisit the sales displacement question and ask whether illegal music downloading is used
as a substitute for legal digital music consumption. We are also interested in the effect that
legal streaming may have on legal digital music consumption. As in the case of file-sharing,
economic theory does not provide us with an unambiguous prediction for how music stream-
ing should affect purchases of digital music. On the one hand, consumers may substitute
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legal downloads for streaming. On the other hand, consumers may well use streaming to
sample new artists and/or songs. In particular, it may be the case that individuals assign a
higher value to a song when they posses it, as opposed to simply having access to it. This
would enhance the value of streaming services as discovering tools, which would positively
affect sales. Another part of the debate on streaming media is related to the concept of “win-
dowing”, a strategy used by some artists requesting that an album be available first only
on sales before being available on streaming platforms.Understanding whether consumers
use these two channels as complements or substitutes is therefore crucial to understand how
these types of strategies actually affect sales.
3.4.1 Determinants of Music Consumption
Before starting to analyze the effects of illegal downloading and streaming on legal music
purchases, we propose to look at the determinants of these three different music consumption
channels.
The empirical literature on the determinants of digital music consumption is rather thin. In
particular, very few studies have analyzed the factors that influence the legal consumption
of digital music such as online purchases or online streaming. However, most of the papers
that analyze sales displacement of digital music also provide some evidence on the factors
influencing these purchases. In general, age does not seem to affect purchasing behavior
and no significant nor systematic difference is found between males and females. Income is,
however, positively correlated with online sales of digital music (Bastard et al., 2012; Cecere
et al., 2012; DangNguyen et al., 2012; Waldfogel, 2010). Probably unsurprisingly, all studies
show that legal consumption of online music is increasing in the individuals’ interest for
music.
Studies on the determinants of illegal music consumption are also rather limited, although
papers analyzing music sales displacement again provide some evidence on factors affecting
online piracy (Zentner, 2006; Waldfogel, 2010). Clearer patterns emerge from this literature.
Gender seems to matter in terms of music piracy behavior, with males being much more
active. In a large sample of European consumers, Zentner (2006) finds that online music
piracy is negatively correlated with both education and income, although not significantly
so for the latter. Again unsurprisingly, all studies show that there is a strong correlation
between illegal music consumption and interest in music.
Although the existing empirical literature on the factors influencing digital music piracy is
scarce, there is a rather important body of literature on the determinants of digital piracy
of other sorts of products such as software. Looking at the patterns found in these studies
may therefore be informative to further investigate the determinants of online music piracy.
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According to this literature, some of the most relevant factors influencing piracy are income,
cultural differences, past behavior or habit formation, and the legal setting.17 The vast ma-
jority of studies finds that income is negatively correlated with digital piracy. Culture plays
an important role, too. In a study analyzing software piracy, Marron and Steel (2000) find
that countries characterized by individualist cultures have higher piracy rates than countries
with a collectivist culture. They also find that piracy rates are lower in countries that have
strong institutions that enforce contracts and protect property from expropriation. Another
set of studies uses individual data to study the factors that determine piracy behavior.18
They also confirm that piracy is negatively correlated with income and show that it is gen-
erally higher for male than for females. Most of these studies are, just as in the case of
the above-mentioned music studies, based on college students’ surveys. As such they do not
allow for a clear analysis of the relationship between education levels and piracy. Likewise,
they provide only limited evidence on the correlation between age and piracy given that the
range of ages is quite limited within such population. Studies analyzing this specific question
are therefore rather scarce. One exception is the work of Mandel and Su¨ssmuth (2012) who
study a sample representative of the German working population with high-speed internet
access.19 They, too, find that frequency of digital piracy is negatively correlated with in-
come. Although they find no significant gender difference in the propensity to pirate, they
find that male individuals are prone to pirate at a significantly larger scale. Finally, their
findings indicate that individuals in their early twenties (between 20 and 25 years old) are
predominantly responsible for the overall extent of digital piracy in their sample.
Using the cross-sectional dimension of our data, we turn to the analysis of the determinants
of music consumption through the different channels available to consumers. Our objective
is to describe how the number of clicks on purchasing, downloading and streaming websites
vary across individuals in our sample. Table 3.4 presents the results of this exercise. Each
column of the table represents the regression of the different dependent variables (the clicks
on purchasing, downloading or streaming websites) on the same set of regressors.
Considering first demographic characteristics, some differences are worth noticing. Legal
purchases of digital music raise with household income and seem to be more prevalent among
males. Education, on the other hand, seems to have no significant effect on the legal purchases
of digital music. In line with the results of the previous literature presented above, there is a
strong negative correlation between income level and illegal downloading activity. As in the
case of legal purchases, digital music piracy seems to be a predominantly masculine activity
17See Waldman (2013) for a review of the literature analyzing the different factors determining piracy of
intellectual property.
18See for example Ramayah et al. (1990), Sims et al. (1996), Limayem et al. (2004) and Ramayah et al.
(2009).
19Although they integrate it in their piracy measures, the authors do not confine their analysis to digital
music piracy.
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and no clear pattern emerges on its relationship with education levels. The determinants
of music consumption via online streaming services show different patterns. There seem to
be no significant gender nor income differences in this specific mode of music consumption.
Education is, however, positively correlated with online streaming of music. Finally, music
consumption appears to differ significantly by age groups only when it is in the form of illegal
downloading or online streaming. Individuals aged between 21 and 25 stand out as being the
most active in terms of illegal downloading while online streaming seems to be an activity of
the really young.
The country differences are remarkable for the three modes of music consumption. In terms
of purchases, Spaniards and Italians have 50% less clicks than Germans, British have 22%
less clicks and French 13% less. These differences could relate to several characteristics cap-
tured by our country dummies. First of all, it might be that not all of the countries have the
same availability of legal digital purchasing websites, and purchasing a song from another
country’s website is not always feasible. The same considerations hold when thinking about
online streaming services. For that specific type of music consumption, France stands out
with 150% more clicks than Germany. Spaniards have 20% more clicks than the German,
while Italians have 25% less. The UK presents a small difference with Germany in terms
of streaming, with only 9% more clicks. These differences are again possibly due to differ-
ences in availablity, especially given that online streaming services were a rather new music
consumption mode in European countries in 2011. For example, neither Italy nor Germany
had access to the Spotify online streaming service as of 2011. Individuals’ awareness of the
existence of such services may therefore not be equal in all countries, affecting their ultimate
usage levels. The most striking differences appear when looking at the determinants of ille-
gal downloading. Used as the reference country, Germany shows the lowest level of visits on
illegal downloading websites. Compared to it, Spain and Italy show important differences of
230% and 134% more clicks respectively. Individuals from the UK have 43% more visits while
French individuals present a differential of 35%. As mentioned above, several non-mutually
exclusive explanations could drive these important country differences. Again, market forces,
and in particular the limited access to legal digital purchasing websites, could influence the
illegal downloading activity of consumers.20 Second, unobservable cultural characteristics
could explain the use of different types of music consumption channels. In particular, past
behavior and cultural factors are, as highlighted above, important determinants of digital
piracy. Individuals from different countries may also differ in their cultural norms or stan-
dards toward acceptable behavior and may perceive differently the extent to which their
piracy behavior affects artists and/or producers. It may also be the case that indivuduals
more used to downloading illegaly (say because legal sources to obtain digital music were not
20For the case of television content, Danaher et al. (2010) present evidence that the lack of legal channels
can positively affect the level of piracy.
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previously available) may stick to this illegal behavior as a consequence of habit formation.
Finally, previous literature showed how different legal setting influence piracy behaviour.
Cross-country differences in individual piracy behavior may indeed also be driven by differ-
ences in specific, national copyright enforcement laws (e.g. the HADOPI law in France).
The important significance of our country variables indicate that all of the above mentioned
factors play an important role in the determinants of online music consumption.
The three types of music consumption are positively and significantly increasing in the vari-
ables that capture interest in music (visits on music related websites). This unsurprisingly
confirms that individuals who like music enjoy consuming more of it via the different chan-
nels available. The coefficients on the variables related to other online activities present some
differences as well. The visits on book websites are positively correlated with purchasing and
streaming, but not with downloading. Clicks on events websites are positively correlated
with purchasing and streaming, but negatively with downloading and movies websites are
positively correlated with all three channels of music consumption. This is also true for visits
on types of websites related to instant messaging and personal webpages. Finally, clicks on
global news and social network webpages significantly affect downloading and streaming, but
not purchasing of digital music.
3.4.2 Displacement: Downloading, Streaming and Purchases
We now turn to the effect of illegal downloading and streaming on legal music purchases.
In particular, the question we want to answer is how much does an instance of downloading
(respectively streaming) depress or stimulate digital music purchases. Ideally, we would like
to compare the legal purchases of an individual who has access to downloading (streaming)
with the legal purchases of that same individual in the hypothetical case in which she has
no access to downloading (streaming). This direct comparison is obviously impossible, as no
individual can simultaneously be in these two scenarios. Since we only observe consumers
when they have access to downloading and streaming, we have no way of knowing directly
how they would have behaved had they had no access to those services.
One can start by asking whether individuals who download (stream) more also purchase more.
The correlations already presented in table 3.3 showed the positive relationship between the
different music consumption modes. The main problem of this simple approach is that
individuals who like music like to consume more of it through the various channels available.
This would give rise to a positive relationship between downloading (respectively streaming)
and digital music purchases, regardless of whether a complementarity relationship exists.
This prevents us from giving a causal interpretation to this positive relationship, as we
have no way of knowing how an exogenous change in the availability of illegal downloading
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(respectively streaming) would affect legal purchases. The main obstacle therefore comes
from individual unobserved characteristics, and in particular their taste in music. Several
approaches can be used to circumvent this problem. One is to look for some measures of
interest in music in order to partially control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. We use
information on online behavior by considering the number of clicks on music-related websites
such as radio and music-video websites. We also consider sites that are related to music,
although not to direct music consumption. These include websites related to songs’ lyrics,
musical instruments or music news such as blogs. Note that, contrary to the indicators used
in previous studies, these variables have several advantages. First, they are not the result
of a subjective assessment from the individual. In many survey-based studies, music taste
is measured by asking individuals about their music taste on a numerical scale (Rob and
Waldfogel, 2006; Zentner, 2006; Waldfogel, 2010). Such a measure is plagued with several
problems. Different people will assign different meanings to it (a strong taste in music may
not have the same meaning for individual A than for individual B), making it an imperfect
indicator of music interest. Also, category-based variables are less informative than variables
that actually measure the strength of the factor of interest. Our measure of music taste
avoids this types of problems. First, no self-assessment from the individual is needed as it
is the result of directly observed behavior. Second, our data not only allows us to observe
whether an individual visited a given music-related website, it also gives us a measure of the
number of times such visit was made. This gives us a better measure of the intensity of the
factor we want to capture, namely the interest in music. We therefore believe our variables
to be more reliable indicators of music interest than standard survey-based measures.
3.4.2.1 Cross-sectional approach
We start by looking at cross-sectional regressions of the following form:
Pi = Xiβ +Wiα+ δDi + γSi + εi, (3.1)
where for individual i, Pi is the (log of the) number of clicks on legal purchase websites, Di is
the (log of the) number of clicks on illegal downloading websites, Si is the (log of the) number
of clicks on legal streaming websites, Xi is a vector including socioeconomic characteristics
of the individual, and Wi includes a set of variables related to the individual’s online activity
on other types of websites. Unobserved characteristics affecting individual i’s clicks on legal
purchase websites are included in εi, and α, β, γ and δ are parameters to be estimated. The
unobserved heterogeneity problem in this specification comes from the fact that we expect
εi to be correlated with Di and Si due to unobserved taste in music. Our measures of music
interest in the form of visits to music-related websites is therefore included in Wi to solve
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that problem. The identifying assumption is therefore that, once controlling for music taste
and other observable characteristics, the number of clicks on downloading and streaming
websites is random.
Table 3.5 reports estimates of equation (3.1) using OLS. In this equation the unit of ob-
servation is an individual and X includes country dummies and individual socioeconomic
characteristics. The specification in column 1 only controls for X and reports significant and
positive estimated coefficients for both γ and δ. Columns 2 includes our main measure of
music interest, the number of visits to music-related websites. Controlling for this variable
leads in a 20% drop in the effect of both downloading and streaming on purchases. Columns
3 to 5 include other measures of music consumption such as radio, illegal streaming and
specific CD purchases.21 As expected, the introduction of such variables decreases the esti-
mates of γ and δ. In particular, comparing columns 1 and 5, the estimated effect of clicks on
illegal webpages drops by close to 40% when introducing the variable measuring the visits on
other music websites. In turn, the estimated effect of the time spent on streaming websites
drops by 35% . In column 6 we include more explanatory variables related to other forms of
entertainment websites. All show positive and significant effects, except for websites related
to movies and personal webpages. When we include the complete set of regressors (column
6), our coefficients of interest remain positive and highly significant. The estimates reveal
positive elasticities of about 0.03 and 0.08 for the illegal music downloading websites and
legal streaming websites respectively. Our results also show interesting country differences in
terms of legal purchase of legal digital music. Individuals from Spain and Italy show around
50% less clicks than Germany, while the UK and France present around 20% less of such
clicks.
Given that visits to legal music purchases websites is equal to zero for over fifty percent of
the observations, we estimate again equation (3.1) using a Tobit model. Table 3.6 reports
the unconditional marginal effects of the estimation. The estimate for δ drops by half while
the estimate for γ diminishes in one third.
Our results suggest that illegal downloading and legal streaming have both a positive and
significant effect on legal purchases of digital music. Although we have constructed measures
of individuals’ interest in music using online activity measures, we cannot completely rule out
the existence of other forms of unobserved heterogeneity we are not able to control for. While
visits to different kinds of music related websites surely capture individuals’ interests in music,
individuals who do not visit these specific types of webpages may still differ substantially
in their taste for music. In other words, although our online measures allow us to control
21CDs purchase websites are sites that allow the purchase of CDs and LPs. These are rather specific
websites that sell either collectibles or limited edition CDs. They are not websites from large retailers where
one could find any type of CD. The latter type of website is included in the online shopping category. As
already mentioned, we are unfortunately not able to identify the visits related to CDs from the ones related
to other types of goods on these websites.
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for an important part of individuals’ music taste, they may still not allow us to capture it
in its entirety, especially if individuals do not reveal their music taste through their online
activity. For instance, consider individuals A and B who differ only in that B has no interest
in music. It may well be that neither A nor B visit any of the other music-related websites.
In that case our measure would not take into account the fact that individuals A and B
still differ drastically in their taste for music. Since we expect our results to be biased away
from finding a negative effect of downloading (respectively streaming) on purchases, finding
a positive result may simply reflect the fact that our estimations are still contaminated by
individual unobserved characteristics. We next turn to an empirical strategy that allows us
to tackle this problem.
3.4.2.2 Longitudinal approach
The second approach that we use to further solve the problem of unobserved heterogeneity
consists in exploiting the panel dimension of our data. Cross section regressions estimate the
effect of illegal downloading (legal streaming) on legal purchases by comparing individuals
with low levels of illegal downloading (legal streaming) and high levels of illegal downloading
(legal streaming). The panel structure of the data allows us to take advantage of the variation
in these variables within individuals and to control for other (time invariant) unobservable
individual determinants of music consumption. We first consider the following regression
equation
Pit = Xiβ +Witα+ δDit + γSit + ξt + εit, (3.2)
where the unit of observation is now an individual per month. Thus we regress the number
of clicks on legal purchase websites made by individual i in each month on the number of
that month’s clicks on illegal downloading websites and legal streaming websites along with
monthly time dummies ξt and our previous controls. Estimating (3.2) by pooled OLS allows
us to take advantage of the within individual variation in Pit, Dit and Sit when estimating
δ and γ.
Table 3.7 present the results of estimating (3.2) by pooled OLS using data for all individuals
in all months. We cluster standard errors at the individual level since the error term εit is
likely to be correlated over time for a given individual. The estimates of δ and γ are reduced in
about 15% compared to the cross sectional estimations. The estimates suggest elasticities of
about 0.025 and 0.07 for the illegal music downloading websites and legal streaming websites
respectively. The coefficients on the monthly time dummies present evidence of some seasonal
effects. Taking July as a reference, it seems that visits on legal purchase websites are higher
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from December to March, and lower from August to November. These differences could
be driven by several factors. For instance, a larger number of clicks on legal purchasing
websites during the months following December could be the result of gift cards bought
and exchanged during the Christmas season. Likewise, the lower number of clicks observed
during the summer could be related to holidays when individuals may not be spending as
much time on their home computer.
No significant differences are noticed from April to June. The coefficients on the regressors
related to online activity show estimates that are lower in magnitude as compared to the
cross-sectional estimation.
We again estimate equation (3.2) using a Tobit model in order to take into account the fact
that monthly visits to legal music purchases websites are 0 in our data. Table 3.8 reports
the unconditional marginal effects of the estimation. The estimate for δ drops by half and
the estimate for γ diminishes in two thirds. The elasticity of downloading clicks is therefore
similar to the one found when using only cross-sectional variation, while the elasticity of
streaming clicks is somewhat lower.
Our estimates in tables 3.1-3.8 might still be vulnerable to the concern that illegal download-
ing and streaming are endogenous. As mentioned above, it may well be that some other form
of unobserved heterogeneity is not completely captured in our measures of music interest.
While people who visit many music-related websites have most certainly a high interest in
music, it may be that some individuals with a high taste for music don’t visit such webpages
often and only click on websites that allow them to download, stream or purchase songs. The
longitudinal structure of our data allows us to deal with this concern and to further control
for fixed unobservable individual characteristics. We make the substitution εit = µi + νit,
where µi is an individual-specific fixed effect and νit is an individual and month-specific error,
and estimate the following equation
Pit = Xiβ +Witα+ δDit + γSit + ξt + µi + νit. (3.3)
Fixed-effects estimation allows to control for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity (such
as interest in music) and identifies coefficient δ (respectively γ) from the relationship between
variation in the tendency to click on legal purchase websites and variation in the tendency to
click on illegal downloading websites (respectively streaming websites) for each individual.
Only within individual variation is therefore used to identify our parameters of interest.
Note that this estimation strategy allows us to control for both time invariant taste in music
(captured in the individual fixed effects) and possibly time variant shocks to music taste that
are captured by the visits on the music-related websites.
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Table 3.9 presents the results of the estimation of equation (3.3). Including individual fixed
effects we obtain coefficient estimates of 0.022 for our illegal downloading variable. In other
words, a 10% increase in clicks on illegal downloading websites is associated with a 0.2%
increase in clicks on legal purchasing websites. This effect is larger for legal streaming, with
a 10% increase in clicks on these websites being associated with a 0.49% increase in clicks on
legal purchasing websites. The reduction in both these coefficients as compared to the ones
that correspond to our pooled OLS estimation (table 3.7) therefore show the importance of
taking individual fixed effects into account.
3.4.2.3 Country specific effects
The results presented in table 3.4 describe remarkable cross-country differences in the in-
dividuals’ number of clicks on each of the three alternative music consumption channels.
As discussed above, several non-mutually exclusive explanations related to country-specific
characteristics can drive these differences such as cultural traits, market forces or the en-
forcement and effectiveness of copyright-specific laws. All of these effects are captured by
our country-specific dummy variables and we are unfortunately not able to identify the rel-
ative importance of these different mechanisms. Nevertheless, it is natural to consider that
these country differences may also influence the displacement rates of legal purchases of digi-
tal music by illegal downloading and legal streaming. For instance, individuals with different
perceptions of piracy are likely to have different music consumption habits. In particular,
consumers with more permissive attitudes toward piracy are probably more likely to substi-
tute legal consumption of digital music by illegal consumption and should therefore present
higher displacement rates. Likewise, individuals coming from countries with more stringent
copyright laws will be affected by the latter when deciding on consuming pirated content
and may refrain from using this type of consumption channel to a larger extent. To check
for the possibility that underlying country-specific characteristics could lead to different dis-
placement rates, we expand equation (3.3) and estimate the following specification:
Pit = Xiβ+Witα+δDit+
∑
c∈C
δcDitCountryic+γSit+
∑
c∈C
γcSitCountryic+ξt+µi+νit, (3.4)
where Countryic is a dummy variable equal to 1 if individual i is from country c ∈ C and
C = { Spain, Italy, France, UK }. The parameter δc (γc) measures the difference between
the effect of downloading (streaming) on purchases in country c compared to the effect of
the same variable in Germany.
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Table 3.10 present the results of estimating equation (3.4) using fixed effects (within) estima-
tion. The results show no evidence of sales displacement for any of our countries. Note how
each country specific coefficient decreases for both illegal downloading and legal streaming
(i.e. the sums δ+ δc and γ + γc, respectively) as we include our explanatory proxy variables
for music interest, confirming again the importance of controlling for these factors. Focusing
on the relationship between legal streaming and legal purchases of digital music, results show
statistically significant cross-country differences. French users present the largest coefficients
(about 0.068) followed by the Germans (0.061) and by UK users (0.044). Users from Spain
and Italy present elasticities of 0.022 and 0.033, respectively.22 Interestingly enough, there
seems to be no clear relationship between the intensity of clicks on legal streaming websites
as presented in table 3.4 and the elasticities of legal streaming. For instance, while users
from Spain have a much higher intensity of clicks on legal streaming websites compared to
Italian users, they show statistically indistinguishable coefficients in table 3.10.
Although there is no displacement of legal purchases by illegal downloading to be found,
the cross country differences are, again, remarkable. Looking at the relationship between
illegal downloading and legal purchases, French users again present the largest coefficients
(about 0.044) followed by the Germans (0.038) and by UK users (0.026).23 The most striking
difference appears for Spain and Italy which show very small elasticities of 0.008 and 0.009,
respectively. This means that a 10% increase in the clicks on illegal downloading websites is
associated with almost no change in visits to legal purchasing websites for Spanish and Italian
users (0.08% and 0.09% increases, respectively). As already highlighted above, our country
dummy variables capture any unobservable country-specific characteristics that would affect
individuals’ behavior toward music consumption. We can nonetheless try to relate some of the
important country differences that we found in the determinants of digital music consumption
to the elasticities displayed in table 3.10. Speculating beyond what our analysis allows us to
show, the significant differences in elasticities between illegal downloading and legal purchases
could for instance be the result of differences in the availability of legal digital music stores.
In 2011, neither Spain nor Italy had seen the entry of the Amazon mp3 online music store,
as opposed to France, Germany and the UK.24 This relative lack of legal online outlets could
therefore have made consumers more exposed to piracy for a longer period of time given its
22The difference between users from Germany and France are not statistically significant and neither is the
difference between users from Germany and the UK. The difference between users from France and the UK
are, however, statistically significant.
23As in the case of the coefficients on the legal streaming variable, the difference between users from Germany
and France are not statistically significant and neither is the difference between users from Germany and the
UK. The difference between users from France and the UK are, however, statistically significant.
24The Spanish and Italian editions of the Amazon mp3 store were launched on Octobre 4, 2012. it was
launched on December 3, 2008 in the UK, on April 1, 2009 in Germany and on June 10, 2009 in France. See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amazon_MP3.
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relative appeal.25 Given the important link between habit formation and attitude toward
piracy found in earlier research, consumers that are more experienced with digital music
piracy could build more permissive views on it and therefore show higher displacement rates
(i.e. lower elasticities).26
3.4.2.4 Displacement and interest in music
We have seen how controlling for interest in music and individual unobserved heterogene-
ity is crucial to determine the relationship between the different online music consumption
channels. Taking such factors into account is key because individuals with higher interest
in music are likely to consume more music through the different channels, which would give
rise to a positive correlation regardless of whether a complementary relationship exists. If we
expect consumers with different degrees of interest in music to make different consumption
decisions, it seems natural to ask whether different levels of music interest are associated with
different elasticities between the alternative music consumption channels. For instance, we
may expect individuals with higher levels of music interest to show lower displacement rates
(i.e. larger elasticities). One may indeed argue that these individuals might indeed use illegal
downloading more as a discovery tool.27 Such users may also be more likely to use online
streaming services as discovery tools, which would lead to higher elasticities of legal online
streaming as well. In our setup, a higher taste for music is measured by a larger number
of visits on music related websites (such as radio and music-video websites) and to other
types of websites related to music, although not necessarily to direct music consumption
(such as websites related to songs’ lyrics or music news). To check whether individuals with
higher levels of music interest present different displacement rates, we extent equation (3.3)
by interacting our music interest variables with the visits to illegal downloading websites and
legal streaming websites. Table 3.11 presents the results of this exercise. The first column
shows the results of estimating equation (3.3) without any interaction terms and actually
corresponds to column (6) in table 3.9. For variables measuring visits to illegal downloading
websites and legal online streaming websites, specification (2) introduces interaction terms
with visits on radio and music video websites. Specification (3) introduces interactions with
visits to other types of music websites (although not directly related to music consump-
tion). Finally, column (4) incorporates all interactions used in specifications (2) and (3).
Our estimates show that there are indeed significant elasticity differences as a function of
the intensity of visits to other types of music websites. For the visits on illegal downloading
25It is important to note that we are not able to explain why the level of piracy is higher in certain countries.
In particular, the higher levels of piracy observed in Spain and Italy could be higher than in the other countries
of our sample for other reasons than the availability of legal online music stores.
26Most of the literature on the link between habit formation and attitude toward piracy focuses on software
piracy. See for instance Limayem et al. (2004) and Ramayah et al. (2009).
27Likewise, individuals with higher interest in music may put a higher value on music as a cultural good
and have less permissive views on piracy.
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websites, the last 3 columns of table 3.11 show that individuals with higher visits to other
types of music websites (i.e. individuals with higher interest in music) have much higher elas-
ticities. Using the estimates from specification (3), a 10% increase in the number of clicks on
illegal downloading websites is associated with a 0.18% increase in clicks on legal purchasing
websites for an individual with a log number of clicks on illegal downloading websites equal
to the sample mean. For values of the log of clicks on illegal downloading websites at the
90th and 95th percentiles of the sample, this effect increases to 0.33% and 0.4%, respectively.
Interestingly, this effect is unchanged by the inclusion of the interaction with visits to radio
and music video websites (see column (4)). Similarly, our results show that a higher interest
in music is associated with larger elasticities of visits to legal streaming websites. It seems,
however, that the effect of visits to radio and music video websites is larger for the elasticity
of legal streaming than it is for the elasticity of illegal downloading. Using the estimates from
specification (4), and evaluating the effects at the sample mean, we find that a 10% increase
in the number of clicks on legal streaming websites is associated with a 0.3% increase in clicks
on legal purchasing websites. When evaluated at the 90th and 95th sample percentiles, this
effect increases sharply to 0.58% and 0.71%, respectively. Our results therefore show that
individuals with a larger interest in music (in the sense of visiting music related websites to
a larger extent) seem to use online legal streaming as a discovery tool that further stimulates
their visits to legal purchasing websites.
3.5 Conclusion and Discussion
In the last decade, the music industry has faced many changes. In particular, it has seen
its revenues decrease drastically, with industry representatives blaming most of it on piracy
(IFPI, 2011). Nevertheless, the music industry seems to have embraced digitization and
its many business opportunities. Indeed, digital music revenues have increased more than
1000% during the period 2004-2010, growing 8% globally in 2011 to an estimated US$5.2
billion (IFPI, 2011, 2012). While most empirical studies have indeed confirmed a significant
negative impact of piracy on sales of physical music, the growing importance of the digital
sector in total music industry revenue calls for a better understanding of the impact of both
piracy and other music consumption channels on legal digital sales. In this paper, we revisit
the question of music sales displacement in the digital era, and analyze in detail the effect of
online music streaming on the legal purchases of digital music.
Conducting research on the revenue effects of illegal music consumption requires detailed
data on the quantities of both legal and illegal music consumed by individuals. Relying on
an original dataset, we are able to follow the clickstreams of more than 16,000 Internet users,
and in particular their visits to legal and illegal music consumption websites.
Chapter 3. Digital Music Consumption on the Internet 100
After using several approaches to deal with the endogeneity of downloading and streaming,
our results show no evidence of online digital sales displacement. Overall, our different
estimates show relatively stable, positive and low elasticities of legal purchases with respect
to both illegal downloading and legal streaming. Across specifications, the estimates of δ
suggest elasticities of about 0.02 between clicks on illegal downloading websites and legal
purchases websites. If this estimate is given a causal interpretation, it means that clicks
on legal purchase websites would have been 2% lower in the absence of illegal downloading
websites. Specific country estimate show that for Spain and Italy the elasticity is zero, while
it is close to 0.04 for France and Germany and close to 0.03 for the UK. All of these results
suggest that the vast majority of the music that is consumed illegally by the individuals in
our sample would not have been legally purchased if illegal downloading websites were not
available to them.
The existing literature analyzing the effect of piracy on digital music consumption is still
limited. Our study contributes to this literature with results in line with the findings of
Bastard et al. (2012) which show that illegal music downloads have little or no effect on legal
digital sales. It is very important to understand that these results need not contradict earlier
research that found substantial amounts of sales displacement of legal physical music sales by
illegal digital downloads. One must realize that music consumption in physical and digital
format are two very different consumption modes, and it is easy to imagine circumstances
in which music piracy would affect sales of albums in CD format differently than it would
affect sales of individual digital songs. Considering an individual interested in a specific
song, the trade-off between a whole 12-songs album and a free pirated version of that song is
rather different from the trade-off involving the legal purchase of the individual digital song
alone. As such, sales displacement from piracy in a world where only CDs are available does
not necessarily imply sales displacement in a world where digital a` la carte songs are made
available to consumers.
Another contribution of our paper is the analysis of the effect of online music streaming
on the legal purchases of digital music, a question that has received very little attention in
the empirical literature thus far. On this particular question, our elasticity estimates show
somewhat larger figures, ranging from 0.024 in our Tobit specification to 0.07 in the OLS case.
Controlling for individual fixed effects leads to a 0.05 elasticity, suggesting complementarity
between streaming services and purchases of legal digital music. Again, country differences
show that this effect is larger for France and the UK (around 0.06) while it is smaller for
Spain and Italy (around 0.035). Our results are in line with the results in (DangNguyen
et al., 2012), the only study that has, to our knowledge, analyzed the question so far.
Taken at face value, our findings indicate that digital music piracy does not displace legal
music purchases in digital format. This means that although there is trespassing of private
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property rights (copyrights), there is unlikely to be much harm done on digital music revenues.
This result, however, must be interpreted in the context of a still evolving music industry.
It is in particular important to note that music consumption in physical format has until
recently accounted for the lion’s share of total music revenues. If piracy leads to substantial
sales displacement of music in physical format, then its effect on the overall music industry
revenues may well still be negative.
We cannot draw policy implications at the industry-wide level, as our analysis is only confined
to the digital segment of the music industry. Nonetheless, digital music revenues to record
companies are growing substantially, reflecting the increasing importance of digitization in
the music industry (IFPI, 2012). From that perspective, our findings suggest that digital
music piracy should not be viewed as a growing concern for copyright holders in the digital
era. In addition, our results indicate that new music consumption channels such as online
streaming positively affect copyrights owners.
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Table 3.1: Individual characteristics: music users†
No. of individuals % Cumul. %
Country
France 3386 20.8 20.8
Germany 3091 19.0 39.8
Italy 3281 20.1 59.9
Spain 3664 22.5 82.4
UK 2868 17.6 100.0
Total 16290 100.0
Gender
Female 7892 48.4 48.4
Male 8398 51.6 100.0
Total 16290 100.0
Age Category
10-15 692 4.2 4.2
16-25 2062 12.7 16.9
26-30 1657 10.2 27.1
31-40 4278 26.3 53.3
41-50 3911 24.0 77.3
51-60 2338 14.4 91.7
61-75 1352 8.3 100.0
Total 16290 100.0
Employment
Employed 9371 57.5 57.5
Out of Labor Force 2775 17.0 74.6
Self Employed 1375 8.4 83.0
Student 1388 8.5 91.5
Unemployed 1381 8.5 100.0
Total 16290 100.0
Education
Primary 4359 26.8 26.8
Secondary 4233 26.0 52.7
Terciary 7698 47.3 100.0
Total 16290 100.0
Household Income
Low 3649 22.4 22.4
Medium 10144 62.3 84.7
High 2497 15.3 100.0
Total 16290 100.0
Household size
1 - 2 8235 50.6 50.6
Continued on next page
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Table 3.1: Individual characteristics: music users†
No. of individuals % Cumul. %
3 - 4 6662 40.9 91.4
5+ 1393 8.6 100.0
Total 16290 100.0
Buyer
No 7070 43.4 43.4
Yes 9220 56.6 100.0
Total 16290 100.0
Streamer
No 6978 42.8 42.8
Yes 9312 57.2 100.0
Total 16290 100.0
Downloader
No 4457 27.4 27.4
Yes 11833 72.6 100.0
Total 16290 100.0
† The sample includes all music users, i.e. individuals that either buy,
stream or download. Buyers are defined as individuals that clicked
on at least one legal downloading website during 2011. Streamers
are defined as individuals that clicked on at least one legal streaming
website during 2011. Downloaders are defined as individuals that
clicked on at least one illegal music website during 2011.
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Table 3.2: Monthly Click Activity
Mean N
Active Months Buying Streaming Downloading All N
Country
France 4.81 1.65 3.40 6.49 11.54 40,632
Germany 4.28 1.79 1.33 6.24 9.39 37,092
Italy 4.69 0.37 0.98 7.97 9.35 39,372
Spain 5.97 0.41 2.12 10.38 13.11 43,968
UK 4.46 1.23 2.51 7.99 11.75 34,416
Gender
Female 4.51 1.02 2.06 5.88 9.00 94,704
Male 5.24 1.12 2.09 9.76 13.03 100,776
Age
10-15 3.93 0.65 1.82 3.82 6.30 8,304
16-25 6.00 0.84 3.41 10.46 14.79 24,744
26-30 5.78 1.61 2.86 10.66 15.21 19,884
31-40 5.18 1.04 2.09 8.53 11.72 51,336
41-50 4.66 1.21 1.91 7.40 10.57 46,932
51-60 4.15 0.86 1.29 6.83 9.03 28,056
61-75 3.55 1.01 1.01 3.76 5.79 16,224
Employment
Employed 4.92 1.15 2.03 8.16 11.41 112,452
Out of Labor Force 4.04 0.89 1.71 5.22 7.84 33,300
Self Employed 4.68 1.01 1.24 6.70 9.02 16,500
Student 5.97 0.76 3.09 10.19 14.09 16,656
Unemployed 5.43 1.22 2.93 10.14 14.37 16,572
Education
Primary 4.61 1.40 2.00 7.28 10.73 52,308
Secondary 5.06 0.76 1.91 8.89 11.64 50,796
Terciary 4.95 1.05 2.21 7.66 10.97 92,376
Household Income
Low 5.34 1.24 2.64 9.70 13.68 43,788
Medium 4.88 1.02 1.81 7.81 10.69 121,728
High 4.25 1.01 2.33 5.51 8.87 29,964
Household size
1 - 2 5.00 1.29 2.18 8.40 11.92 98,820
3 - 4 4.80 0.84 1.82 7.39 10.12 79,944
5+ 4.61 0.84 2.66 7.16 10.68 16,716
Children at home
No 5.01 1.16 2.25 8.39 11.86 128,556
Yes 4.65 0.89 1.74 6.89 9.58 66,924
Legal 2.49 0.99 1.58 - 2.58 53,484
Downloader 5.79 1.10 2.26 10.85 14.28 141,996
Non-Streamer 3.51 0.66 - 5.20 5.88 83,736
Streamer 5.92 1.37 3.63 9.89 14.98 111,744
Total 4.88 1.07 2.07 7.88 11.08 195,480
† Buying, Streaming and Downloading clicks are defined as clicks on a legal downloading,
streaming and illegal downloading websites, respectively. Streamers are defined as individ-
uals that clicked on at least one legal streaming music website during 2011. Non streamers
are defined as individuals that never clicked on legal streaming music website. Downloaders
are defined as individuals that clicked on at least one illegal downloading music website dur-
ing 2011. Legals are defined as individuals that never clicked on an illegal music websites.
The figures in the table represent the mean number of monthly clicks.
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Table 3.3: Cross-correlations of number of
clicks
Variables Buying Downloading
Buying 1
Downloading 0.0559∗ 1
Streaming 0.3634∗ 0.0470∗
∗ Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 3.4: Determinants of music consumption, †
Purchase Downloading Streaming
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e.
Female -0.071∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.587∗∗∗ -0.457∗∗∗ -0.016 0.021
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Household size -0.039∗∗ -0.037∗ 0.009 -0.038 -0.004 -0.011
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Medium Income 0.092∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗ -0.022 -0.019 -0.020
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
High Income 0.163∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ -0.296∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ 0.022 -0.001
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Secondary Education 0.004 -0.016 -0.042 0.038 0.063∗∗ 0.057∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Terciary Education 0.034 -0.007 -0.137∗∗∗ -0.036 0.194∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Children at home -0.044∗ -0.046∗ 0.095∗∗ 0.019 -0.045 -0.034
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Out of labor force -0.005 0.003 -0.030 -0.077 -0.069∗ -0.065∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Student 0.021 0.009 0.025 0.010 0.070 0.029
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Unemployed -0.019 0.001 0.010 -0.039 0.025 0.026
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Self Employed -0.017 -0.004 -0.213∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ -0.048 -0.056
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Spain -0.828∗∗∗ -0.772∗∗∗ 1.156∗∗∗ 1.201∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
France -0.132∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗ 0.928∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Italy -0.788∗∗∗ -0.729∗∗∗ 0.919∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗ -0.314∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
UK -0.288∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.022 0.082∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Age: 16-25 0.024 -0.015 0.652∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ -0.155∗ -0.159∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)
Age: 26-30 0.111∗ 0.045 0.435∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)
Age: 31-40 0.102∗ 0.045 0.153∗ 0.427∗∗∗ -0.300∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Age: 41-50 0.088 0.042 -0.051 0.296∗∗∗ -0.371∗∗∗ -0.278∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Age: 51-60 0.035 -0.002 -0.246∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Age: 61-75 0.006 -0.018 -0.678∗∗∗ 0.010 -0.417∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Total online time 0.130∗∗∗ 0.000 0.238∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.020
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Total (log of) clicks on:
Other music websites 0.170∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.4: Determinants of music consumption, †
Purchase Downloading Streaming
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e.
Radio & music video websites 0.083∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ilegal Streaming websites 0.113∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
CD Purchase websites 0.232∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Online store websites 0.053∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Books websites 0.031∗∗∗ 0.006 0.044∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Events websites 0.044∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Movies websites 0.026∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Coupons websites 0.010 0.036∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Instant messaging websites 0.017∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Personal webpage websites 0.019∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Global news websites -0.005 -0.101∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Social Networks websites 0.006 0.006 0.025∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Online gaming websites -0.002 0.059∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Constant -0.694∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ -1.664∗∗∗ 2.076∗∗∗ -1.703∗∗∗ -0.469∗∗
(0.13) (0.16) (0.20) (0.25) (0.14) (0.18)
Adjusted-R2 0.185 0.198 0.237 0.334 0.225 0.243
No. of Obs. 16290 16290 16290 16290 16290 16290
† The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of clicks on legal digital music purchase websites (first column),
illegal digital music downloading websites (second column) and legal digital music streaming websites (third column). All
regressors referring to clicks on a given type of website are in logarithm. Total time online is the logarithm of the total time
spent online during the year, in seconds. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The reference country is Germany.
∗ Significant at the 10% level.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 3.5: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Results, Cross-Section data †
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e.
Illegal download websites 0.064∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Legal Streaming websites 0.140∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female -0.044∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Household size -0.030 -0.038∗∗ -0.038∗∗ -0.038∗∗ -0.039∗∗ -0.035∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Medium Income 0.101∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
High Income 0.175∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Education 0.013 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.012 -0.008
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Children at home -0.050∗ -0.041 -0.046∗ -0.047∗ -0.044∗ -0.044∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Out of labor force -0.012 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.011
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Student 0.030 0.016 0.009 0.009 0.013 0.006
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Unemployed -0.036 -0.025 -0.022 -0.023 -0.021 -0.001
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Self Employed -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.009
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Spain -0.922∗∗∗ -0.867∗∗∗ -0.885∗∗∗ -0.911∗∗∗ -0.897∗∗∗ -0.828∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
France -0.283∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗ -0.244∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Italy -0.823∗∗∗ -0.774∗∗∗ -0.809∗∗∗ -0.811∗∗∗ -0.805∗∗∗ -0.734∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
UK -0.267∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗ -0.289∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -0.297∗∗∗ -0.273∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age: 16-25 -0.002 0.004 0.015 0.013 0.009 -0.025
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Age: 26-30 0.061 0.096 0.127∗∗ 0.124∗∗ 0.116∗ 0.045
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Age: 31-40 0.038 0.089 0.137∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.043
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Age: 41-50 0.046 0.095∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.050
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Age: 51-60 -0.033 0.037 0.096∗ 0.093 0.072 0.006
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Age: 61-75 -0.038 0.024 0.090 0.087 0.066 -0.003
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Total online time 0.193∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Total (log of) clicks on:
Other music websites 0.174∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Results, Cross-Section data †
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e.
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Radio & music video websites 0.069∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ilegal Streaming websites 0.073∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
CD Purchase websites 0.194∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Online store websites 0.052∗∗∗
(0.01)
Books websites 0.026∗∗∗
(0.01)
Events websites 0.042∗∗∗
(0.01)
Movies websites 0.008
(0.01)
Coupons websites 0.010∗
(0.01)
Instant messaging websites 0.012∗∗
(0.01)
Personal webpage websites 0.007
(0.01)
Constant -1.404∗∗∗ -0.899∗∗∗ -0.541∗∗∗ -0.518∗∗∗ -0.486∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15)
Adjusted-R2 0.162 0.186 0.192 0.193 0.197 0.207
No. of Obs. 16290 16290 16290 16290 16290 16290
† The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of clicks on legal digital music purchase websites. All regressors
referring to clicks on a given type of website are in logarithm. Total time online is the logarithm of the total time spent
online during the year, in seconds. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The reference country is Germany.
∗ Significant at the 10% level.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 3.6: Tobit Results, Unconditional Marginal Effects , Cross-Section data †
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e.
Illegal download websites 0.047∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Legal Streaming websites 0.111∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female (d) -0.050∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Household size -0.034∗ -0.042∗∗ -0.042∗∗ -0.041∗∗ -0.042∗∗ -0.037∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Medium Income (d) 0.114∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
High Income (d) 0.207∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Education 0.026∗ 0.019 0.025∗ 0.025∗ 0.025∗ 0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Children at home (d) -0.057∗∗ -0.049∗ -0.054∗∗ -0.056∗∗ -0.053∗ -0.056∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Out of labor force (d) -0.013 0.004 0.012 0.011 0.006 0.013
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Student (d) 0.039 0.022 0.015 0.013 0.017 0.015
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Unemployed (d) -0.052 -0.040 -0.037 -0.039 -0.038 -0.014
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Self Employed (d) -0.012 -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 -0.011 0.004
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Spain (d) -0.796∗∗∗ -0.758∗∗∗ -0.771∗∗∗ -0.802∗∗∗ -0.794∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
France (d) -0.224∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Italy (d) -0.708∗∗∗ -0.675∗∗∗ -0.701∗∗∗ -0.703∗∗∗ -0.700∗∗∗ -0.641∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
UK (d) -0.193∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age: 16-25 (d) -0.032 -0.021 -0.010 -0.012 -0.016 -0.061
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Age: 26-30 (d) 0.013 0.051 0.086 0.082 0.075 -0.013
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Age: 31-40 (d) -0.018 0.037 0.089 0.086 0.073 -0.016
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Age: 41-50 (d) -0.009 0.043 0.093 0.090 0.074 -0.006
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Age: 51-60 (d) -0.103∗ -0.034 0.028 0.022 0.006 -0.067
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Age: 61-75 (d) -0.083 -0.023 0.046 0.041 0.024 -0.049
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Total online time 0.237∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Total (log of) clicks on:
Continued on next page
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Table 3.6: Tobit Results, Unconditional Marginal Effects , Cross-Section data †
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e.
Other music websites 0.161∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Radio & music video websites 0.072∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ilegal Streaming websites 0.116∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
CD Purchase websites 0.140∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Online store websites 0.069∗∗∗
(0.01)
Books websites 0.021∗∗∗
(0.01)
Events websites 0.045∗∗∗
(0.01)
Movies websites 0.015∗
(0.01)
Coupons websites 0.006
(0.01)
Instant messaging websites 0.014∗∗∗
(0.01)
Personal webpage websites 0.006
(0.01)
No. of Obs. 16290 16290 16290 16290 16290 16290
† The table presents unconditional marginal effects. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of clicks on legal
digital music purchase websites. All regressors referring to clicks on a given type of website are in logarithm. Total time
online is the logarithm of the total time spent online during the year, in seconds. (d)= dummy variable. Robust standard
errors are in parenthesis. The reference country is Germany.
∗ Significant at the 10% level.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 3.7: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Results, monthly data †
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e.
Illegal download websites 0.045∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Legal Streaming websites 0.105∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female -0.016∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Household size -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Medium Income 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
High Income 0.020∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Children at home -0.014∗∗ -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.009
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Out of labor force 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Student 0.007 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.008
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Unemployed -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Self Employed 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
January 0.040∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
February 0.014∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
March 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
April 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
May -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
June 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
August -0.011∗∗ -0.008∗ -0.008∗ -0.008∗ -0.008∗ -0.009∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
September -0.017∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
October 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
November -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.014∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
December 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age: 16-25 0.015 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.004
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age: 26-30 0.037∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗
Continued on next page
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Table 3.7: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Results, monthly data †
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e.
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age: 31-40 0.020 0.038∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age: 41-50 0.020 0.038∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age: 51-60 -0.001 0.023∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.015
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age: 61-75 -0.002 0.025∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.020
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Total online time 0.022∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Total (log of) clicks on:
Other music websites 0.082∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Radio & music video websites 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ilegal Streaming websites 0.007 0.006 0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CD Purchase websites 0.174∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Online store websites 0.012∗∗∗
(0.00)
Books websites 0.014∗∗∗
(0.00)
Events websites 0.007∗∗∗
(0.00)
Movies websites 0.005∗∗∗
(0.00)
Coupons websites 0.004∗∗∗
(0.00)
Instant messaging websites 0.006∗∗∗
(0.00)
Personal webpage websites 0.004∗
(0.00)
Constant -0.198∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Adjusted-R2 0.059 0.081 0.083 0.083 0.085 0.089
No. of Obs. 195478 195478 195478 195478 195478 195478
† The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of clicks on legal digital music purchase websites. All regressors
referring to clicks on a given type of website are in logarithm. Total time online is the logarithm of the total time spent online
during the month, in seconds. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the individual level. All specifications
include regional dummies. The reference month is July.
∗ Significant at the 10% level.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 3.8: Tobit Results, Unconditional Marginal Effects monthly data †
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e.
Illegal download websites 0.024∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Legal Streaming websites 0.040∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female (d) -0.014∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Household size -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Medium Income (d) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
High Income (d) 0.030∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education 0.005∗∗ 0.003 0.004∗ 0.004∗ 0.004∗ 0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Children at home (d) -0.010∗∗ -0.008∗ -0.009∗ -0.009∗ -0.009∗ -0.010∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Out of labor force (d) -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Student (d) 0.007 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Unemployed (d) -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Self Employed (d) -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
January (d) 0.030∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
February (d) 0.010∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
March (d) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
April (d) 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
May (d) -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
June (d) 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
August (d) -0.012∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
September (d) -0.016∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
October (d) 0.005 0.007∗ 0.008∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.005
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
November (d) -0.007∗ -0.007∗ -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.010∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
December (d) 0.020∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age: 16-25 (d) -0.000 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 -0.000
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.8: Tobit Results, Unconditional Marginal Effects monthly data †
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e.
Age: 26-30 (d) 0.007 0.020∗ 0.024∗ 0.024∗ 0.023∗ 0.016
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age: 31-40 (d) -0.007 0.010 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.008
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age: 41-50 (d) -0.007 0.009 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.008
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age: 51-60 (d) -0.018∗ 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age: 61-75 (d) -0.014 0.007 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.010
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Total online time 0.045∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Total (log of) clicks on:
Other music websites 0.041∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Radio & music video websites 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ilegal Streaming websites 0.013∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CD Purchase websites 0.036∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Online store websites 0.009∗∗∗
(0.00)
Books websites 0.005∗∗∗
(0.00)
Events websites 0.001
(0.00)
Movies websites 0.007∗∗∗
(0.00)
Coupons websites 0.001
(0.00)
Instant messaging websites 0.002
(0.00)
Personal webpage websites 0.000
(0.00)
Constant
sigma
Constant
No. of Obs. 195478 195478 195478 195478 195478 195478
† The table presents unconditional marginal effects. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of clicks on legal
digital music purchase websites. All regressors referring to clicks on a given type of website are in logarithm. Total time
online is the logarithm of the total time spent online during the month, in seconds. (d)= dummy variable. Standard errors
are in parenthesis and clustered at the individual level. All specifications include regional dummies. The reference month
is July.
∗ Significant at the 10% level.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 3.9: Fixed Effects Estimation †
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e.
Illegal download websites 0.036∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Legal Streaming websites 0.067∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Total online time 0.017∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Total (log of) clicks on:
Other music websites 0.061∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Radio & music video websites 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ilegal Streaming websites 0.018∗∗ 0.017∗ 0.016∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CD Purchase websites 0.103∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Online store websites 0.008∗∗∗
(0.00)
Books websites 0.008∗∗∗
(0.00)
Events websites 0.003∗
(0.00)
Movies websites 0.010∗∗∗
(0.00)
Coupons websites 0.007∗∗∗
(0.00)
Instant messaging websites 0.011∗∗∗
(0.00)
Personal webpage websites 0.003∗∗
(0.00)
Constant -0.052∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted-R2 0.018 0.029 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.034
No. of Obs. 195478 195478 195478 195478 195478 195478
† The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of clicks on legal digital music purchase websites. All regressors
referring to clicks on a given type of website are in logarithm. Total time online is the logarithm of the total time spent
online during the month, in seconds. All specifications include monthly fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis
and clustered at the individual level.
∗ Significant at the 10% level.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 3.10: Fixed Effects Results, country interactions †
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e.
Illegal download websites 0.053∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Illegal download×Spain -0.030∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Illegal download×France 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Illegal download×Italy -0.031∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Illegal download×UK -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Legal Streaming websites 0.081∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Legal streaming×Spain -0.038∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Legal streaming×France 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Legal streaming×Italy -0.027∗ -0.027∗ -0.028∗∗ -0.029∗∗ -0.029∗∗ -0.029∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Legal streaming×UK -0.018 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.018
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Total online time 0.017∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Total (log of) clicks on:
Other music websites 0.061∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Radio & music video websites 0.030∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ilegal Streaming websites 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CD Purchase websites 0.102∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Online store websites 0.008∗∗∗
(0.00)
Books websites 0.009∗∗∗
(0.00)
Events websites 0.003∗
(0.00)
Movies websites 0.010∗∗∗
(0.00)
Coupons websites 0.007∗∗∗
(0.00)
Instant messaging websites 0.011∗∗∗
(0.00)
Personal webpage websites 0.003∗∗
(0.00)
Constant -0.052∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted-R2 0.019 0.030 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.035
Continued on next page
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Table 3.10: Fixed Effects Results, country interactions †
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e.
No. of Obs. 195478 195478 195478 195478 195478 195478
† The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of clicks on legal digital music purchase websites. All regressors
referring to clicks on a given type of website are in logarithm. Total time online is the logarithm of the total time spent
online during the month, in seconds. All specifications include monthly fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis
and clustered at the individual level.
∗ Significant at the 10% level.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 3.11: Fixed Effects Results, interaction with music interest †
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e. Coef./s.e.
Illegal download websites 0.022∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Illegal download x Other music websites 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Illegal download x Radio & music videos 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.00) (0.00)
Legal Streaming websites 0.049∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Legal streaming x Other music websites 0.014∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Legal streaming x Radio & music videos 0.012∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Total online time 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Total (log of) clicks on:
Other music websites 0.051∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Radio & music video websites 0.024∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ilegal Streaming websites 0.016∗ 0.014 0.011 0.011
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CD Purchase websites 0.100∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Online store websites 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Books websites 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Events websites 0.003∗ 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Movies websites 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Coupons websites 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Instant messaging websites 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Personal webpage websites 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.003∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.015∗∗ -0.016∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted-R2 0.034 0.035 0.036 0.036
No. of Obs. 195478 195478 195478 195478
† The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of clicks on legal digital music purchase websites.
All regressors referring to clicks on a given type of website are in logarithm. Total time online is the
logarithm of the total time spent online during the month, in seconds. All specifications include monthly
fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the individual level.
∗ Significant at the 10% level.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1% level.
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 N = 16290
 
 Buyers 
 Streamers
 (57 %)
 (57 %)
 (73 %)
 Downloaders
 1205
 7 %
 1486
 9 %
 1766
 11 %
 4258
 26 %
 3221
 20 %
 1991
 12 %
 2363
 15 %
Figure 3.1: Composition of the sample by types of music consumer.
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